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GENERAL ON TNF, BUNDESWEHR ROLE IN NATO

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 8 Oct 80 p 14

Interview with Commanding General, III Corps, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Altenburg by Ulrich Mackensen: "Armed Forces Not To Be Last Redoubts of Obsolete Leadership Concepts"⁷

Text⁷ Wolfgang Altenburg joined the Bundeswehr as a recruit in 1956. While serving as a major on the general staff in the mid-sixties, he found time in addition to his military duties for translating Truman Capote's "Grass Harp." He was subsequently assigned as battalion and brigade commander and as department head in the defense ministry and at NATO. From the end of 1978 until 30 September 1980 Altenburg served as German representative on the NATO military committee. Since 1 October the 52 year-old lieutenant general has held the post of commanding general, III Corps in Koblenz. In an interview with FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU editor Ulrich Mackensen, Altenburg comments on Bundeswehr and NATO matters.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: Mr Altenburg, what kind of reputation does the Bundeswehr have at NATO?

Altenburg: A very good reputation. And that is as it should be, since the Bundeswehr is one of the most important elements in the defense of Central Europe. The territory, which occupies a key position in the geo-strategic sense as well, must be held not only by us but also by our partners. If we expect our partners truly to commit themselves, then the contribution we ourselves make must be an exceptional one.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: Does this also apply to the military role of the Bundeswehr in Central Europe?

Altenburg: By all means. Our forces have very modern equipment; they are very well trained. At first glance, we would appear to be encountering problems in motivating young people for national defense. But this is not a problem peculiar to the Bundeswehr; it is endemic to society and is not restricted to Germany. As a

matter of fact, many democracies are confronted with the same problem of convincing young people of the need to serve their country which does a lot for them.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: In visiting other NATO member countries, like Great Britain or the United States, one gets the impression that officers concerned with guidance, political education and personnel matters have a good deal of understanding for the way this is being handled in the Bundeswehr. How do you feel other NATO countries view the integration of the Bundeswehr into the social life of the FRG?

Altenburg: The top officers of other armies had just as difficult a time grasping what we meant by guidance and moral leadership as our own troops did at first. But, the more you deal with it and with what it should mean in a practical sense, the more you realize that it is inconceivable in this day and age to command troops without it. You must not forget that the alliance comprises the armed forces of 14 different countries, excluding Iceland. They are --as they must be-- all different as regards hierarchical order, leadership principles and leadership structures in their armed forces. Meantime, it seems to me, many armies are envious of the progress we have made as a result of our moral leadership programs. They have realized that we can no longer demand unconditional obedience but that we must, in fact, appeal to the individual soldier's understanding and sense of responsibility. They also realize that the armed forces cannot remain a last redoubt of leadership concepts which society-at-large has long since discarded as obsolete. Otherwise, the outcome would be the very thing we are trying to avoid-- to permit the armed forces to become a state within the state which can never be integrated and, as a consequence, never be supported by the citizenry.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: The policy of the FRG and of the entire alliance is based on the twin concepts of defense and detente, including arms control. Did you get the impression in Brussels that not only the U.S. government but also its top military leaders support this policy?

Altenburg: They do. Of course, it was a learning process for all because detente first had to gain acceptability in the minds of military men as one of the bases of security policy. And the military men, including those of other countries, have come to realize this even if to a certain extent it was difficult to do so. They accepted it because they knew that (a) rising costs were no longer supportable and that one would have to try and attain equal security at a lower level. Another reason why they accepted it was that they feel that a huge military potential on both sides which is concentrated in a narrow geographic area in itself creates tension. The very volume of power, thus concentrated, must be defused.

I think that most of them have also realized in the meantime that the purpose of maintaining armed forces is not to aim for conquest or to force an adversary to accept one's will but very simply to prevent war.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: The United States and the Soviet Union are to open negotiations soon on medium-range weapons. The Soviets want to see forward based systems nuclear submarines and carrier aircraft included in these negotiations. How does Brussels feel about this ?

Altenburg: First of all, it was to be expected that the Soviet Union would want the forward based systems included. Secondly: the Soviet Union has intensified its buildup in the very medium-range field not covered by SALT and MBFR over the past few years. We have taken note of this and decided to do something about correcting the disproportionate situation in the medium-range field. At the same time, we will couple it with an arms control proposal to defer implementation, modernization and stationing until such time as it should prove impossible to clear up the situation through negotiations with the Soviet Union. All this opposition to NATO with regard to the medium-range weapons decisions is quite incomprehensible because NATO has no plans at present for putting the missiles in place. If we do not create certain technical conditions as we are empowered to do by the NATO decision of 12 December 1979, we would have lost a lot of time, if the negotiations do not succeed. We also think it would be good to have an ace up our sleeve as we deal with the Soviets.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: In other words, Mr Altenburg, as the FRG's former representative on the military committee, you are going on the assumption that the dual decision will find full support ?

Altenburg: I have been active in military affairs for a great many years. It would be disappointing to me, if our dual decision of putting forward an arms control proposal while preparing for modernization would not be as clearly understood in our own camp as it appears to have been by the Soviet Union. The fact is that the Soviets talked to the chancellor about it when he was in Moscow and at last appeared ready to negotiate as we hoped they would be.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: Turning to NATO's so-called long term defense program which calls for a long-range buildup of fighting strength-- can this program be realized in view of the financial problems some member countries are encountering ? Where do you perceive weaknesses, if any ?

Altenburg: The long-term defense program concerns itself in the main with enhancing our conventional defense capability. Our point of departure is that overall deterrent strategy becomes credible, if a potential aggressor views our conventional capability as a risk. The subsequent deterrents which, we hope, need never be employed become credible, if an aggressor realizes that he begins to run risks at the very lowest threshold. For a good many years, however, we have not been as active in the conventional field as we ought to have been. I am not speaking of the FRG in particular because, as it happens, we have done a lot; although it is a moot point whether we have really done enough. The long-term defense program is extraordinarily expensive because arms have increased in price even more than consumer goods generally. One must realize that it is only natural in a democracy --which would not be worth defending otherwise-- for the budgets of various departments such as defense, social welfare and education to name but a few, to compete with one another. It would be bad if it were otherwise. One must also realize that defense only makes sense if there is inner stability. Some countries spend a great deal on national defense at the expense of inner stability. Under such conditions, national defense no longer makes sense. The long-term defense program is designed to correct weaknesses in the potential for absorbing conventional reinforcements from overseas. One must realize that operational depth in Central Europe is minimal. To be able to defend it, the available forces must arrive in the potential combat zone at a very early stage-- at our frontiers where we would expect an aggressor to attack. If they arrive too late, it need not spell the end of the entire alliance; but our vital interests, those of the FRG, would meantime have been damaged. The absorption of overseas reinforcements only makes sense if their heavy equipment has been brought over and stored ahead of time and if combat-ready units are flown in and there is no need for building up logistic support from scratch. That would be too expensive. Another very expensive program is that of modernizing air defenses such as could be used in a territory directly adjacent to a border vulnerable to enemy attack and which would still be meaningful in view of the speed of today's aircraft, the early warning systems as well as the time needed to prepare and institute defensive measures. This calls for very complicated modern electronic equipment which is also very expensive. If one limits oneself to the priorities which are important for the attainment of the primary goal of deterrence through defense capability and if one dispenses with anything beyond that, then we should be able to finance the program.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: The NATO guidelines calling for an annual increase in defense budgets by 3 percent in real terms which is hard enough to attain were rather optimistic. Is the alliance not disturbed by the fact that Belgium, for example, does not have the means this year to take part in the "Autumn Forge" exercise, that

Denmark is running into problems and that we in the FRG are feeling the financial pinch of providing for weapons systems of the next generation and considering the construction of a new fighter aircraft?

Altenburg: You are right in speaking of the 3 percent guidelines. In fact, the FRG has fulfilled the 3 percent requirement. As a matter of fact, I am not happy about this 3 percent business. If one wants to get at a real figure, one would have to know the exact inflation rate in all of the countries as applied to armaments-- and that is very hard to come by. Any given sum total will be correct only if the individual numbers are correct. That does not apply in this case which means that the whole thing is of doubtful value. But we went along with the alliance recommendations in this instance because as the main contributor we did not wish to set a bad example. The other member countries, some of which you have just mentioned, are going to find it difficult to raise their defense expenditures according to the needs of the alliance and the nature of the threat because we are more and more getting into a situation where the significance of the latent threat is not being recognized. We are in the happy position of having enjoyed 35 years of peace-- among other things because security is being maintained in the area for which the alliance is responsible and which we wish under no circumstances to extend on the basis of everyone's being aware that an aggression would involve excessive risks. If some of the member countries now lower this threshold, they must recognize that their problems will increase rather than decrease as a result.

In Essence, FRG Must Rely on Army

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: You have just said that the responsibilities of the alliance should under no circumstances be extended. But the United States ~~has~~ taken on additional ones as for instance by promulgating the Carter Doctrine which declared the Persian Gulf to be part of the American sphere of influence. Does Washington now expect us to make a stronger contribution?

Altenburg: I am not sure one can say that the United States ~~has~~ taken on this additional burden of their own volition or whether developments in the Middle East which are of particular importance for our welfare and the stability of all our countries are such that one could say the United States saddled themselves with this burden. The situation there has developed in such a way that we simply could not turn our backs on it. On the one hand, I think, one should make it clear that one has interests in that area and on the other hand, I am in favor of that being done militarily by countries which traditionally maintain forces there and which show the flag. But I am against countries which are not as a rule represented in the area suddenly showing up with ships and engaging in

what would inevitably be construed as gunboat diplomacy. There is no contradiction here. But if I said that the United States or France or Great Britain for example should commit themselves there, it would be unfair to ask them to do this for me while I sit this one out, knowing full well that my interests are at stake, too. The Americans of course assume that the alliance will compensate for the additional services they perform and we are prepared to do this. But, in accordance with our constitution and our own defense interests, we wish to do so where a direct relationship exists to the defense of our territory-- in the maritime context, for example, to protect the last stage of the trans-Atlantic communications line which is to say in the extended North Sea area. I do not think anyone can accuse us of overstepping the bounds of our own defense interests, if we concern ourselves to a greater extent with the protection of sea lanes in the North Sea and adjacent waters. But it is even more important that we commit ourselves primarily in those areas where our interests are directly affected. And that concerns our ground forces, in the defense of our territory.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: Does this point to a greater division of labor within the alliance with the FRG placing more of an emphasis on ground forces in addition to the naval units you have just mentioned?

Altenburg: If I now include a political proviso in my answer to your question, that does not alter the underlying meaning of what you said. We must continue to have a display of solidarity along our borders with troops of as many member countries stationed there as possible. Under no circumstances do we want to see the present minimum presence of member country forces along our borders reduced even further. But we will have to adjust our thinking to the possibility of a crisis simultaneously erupting in the Middle East and in Central Europe which would mean that the United States could not dispatch reinforcements to Europe to the extent to which some of us might hope. And as for us, we will have to concentrate on what is needed to have conventional defense capability, which is another way of saying ground forces, available along our borders in time.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: Large-scale exercises are needed to test out this timely presence as well as cooperation and integration of member country forces in order to have each country accept its share of the overall responsibility. From the NATO viewpoint, how well does cooperation between the various general staffs, the different training systems and different command structures work in practice?

Altenburg: The higher the level of the staffs, the better it works. I still see very definite problems in the area of interoperability which is to say the cooperation between different units in a combat situation. It disturbs me to think that a simple problem such as establishing communications traffic between two armored battalions of different nationality in a combat situation has not yet been solved. We cannot honestly say we have covered ourselves with glory in this regard. As soon as we move on up to the staff level, things improve considerably because of the language capabilities and joint training experiences. Cooperation is already possible at the division level and poses no problems. I mean to say from the division level on up there are no problems. At the brigade level, it is feasible; at any level below that, it is difficult. But it would seem that any mixing of units below the brigade level ought to be avoided anyway. But where the are neighboring units, even the lower levels will have to collaborate. Now let me point out a concrete example for concentrating on the improvement of ground forces on our territory. The Americans are capable of transferring substantial air force units to Europe in a very short time. The Americans are practicing this very carefully not only as applies to the individual pilot but also to organizational detail and operational management in a manner that is impressive. This also includes the use of tanker airplanes which make it possible to fly entire squadrons across the Atlantic in a matter of hours. That is a very real reinforcement capability for Europe which can be available very quickly in case of need. On the other hand, I do not have to point out what a big problem it is to transport armor, artillery and the like across the Atlantic. Plans for such an eventuality and organizational details can be devised, but it takes a lot of time. All of this means that it makes sense to concentrate on those items that are needed in combat right away and to count on my own air force units being reinforced in very short order by those of the allies. I do not mean to imply that we do not need any air force units of our own in Germany because we would then lose our position of autarky which permits us to mount our own national defense in a variety of ways. I am merely speaking of establishing priorities. And if one feels one wants to spend a great deal of money on an air force anyway for whatever reasons which need not necessarily concern the armed forces as such, one will have to think about how to finance this item and about where to find the money for it.

FRANKFUTTER RUNDSCHAU: Nonetheless, there will have to be a priority established somewhere during the next decade. You have already said that there is a need for additional naval protection in the North Sea. And you have said that the army must be capable of doing its job even if two conflicts arise simultaneously. If one relates this to demands such as are again being raised for new fighter aircraft and the like-- where is the money supposed to come from? As a military expert, what do you think of these demands?

Altenburg: I am glad you did not ask me as an army officer or as the commanding general of an army corps. I think we will have to take the concept of the division of responsibilities within the alliance much more seriously-- above all because we are faced with a vast explosion in certain technical fields and because the primary task assigned to our armed forces is becoming clearer and more unmistakable as a result of the type of defense program we have.

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GOVERNMENT RESTUFFLED, NEW MINISTERS LISTED

Nicosia (CEN) in Greek 12-18 Sep 80 p 20

Text] At midnight of Tuesday, 10 September, and upon completion of the 30-month service needed for pensioning ministers as a recent law provides, President of the Republic of Cyprus Spyros Kypriacos announced a broad reshuffling of his government. The official announcement with the names of the new ministers was made at 5 minutes past midnight but the press was notified by the Office of Information at 2340 or 25 minutes before the announcement.

With this reshuffling, seven ministers were replaced, six new ones were appointed, three kept their ministerial positions, one deputy minister was promoted to minister, and the Ministry of Education was abolished.

The ministers leaving the government are: Dr. Sofianos (Education), G. Ioannidis (Ministry to the President), P. Michalidis (Justice), A. Papageorgiou (Commerce and Industry), A. Theodoulou (Labor and Social Insurance), M. Iliadis (Communications and Works), and Dr. A. Mikellidis (Health). Those remaining are: N. Rolandis (Foreign Affairs), Dr. Venizelis (Interior), and A. Avramidis (Finance).

According to reports, the main reason for the government reorganization is that the ministers leaving the government have completed the period of service necessary for their pensioning as the law voted recently by the House of Representatives provides. The ministers who left the government have completed this period of service--30 months--having been sworn in on 9 September 1976. They are: M. Iliadis (Communications and Works), A. Theodoulou (Labor and Social Insurance), A. Papageorgiou (Commerce and Industry), P. Michalidis (Justice), and Kotsiostafanou (Education deputy minister).

The seven newly appointed ministers are:

Ministry of Education: Nicosia Kotsiostafanou, Salonic University professor, former rector.

Ministry of Communications and Works: Georgios Kotsaikostas, civil engineer and International bank counselor.

Ministry of Commerce and Industry: Konstandinos Kitis, director general of "Karreras" Cyprus.

Ministry of Labor: Georgeos Kavranakis, chief judge of a Nicosia district court.

Ministry of Justice: Andreas Dimitriadis, lawyer and chairman of the Paphos District Democratic Party Committee.

Ministry of Agriculture: Nikos Pattikis, former minister of communications and works and Limassol mayor.

Ministry to the President: Stelios Kotsiris, former deputy minister of interior.

Ministry of Health: Georgios Tombazos, former minister of agriculture and natural resources.

Petros Stylianou, director of the Struggle Museum, was appointed deputy minister of interior.

Minister of Education N. Kotsiris was in Cyprus when the reshuffling took place, while Minister of Communications and Works G. Kotsiris was in the United States.

The new members of the Ministerial Council were sworn in on Wednesday, 11 September, at 1700 hours. According to exclusive information President Spyriacos himself made direct contact with the appointees. He did not update or exchange views with any of his colleagues nor with the leadership of the Democratic Party, nor the president of the House of Representatives Alekos Michailidis or any minister or deputy. No one knew anything about the reshuffling until Tuesday at midnight when the announcement was made.

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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED IN TALKS

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 28 Sep 80 pp 1, 4

(Text) Nicosia: Ambassador Suat Bilge who is also a high level consultant for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been sent to Nicosia by the Ministry and has begun his work concerning the intercommunal talks. Suat Bilge has been involved in the preparation of the Republic of Cyprus Constitution adopted in 1960 and has had recent talks in Nicosia with the President of the TPNC, Rauf Denktas and with the Turkish Ambassador to Nicosia.

The constitution of a prospective Federal Republic of Cyprus will be a topic of discussion at the meeting next Wednesday between the sides represented in the intercommunal talks. The meeting will take place in the Ledra Palace Hotel. The intercommunal talks have the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Cyprus.

Greek Cypriot sources are saying that it is the turn of the TPNC delegate to present during the course of next week's meeting written proposals concerning the constitution. On the Turkish side, sources close to Turkish representative Onan are leaving unanswered any questions involving this matter.

Ambassador Bilge who has begun his work at the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia and who has met earlier with representatives from the Turkish Press, had earlier denied rumors that he was being appointed to replace Professor Hümzü Soysal. Instead, he has said that his visits and contacts are the continuation of a visit to Nicosia by Foreign Minister İlter Turkaan during the latter's tenure as Secretary General of the Ministry.

While work concerning the constitution continued in the Turkish Sector, in the Greek Cypriot Sector an emergency meeting of the Greek Cypriot Advisory Council has been called for 16:00 hours on Monday by Kipriano, the leader of the Greek Cypriot Community. The meeting will focus on developments concerning the talks.

The newspaper "Ta Nea" published in the Greek Cypriot section of Nicosia has drawn attention to the fact that during his conversation with Turkish newsmen Ambassador Suat Bilge said that:

"It is out of the question that Turkey and Greece participate in the talks at this stage, however this matter could be reconsidered in the event of agreement between the two communities."

The newspaper has claimed that "in a roundabout way Turkey has raised the issue of Turkey's and Greece's participation in the talks."

OPENING SESSION OF TPSC ASSEMBLY EXAMINED

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 2 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

(Article by Ergun Aydogan)

(Text) The Federated Assembly convened yesterday at 15:15 hours for the first session of the fifth legislative year of its first term. The session lasted only 20 minutes. Before the meeting, Oguz Ramadan who is the chairman of the assembly entered the empty assembly room. He surveyed his surroundings, straightened some curtains and left the room to tell some attendants that the dusty clock in the assembly needed to be set.

Starting at 15:10 hours the representatives began to take their seats. Among the first to enter the assembly room was Ismet Katak from the Democratic People's Party who sparred with Mehmet Ozturk from the National Unity Party for the duration of the session. On several occasions Katak told Ozturk: "It appears that you brought about the complete disruption of the Minor Convention. Why don't you tell us what it was all about so that we could print it in our magazine?"

Democratic People's Party Representative Osman Orek noted that the gallery for spectators was empty at the time he took his seat and the session was scheduled to begin. He muttered to himself: "The gallery is empty. For whom are we to put on this show?"

Interior and Housing Minister Recep Ali Gurler was the most talkative and feisty participant in the 20 minute meeting. When Dervis Eroglu entered the assembly room, very many individuals were heard to tease him with statements like "here is the handsomest man of the Assembly." Dr. Eroglu responded to these compliments with broad smiles.

Chairman Korhan took his place at the pulpit and opened the session with a brief statement. In his talk, Korhan said that the preceding years had not been productive, and that the committees as well as the General Council had not functioned at the desired level or volume. He also said that he hoped that this year would be taken seriously, that work would be done to resolve the needs and the sufferings of the people and that his best wishes went out for the success of the assembly.

Following Korhan's talk, National Unity Party Representative Raif Denktas rose on a point of parliamentary procedure and came to the pulpit. He evoked the name of God in the Islamic tradition and stated the following:

"Honorable chairman, we have listened to your advice. Tomorrow, the press will examine this advice and will condemn us, the representatives. However the question is not what the honorable chairman states it to be. What is preventing us representatives from working is the internal charter of the assembly. This charter is in need of revision. With this internal charter, this assembly can function no better than it has in past years."

As Raif Denktas left the pulpit, Chairman Korhan replied: "Honorable Denktas, that is a matter of opinion."

Following this and in keeping with procedure, the assembly took up the task of electing secretaries and administrators. Ata Atun and Raif Denktas who are both from the National Unity Party had their names placed in nomination for the secretarial vacancies.

The first ballot was held for the purpose of electing Ata Atun. It was noted during the balloting that Vedat Celik, Tansel Pikri, Mustafa Haciahmetoglu, Irsen Kucuk, Umit Onan, Semsiz Kazim and Kenan Atakol were not at the meeting. It was determined that Umit Onan was away at the intercommunal talks and that Kenan Atakol had gone to the UN. Irsen Kucuk, Vedat Celik and Tansel Pikri entered the assembly room during the vote count. Balloting for the election of Ata Atun yielded 17 affirmative, 13 negative and 2 abstaining votes.

Following this, balloting was held for the purpose of electing Raif Denktas. He received 20 affirmative, 13 negative and 3 abstaining votes. Since neither candidate could secure the necessary 21 affirmative votes they could not be elected. When the time came to elect administrators, no willing candidates could be found. In view of this, Chairman Oguz Ramadan Korhan declared the meeting adjourned.

The next session of the Federated Assembly will take place at 15:00 hours on Thursday, October 9.

9491
CSO: 4907

LIFTING EMBARGO SEEN VITAL TO PEACE EFFORTS

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 29 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Nicosia: Mustafa Cagatay who is Prime Minister and Chairman General of the National Unity Party has said that a removal by Greek Cypriots of the embargo imposed by them on the Turkish side would facilitate the creation of a long awaited atmosphere of peace on the island and improve prospects for a political solution. Speaking yesterday at the Minor Convention of the National Unity Party, Mustafa Cagatay once again stated that intercommunal talks were the only acceptable format for the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

Indicating that the Turkish side was demonstrating goodwill in participating in the latest round of the intercommunal talks, Cagatay stated that a similar attitude was being expected from the Greek Cypriot side. Prime Minister Mustafa Cagatay said that in proposals presented during Wednesday's talks, the Turkish side had requested an end to the embargo imposed by the Greek Cypriots and added that such an end to the embargo could bring about a long awaited atmosphere of peace to the island.

Cagatay stated that the socio-economic difficulties experienced by the Turkish Community were based on the fact that no political solution had yet been found to the Cyprus problem. Cagatay said that the Federated State had been economically isolated by the Greek Cypriot side which through blackmail, threats and pressure tactics has been undermining all attempts by the Federated State to establish economic and political ties with other nations. Mustafa Cagatay declared that another reason for the economic difficulties lay in the adverse impact that economic crises in the World and in Turkey were having on an economy placed under embargo. He said:

"The fact that we use the same monetary unit as Turkey is preventing us from making a realistic determination of our economic policy. As a result, each crisis in Turkey is reflected in amplified form within our weaker structure. Our steadfastness in sharing with the Turkish mother land issues that bring pride as well as issues that cause concern is once again being demonstrated. In consequence, as we struggle to surmount the economic adversities confronting our own state, we also await with profound anticipation the arrival of prosperous days for the economy of Turkey. There is no doubt that Turkey's progress towards prosperity will become an important factor in the surmounting of our own economic difficulties."

Prime Minister Cagatay appealed to the opposition for its cooperation in defending the interests of the Turkish community and its help in bringing an end to the difficult period being experienced by the community. In his talk, Cagatay who is Prime Minister and Chairman General of the National Unity Party referred to the Iraq-Iran conflict and stated that the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus would also be affected by a prospective oil crisis stemming from higher oil production costs brought about by the conflict.

9491
CSO: 4907

DISPLACED CHILDREN AFFECTED PSYCHOLOGICALLY

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 11 et 80 p 5

Article by Varvara Lassaridis: "As the Hope for Their Return Fades, the Problems Dangerously Increase."

Text According to a recent report by the Social Welfare Service ~~TKO~~, the Turkish invasion increased by 85 percent the behavior and psychological problems of children and young men and women. Many of the 2,000 "special cases" handled by IAK social workers come from refugee families and in their majority are among the 1,000 orphans--children separated from their families or living in "painful ignorance of whether their fathers are dead or alive."

The report warns that if this unstable situation continues, the impact in most cases from such a perpetuating dramatic experience will be dangerous to the present and future adjustment of the children.

IKE offers assistance to affected families and their children--advisory, psychological, social, or financial assistance as the case may be. "We know," states the report, "that there are cases where the families are dissuaded by traditional pride from seeking or accepting state intervention through a social worker."

According to recent statistics, 136 cases of children and young adults are in a temporary trial period, 1,777 cases under "preventive supervision" by the Welfare Service, 140 children are in foster families, and 29 in youth hostels. From a scientific and sociological point of view most of these cases are considered a natural consequence of the war and the subsequent displacement of people, including children.

The report states that with the passing of each year the problems become greater because the social and psychological strength of the Cypriot society begins to weaken. To stop the lurking danger or at least to limit it, the Welfare Service uses protective and remedial measures. Wherever possible the treatment is done in the person's familiar family environment. In the meantime, the report points out, the need is imperative for a further study of the problem and for more money for training more personnel for implementing the family welfare programs and the child protection programs. The report concludes:

"The young people can be the hope or the curse of the future depending on whether we do or do not take the proper measures in support of the future citizens of our country."

According to Social Welfare Director Takis Konis, the more their hopes for return fade the greater the problems become. "Children who were infants or were born in camps are now attending schools. They are facing life. At first, these children lived in tents, then in shanties, and finally in cement houses. This arrangement solved the housing problem but not that of the family shelter in its real sense.

Konis said that the children who attended elementary school when they lived in shanties are now young adults. Before the invasion they lived in the protected environment of the society and of the family with its close ties. "Now," added Konis, "their environment is often unknown and some youngsters react to their anxiety either by keeping to themselves or by becoming aggressive."

"There is also less social control in the sense of community or neighborhood supervision because many old communities have disappeared. The environment also has now become less disciplined and it is easier for one to go out and cause trouble."

Konis pointed out also that many refugee families "are doing well" in their new environment and in their totality they were very favorably received by the non-refugee community. In some cases, however, the family broke up under great mental anguish and this affected the behavior of some children. To help develop the sense of community in refugee settlements the Welfare Service established community centers, youth centers, and infant care stations in order to promote social reconstruction and develop a community symbol.

According to Konis, the Cypriot family has traditionally had close ties and the women particularly drew psychological strength from such ties when they faced displacement and were thus able to develop households in their tents. "Many women would have disintegrated (under such conditions). On the contrary, and despite the fact that they lost their homes and were dealt painful blows, the Cypriot women promptly set up households in their tents with gardens and flowers outside.

"They have had to bring up children in tents where, even under normal conditions, such a task has its agonies and tediums. The refugee conditions have made this task even more difficult."

The fact that the number of children who were seriously affected psychologically and socially is not greater, speaks very highly of the Cypriot women as well as of the social services such as those offered by the Social Welfare Service.

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NEW UNEMPLOYMENT, ILLNESS AND MATERNITY ALLOWANCES PLANNED

Nicosia I MAKI in Greek 8 Oct 80 p 7

[Text] Within the context of its campaign to enlighten the public on the new social insurance plan, the Social Insurance Department *[TEA]* broadcast during the the program "Echo of Events" of the National Broadcasting Corporation *[RKY]* an interview with TEA official Dimos Tymvakis on the question of unemployment, illness, and maternity allowances. Tymvakis said that all wage and salary earners between the ages of 16 and under 65 as well as all those who are working abroad for Cypriot employers and are voluntarily insured are entitled to unemployment allowances.

To collect such allowance the insured must be unemployed, able and available for work. Payment of the allowance is made under the following preconditions:

- a. Payment of contributions must have been made *[by the insured]* for at least 25 weeks on earnings totaling no less than 364 pounds and
- b. Payment of contributions must be made on real earnings or on income earned but credited to the previous year and totaling no less than 260 pounds.

No allowance is paid for the first 3 days of unemployment and in the case of persons working abroad for a Cypriot employer and who are voluntarily insured, the unemployment allowance is paid 30 days after the insured remains unemployed. The allowance is paid for a maximum period of 156 working days during each period of unemployment. The number of days for which allowance is collected is proportional to the insured's minimum insurable earnings. For the first 364 pounds of earned income the insured collects an allowance for 78 days and for each additional 14 pounds he is entitled to an additional allowance of 1 day. Thus an insured who has earned the minimum insurable income of 1,456 pounds will be receiving an unemployment allowance for 156 days.

In the event the right of an insured to collect such allowance is exhausted, such right can be restored after 26 weeks provided the insured has paid contributions on earnings totaling no less than 364 pounds.

The unemployment allowance includes a basic and a supplementary allowance. The weekly amount of the basic unemployment allowance is equal to 60 percent *[but not to exceed 14 pounds]* of the average weekly minimum insurable amount of the insured's earnings during the previous year and is increased to 80 percent *[of the amount]*

over 14 pounds/ if he has one dependent, to 90 percent for two dependents and to 100 percent if he has three or more dependents. The weekly amount of the supplementary allowance is equal to 50 percent /of the amount over 14 pounds/ of the average weekly maximum insurable amount of the insured's earnings during the previous year, but in no case can such weekly supplementary allowance exceed 14 pounds. If, for example, an insured with three dependents had an average weekly income of 30 pounds during the previous year, he will collect a weekly basic allowance of 14 pounds /100 percent of 14 pounds/ and a supplementary weekly allowance of 8 pounds /50 percent of (30-14) 16 pounds/ or a total of 22 pounds per week. If his weekly average income was 42 pounds or more he will be entitled again to a basic allowance of 14 pounds /100 percent of the first 14 pounds/ and a supplementary allowance of 14 pounds /50 percent of (42-14) 28 pounds/ or a total weekly allowance of 28 pounds. Payment of the supplementary unemployment allowance will start as of the first Monday in July 1962.

On the question of the allowance for illness Tymvakis said that to such insurance are entitled all insured workers and employees, all insured self-employed and all those working abroad for a Cypriot employer and are voluntarily insured. An insured of less than 16 and over 65 years of age is not entitled to such allowance.

To collect illness allowance the insured must be unemployed due to illness and he must not be receiving his whole daily wage or salary from his employer during the period of his illness.

The conditions for contributions by the insured are the same as those in the case for the unemployment allowance. No illness allowance is paid to those working abroad for a Cypriot employer and are voluntarily insured for the first 3 days of inability to work /because of illness/. In the case of the self-employed such allowance is not paid the first 30 days of inability to work. The illness allowance as well as the period over which it is paid are the same as those in the case of the weekly unemployment allowance.

In the event the right of an insured to collect an illness allowance has ended, such right is restored after at least 13 weeks provided he has paid contributions on earnings whose total is no less than 182 pounds. It is made clear that the supplementary illness allowance will not be collected until after the first Monday of July 1962.

Finally, Tymvakis spoke on the maternity allowance and said that such allowance is paid to insured expectant mothers. To collect such insurance the expectant mother must not be fully employed in the last weeks of pregnancy, must not collect fully daily wages or salary from her employer, and must satisfy the conditions concerning contributions /to the insurance fund/, that is, a) she must have paid for at least 26 weeks on weekly earnings totaling not less than 364 pounds and b) she must have real or credited earnings during the previous year totaling at least 280 pounds.

The maternity allowance is paid for 12 weeks--for 6 weeks before childbirth and for 5 /sic/ weeks following it. It includes both the basic and the supplementary allowance. The weekly amount of the basic allowance is equal to 60 percent of the first 14 pounds of the average weekly earnings of the insured during the previous year and does not exceed 14 pounds. The weekly supplementary allowance is equal

to 50 percent of the amount over 14 pounds of the insured's average weekly earnings during the previous year. The maximum such allowance is 14 pounds.

If the insured, for example, had average weekly earnings of 20 pounds during the previous year she will receive a basic allowance of 8 pounds 400 mils which is 60 percent of the first 14 pounds, and 3 pounds supplementary weekly allowance which is 50 percent of the amount of her earnings over 14 pounds. If her weekly earnings are 42 pounds or over her total (basic and supplementary allowance) will be 22 pounds 400 mils. The payment of the supplementary maternity allowance will start also the first Monday of July 1962. However, if the insured's employer pays part of her daily wage or salary during the period of pregnancy, then the amount of allowance is reduced by such an amount so that the total received from the employer and the allowance will not exceed the total of her regular earnings.

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LOW CRIME RATE, INCREASED SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AMONG YOUNG REPORTED

Nicosia O AGON in Greek 5 Oct 80 p 3

Interview with Police Chief Savvas Andoniou by Polivis Kiteiou

Text 7 in recent times the suicide attempts particularly among young people have increased. According to police authorities they are attributed to disappointments in love and to other psychological factors which lead boys and girls to attempt suicide.

In Cyprus, however, the crime rate compared to other countries continues to remain low, a fact which causes no reason at all for anxiety.

The above observations were made by Chief of Police Savvas Andoniou in response to our questions on crime trends in Cyprus today. The full text of the interview is as follows:

Question: Mr. Andoniou, the impression prevailing in recent years is that the crimes of abduction and rape especially among young persons have increased. What can you tell us about it?

Answer: The statistics for the first 6 months of the past 3 years, that is, 1978, 1979, and 1980 (see tables), show that the abductions and rapes among young persons particularly are very limited. They appear in isolated cases in negligible numbers and therefore are no cause for alarm.

Question: What measures do the police take to protect the young from all sorts of crimes?

Answer: Besides the legislative measures, the special services and courts which protect children, young persons, and youth in general, the police also are watching out for the protection of our youth which is the social and national bulwark of our nation. We pay great attention to the prevention of crimes against young persons by watching the whole situation carefully and prudently and taking action only when necessary.

Even in the few isolated cases reported to the police we always proceed with prudence in cooperation with other appropriate authorities for the protection of the child, the purpose being the emotional and social rehabilitation of the victim from any traumatic effects.

Question: Are the victims of the various crimes mostly refugees?

Answer: One cannot support the view that even the few victims are particularly refugees.

Question: The suicides have been on the rise recently. To what can this be attributed?

Answer: It appears that the suicides are sufficiently limited while the attempts at suicide show an increase. This is attributed to the anxious and metastatic nature of youth, to the lack of experience in life and its problems, to disappointments in love, and to other psychological reasons and factors which lead young people of both sexes to attempt suicide as a last resort in solving the problems bothering them without first thinking over their actions or seeking help from proper persons or appropriate authorities who can help them in averting the attempt.

Question: One more question. In previous statements the police pointed out that the crime rate in Cyprus is low compared to other countries. Do these optimistic views continue to prevail?

Answer: It is a fact that repeatedly police authorities have said that the crime rate here is very low compared to other countries and that there is no cause for anxiety. We continue to support this view on the basis of proven facts.

We repeat that Cyprus has repeatedly been praised by international organizations and that it is among the few privileged countries with the smallest crime rate index. This favorable condition has existed for many years now, while the percentage of tracing (cases) is sufficiently high.

It is worth pointing out with particular emphasis that in our country no rape or organized crimes exist and that the rapes reported from time to time are minimal despite the Turkish invasion which created a large number of refugees and caused great hardship for the population.

We must admit that the Cypriot people and particularly our youth have remained as uncorrupt and pure as they were during the years before the invasion. This favorable status as concerns the crime rate is considered a miracle and is attributed absolutely to the ever prevailing national, church, school, and family institutions which still remain strong and unalterable. They are also attributed to the high principles, ideals, and "credo" of the Cypriot people as a whole.

We publish on the next page a table showing the cases of rape, abduction, suicide, and so forth, during the first 6 months of the years 1978, 1979 and 1980.

CRIMES

(Serial No.)

1. Abductions (art. 148, chapter 15a)
2. Abductions of girls under 16 (art. 149, chapter 15a)
3. Rape (arts. 144-146, chapter 15a)
4. Corruption of girls under 13 (art. 153, chapter 15a)
5. Corruption of girls 13-16 years old (art. 154, chapter 15a)
6. Corruption of imbeciles
7. Suicide attempt (art. 210, chapter 15a)
8. Suicides

(Note: The key serial numbers correspond to those of the tables below.)

Victims from 1 January 1978 to 30 June 1978

Number of Cases	Refugees under 21	Non-refugees under 21
1.	4	4
2.	-	-
3.	1	1
4.	4	3
5.	1	-
6.	23	5
7.	2	-
8.	-	-

Victims from 1 January 1979 to 30 June 1979

Number of Cases	Refugees under 21	Non-refugees under 21
1.	2	2
2.	5	2
3.	-	-
4.	1	1
5.	3	2
6.	-	-
7.	30	8
8.	21	2

Victims from 1 January 1980 to 30 June 1980

Number of Cases	Refugees under 21	Non-refugees under 21
1.	-	-
2.	2	2
3.	1	1

Number of Cases	Refugees under 21	Non-refugees under 21
4.	0	0
5.	4	3
6.	0	0
7.	42	5
8.	8	1

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'KIKONIS' INTERVIEWS FORMER EDUCATION MINISTER

Nicosia KIKONIS in Greek 19-25 Sep 80 pp 26-31

Text In the following exclusive interview to KIKONIS, former Education Minister Dr. Chrysostomos Sofianos, the most discussed person in the government reshuffling, explains how he was "dismissed" by the president of the Republic, why he did not personally hand over the ministry to his successor who wanted his removal, how the rift with the archbishop came about, why he did not resign voluntarily, and what his future plans are.

Chrysostomos Sofianos, former minister of education in the Kyriacou government, is undoubtedly the most discussed person following the "famous" midnight government reshuffling. However, Sofianos as a public figure and as education minister was for a long time before the reshuffling the center of discussion by political circles and by ordinary people.

The daily sharp attacks by the Cypriot press and by politicians against him and his reforms in education--the democratisation of education as he called it--raised many questions and created confusion as to what kind of a man he is. Is he a determined anti-Hellenic favorocrat as his enemies present him or a modest idealist who assumed the burden of reviving the Cypriot educational system which was corrupted to a large extent by the junta and of keeping vivid the memory of the causes of the tragedy--as his friends and followers claim?

We met Dr. Sofianos at his home at 77 Achilleos St., Strovolos, and talked with him for 45 minutes in a very friendly atmosphere. The house is furnished tastefully and with imagination but has nothing that distinguishes it from an ordinary middle-class house--nothing pretentious and provocative. Sofianos came out of his office dressed very plainly--blue trousers, blue safari-style shirt, and sport shoes. He received us with a broad smile.

The office is simple and plainly decorated as are the other rooms. It is average in size with large bookcases lining the walls. On his desk is a color picture of Archbishop Makarios and another black and white picture of Makarios hangs on the wall to the left. On one of the shelves of the bookcases we saw a picture of the Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara and a photograph of his two daughters.

We started the tape recorder and began our salvo of questions. He also recorded the interview on a small recorder of his own. He responded to our questions

calmly, without animosity or hatred against anyone. He always looked us straight in the eye as if he were trying to guess our next question. Absolutely sincere, he dispelled all misunderstandings and questions created during his 4 years as minister. He did not want to reveal much because, as he said, the time has not yet arrived. It appears that he keeps his "ammunition" for use when he enters the political arena. Throughout our conversation he toyed with a blue pen in his hands out of habit rather than nervousness. He showed he was not afraid to talk and to answer any of our questions. He can lead astray his interviewer and evade a question--a trap that may lead to wrong conclusions. He is very humorous and knows how to "accommodate" every situation in his favor. Very dynamic, of sound beliefs and ideology, persevering and determined, Sofianos has set as his objective the serving of the public and playing an important role in the political life of Cyprus.

From our conversation with him we have concluded that Sofianos has in his possession indisputable data and records about situations and persons who fought him and impeded his work.

Following are the answers Sofianos gave to the main questions EKMONS submitted to him:

How He Was Removed During the Reshuffling

To our question of how his removal came about, Sofianos said:

"I don't know if it was removal or government reshuffling, but I have no objection to the use of either term. Well, until 2230 hours Tuesday night we were at home with some friends. Later, my wife and I went out on an errand. You must remember that there were police guards at the front entrance so we used the rear entrance to go to a friend's home. We left our sleeping younger daughter at home. Our older daughter was staying with a girl friend that night.

"The whole thing developed as follows, as our younger daughter told us and as others have informed us. At about 2330 hours that night the telephone rang and woke up our daughter. When she answered the phone she was told, 'they are asking for your father at the presidential mansion.' She said: 'I think he is sleeping.' 'Wake him up,' they said. She went to the bedroom to wake me up and when she saw no one there, she went to the phone and told them. 'I thought he was in the bedroom sleeping but no one is home. I am alone here,' and she hung up. Later, as she related to us and as our neighbors confirmed, policemen arrived at our house in land rovers and started knocking persistently and shouting at the front and rear doors.

"We had instructed both our daughters never to open the door when they are at home alone for security reasons. The little girl became terrified. She was neither opening the door or responding to the shouting. In the meantime, the whole neighborhood was awakened by the knocking and shouting. It was now midnight, the neighborhood veranda lights went on, there was a lot of noise and people appeared on their verandas to watch. My daughter was shocked, as you can understand. In the meantime, since she would not open the door, the policemen and those who came with them left empty-handed. My wife and I returned home--I don't

exactly remember what time, it must have been around 0100 hours--and we entered through the rear door. A little later, a friend telephoned to tell me about the Public Information Office announcement with the names of the new ministers.

"In the morning I went as usual to my office since the swearing in of the new ministers was arranged for 1700 hours. I finished whatever pending matters there were and left the office shortly before 1700 hours." We asked Dr. Sofianos if on that last day in his office he had had any visitors or a telephone call from the president.

"I had been informed that the president of the Republic had gone that morning to Larnaca to greet the president of Hungary who was passing through Cyprus. In the meantime, Vovides had arrived in my office and I thought that the president had sent him to inform me of his decision."

Why He Did Not Hand the Ministry Over to His Successor

To our question if he had not the new minister of education, Sofianos said:

"Well, I did not have any contact nor did I go to the ministry for the [swearing in] ceremony because this 'reshuffling' was done in an unorthodox manner and the president did not observe even his most formal and elementary obligations to his ministers. In my case he observed neither the human nor constitutional formalities and my absence from the traditional ceremony was an action any decent person would have taken. It was also a simple protest at the whole behavior of the president. Of course, [new minister] Konomis had visited me in the past as a university professor whenever he came to Cyprus and I know him. However, I don't want to comment at this time on our meetings, nor to express my views about him."

About his relations with Deputy Minister of Education Dr. Khatzistafanou, Sofianos said:

"The fact has impressed the people that when the first Kyprianou government was appointed, the president thought that it was necessary to establish an under-ministry. But now that I have left the ministry, the president thinks it unnecessary. This thing raises many questions among the people. But you had asked me about my relations with the deputy minister. It would be better if you had asked what were the deputy minister's relations with the minister. I cannot say anymore at this point because the reasons for creating and abolishing the under-ministry are known."

Why Some People Wanted His Removal

"It is true," Sofianos continued, "that there were [political] circles in Cyprus who wanted my removal from the Education Ministry. First of all, there were the coupists and all their associates in Cyprus. Then there were those circles here and abroad (in Greece mainly) who did not want at all the strengthening of the Cyprus state entity and the accentuation of the coupists' responsibility for the tragedy that struck our people. These circles did not want Sofianos because he continually spoke about the coup and the responsibility of those responsible for the Cyprus tragedy. Sofianos, moreover, could not in any way tolerate a weakened state entity, not for egotistical reasons but because he believed--and it was our policy also--that strengthening our state entity was the most basic precondition

of our struggle for the salvation of Cyprus. If today we survive as a people it is because of our state entity which is internationally recognised. Without it we would have faced the danger of vanishing as Cypriot Hellenism.

"In order to realize their objectives, these political circles always wanted to exert pressure directly or indirectly either on the minister of education or on a higher authority whenever I would not submit to their pressures. Of course, we had political circles who channeled their policy to Cyprus through the structures established here for years by all sorts of reactionary circles."

To the question of whether suggestions were made to him to avoid speaking to the coup he said:

"Indeed such suggestions were made and I possess specific data with dates. When the time is ripe I will reveal to the people who threatened and pressured me to stop talking about the coup because, presumably, I was shattering the spiritual bonds between Greece and Cyprus.

"Of course, such threats and pressures had no effect at all. Besides, I believe that the spiritual bonds linking the Greek and Cypriot peoples are indissoluble and it is not the forgetting of the coup which will cleanse the spirit of the Cypriot Hellenism but, on the contrary, only the cleansing of the authorities will avoid similar mistakes on the basis of the lessons and experiences of the past."

In a recent statement Sofianos said that the presidential mansion is visited by coupists. He asked him to clarify his statement. "Everyone sees that such a thing goes on," he answered.

"It is a daily phenomenon. Unfortunately such a situation, which is very sad and dangerous, exists. (It is dangerous) because while the coup's scars are still fresh in the tragedy of the whole people as well as in the area where the ethnarch was persecuted, these same people who caused the tragedy and inhumanly persecuted the ethnarch are now going in and out of the presidential mansion. This is non-permissible."

The Condition of Education and What He Tried To Do

"We must not forget that I became minister in 1976, sometime following the tragedy which brought about the dual crime of the coup and of the invasion. Also we must not forget that during the 7-year dictatorship in Greece the abiding aim of the junta's mechanism was to control the schools and make them nurseries of unlawfulness and of junta-EOKA B principles. Indeed, the junta had achieved this objective. At least some educators had surrendered the ramparts they were assigned to guard. This had created a climate of reactionary situations in our schools which facilitate the activities of all junta elements. You know very well that in the illegal EOKA B groups pupils participate who became tools of the junta's plans against the late ethnarch Makarios.

"When I took over as minister, I tried with the support of our teachers, the public in general and my close co-workers to change the climate prevailing in schools, a change which frightened the reactionary circles most. We established a climate of freedom, democracy, dialogue, criticism, and discussion. It was exactly this

climate that bothered the opposition because reaction becomes furious when a climate of suppression exists, when there is an atmosphere without criticism and when there is a passive acceptance of events as projected by reactionary situations. It was this passive acceptance of events that we fought by developing the policy of criticism in the schools themselves and by creating the proper climate. The reactionary circles said that we were promoting only teachers who belonged in certain political parties. This is inaccurate. We just supported democratic persons regardless of the party they were affiliated with. But the democratization was not limited to such support of democratic teachers. We tried to change the junta mentality and to achieve democratization based on democratic structure and democratic curricula and methods. I have analyzed this plan during the many public speeches I have made and I am in a position to give you all relevant documents and all my speeches where such analysis is given. Many tried to villify the democratization of education because it did not benefit the opposition. Moreover, UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and all international organizations concerned with education do recommend such democratization. It was not an invention of mine. It is an international trend--something that had to be done in our country also. It was also necessary just because of the special conditions which prevailed after the coup and the invasion.

"Our task was very difficult and we struggled through unimaginable adversities since on many occasions the very state machinery was undermining the state itself. This may sound preposterous but it is well known that within the state machinery there still exist coupists and 'sympathizers' and naturally it was these people who undermined, impeded and denigrated our program. Many supposedly confidential ministry documents were leaked to the press, as you yourself know. We are not for secrecy, but it is characteristic that in the state machinery itself we were being undermined--undermining did take place in the Ministry of Education. On the other hand, the support given us by our teachers and the public in general was very touching. Without this support we could not have achieved all that we have during the 4 years I was minister.

Sofianos-Archbishop Rift

During his ministerial term Sofianos had conflicts with Archbishop Khrystostomos. He asked him to discuss his rift with the archbishop.

"I had no quarrel with him. He started speaking against the minister of education. At first I could not understand why because I kept in mind the cooperation we had enjoyed before the coup for coping with all junta and coupist situations. Later, when I became minister after the coup, I noticed with regret that the archbishop started at first with hints and later with direct attacks against me and the educational policy we followed which, after all, was not a personal policy but a state one--it represented Ministerial Council decisions which I undertook to implement. It was not a personal matter. The people followed with anguish the archbishop's attacks against me.

"Moreover, the archbishop dared talk against our educational policy in the presence of President Kyprianou himself. Only in Cyprus could such a thing happen--for a leader of the church to speak against the state and to be given the right to attack the state authority. This, in my view, is something that cannot happen in any other country of the world. Because the church and the state must be completely

separate. Of course, the church has the obligation to carry on its spiritual duties but as we all know in Cyprus, despite the fact that the clergy in its totality is a sound element, at least a section of the official church behaves in a way which disturbs the conscience of the faithful and in my opinion it does not strengthen their Christian faith."

Cooperation With the President--Retirement of the Two Men

"As is known, the Democratic Front came into existence first. Its establishment was necessary because there was always a need for the central democratic forces to organise in order to avoid the polarization which could be exploited by the opposition thus harming our struggle for freedom and vindication.

"When Kypriano assumed the leadership of the Center and took charge of all forces which rallied around it, I was among the first who helped him. I can even tell you that I wrote that part of his platform which refers to education. Of course, I did help in drafting the whole platform text. This is known by his closest collaborators who can confirm it. I don't say this because I want Kypriano to be obligated to me but just to point out that our collaboration was sincere from the very start and we wanted him to succeed because we believed that he could offer service to the country.

"I believe that with the passing of time he fell victim to partial influences and embraced the opposition thus committing fateful mistakes at his and the country's expense. We have tried, as I have said many times, to support him to the end. Despite the blows we suffered and despite his attitude toward us as a result of the pressures and influences exerted on him, we tried to help him but unfortunately in vain. Finally, he committed inevitable mistakes and I can reveal to you that my resignation was a matter of days because I could see that the margins had been exhausted."

He Explains His Resignation

To our question of why he did not resign earlier since he differed with Kypriano, he responded:

"Basically, the reason is that we hoped that by continuing our support we might be able to save him from the influence of those circles who wanted the destruction of Cyprus. This hope was not only mine but prevailed among many of my cadres in the Democratic Front (M.D.). My friends and collaborators tried to support him and to dissuade him from taking action which could be harmful to himself and to Cyprus.

"Besides you know very well a resignation or withdrawal from the battle is not a solution. This has been proven many times. On the other hand, I did not resign simply because the coupists were stubbornly asking for it. This was their permanent objective. Also, I did not resign because our people--and this you know very well--insisted that by all means I stay on and encouraged me to give battle for a democratic education, for the Cypriot state entity, and for the dignity of our people."

His Future Plans and Prospects for Cooperation with Others

"I can tell you that I'll enter politics because I believe that no one has the right to stay neutral during this critical period for our island. I believe that the people demand a renewal in all sectors of life and state authority. The people are for change--a change with new forces which will lead it to vindication and survival. I feel that I can contribute to this effort. It is for this reason that I enter politics and I am opening a political office this week in the heart of Nicosia.

"I'll enter politics as a person interested in public affairs. I can divulge the fact that I am in contact with other disturbed persons also interested in the public good in order to unite our efforts for the salvation of the country."

We asked him if he excludes future cooperation with DI.KO.

"My cooperation will always depend on matters of policy," he said. "We do not disagree with persons as such. We disagree on matters concerning principles and policies. I don't know what parties will exist or what tickets will be formed. What concerns me and what I shall scrutinize are the principles each person believes in and what policy it serves. This is exactly what will determine the cooperation to be developed. It is evident, however, that DI.KO which we all hoped would fight as representative of the Center, the Center-Right, and the Center-Left has failed in its role. This is evident. It is imperative, therefore, to organize the Democratic, the Makarios, followers. The needs of the country and the struggle our people carry on today demand such organizing. I am working in this direction together with others who are disturbed and love this country."

Did Makarios Want to Fire Him?--Not True

But what does Sofianos have to say about the rumor that Archbishop Makarios intended to fire him from his position?

"This rumor is part of the whole campaign for 'character assassination,' as the foreigners call it, and is absolutely indecent. There are many who know of the esteem the archbishop had for me but it is not proper to mention what the ethnarch had said to this or that person. We must show respect for our great leader. Reference to the political line of the ethnarch and his contribution to the salvation of the country and to the struggle of Cyprus is permissible. But it is inconceivable for anyone to refer to Makarios and claim that he was told this or that or that he knew well the views of Makarios, or his innermost beliefs, and so forth. Such a thing would be disrespectful to his memory."

"What we all know and can judge is his political credo and his struggle for the salvation of Cyprus, his specific views which are expressed in many texts and, of course, his particular political actions. We can refer only to these and not to his secret thoughts and to alleged revelations which he himself never made. These secret thoughts of the archbishop represent only the desire of those who claim that they know about his thinking. This is absolutely a lie and is part of the whole slanderous campaign against me."

what About the Accusation That He Is anti-Hellenes?

To this question, Sofianogl said:

"The charge that I am anti-Hellenes was made, of course, since the junta days. Of course, all counter-revolutionary and anti-junta Greeks know that 'anti-Hellenes' of such kind were the 'flower of the Greeks' as a friendly Greek ambassador had characteristically put it. It is an honor to be called 'anti-Hellenes' by the juntaists and coupists. This naturally is not the time for each of us to prove our Greekishness because it is foolish to claim that one is more Greek than the other. There were only those Greeks who at that time supported the junta and there were the rest of the Greeks who fought it. Those who supported the junta aimed solely at proving that it was identified with Greece, and they called 'anti-Greek' the rest of us--all the anti-juntaists who represented the majority of the people. This is very well known. Later, when the coup took place and we continued to fight it and fascism, the juntaists who earlier identified their junta with Greece began accusing us, the anti-juntaists, of being the ones who ostensibly identified the junta with Greece. This would be ridiculous if not tragic. Because the juntaists were the only ones who tried to connect the junta with Greece while we were trying during the 7 years of dictatorship to prove the opposite. Now can it be possible now for the juntaists to accuse, after the coup and the invasion, the anti-coupists and the anti-juntaists of trying to identify the junta with Greece? It is something that contradicts logic and reality.

"True, I had visited ~~during the dictatorship~~ Greece at the invitation of organizations and societies which expressed the people's will. I spoke at the Athens Literary Club at the invitation of the city's mayor as well as in other Athens municipalities at the invitation of their mayors. I participated in various congresses in Athens and recently I went to Salonica for the Alexander the Great exhibit at the invitation of the Greek minister of civilization. Following these visits, the local opposition which earlier had accused me of not visiting Greece which they claimed was proof of my anti-Hellenism began accusing me of visiting Greece to 'overturn the Greek government' and tried to prevent in various ways my visits to Greece."

Finally we asked the former minister of education to explain what the suggestion in his announcement means that the president should resign quietly. He said:

"I mean that he should resign without further entanglements, without new crises being created in our internal front which has faced serious crises as a result of the fateful mistakes he has made. A prerequisite for the salvation of the country is the unity in our domestic front. Having been isolated, the people are against him and there is a general outcry that he cannot contribute to such unity which is so indispensable. Therefore, the best he can do is to withdraw without further worsening the internal political crisis."

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C30-4908

FRG ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST GDR NOT FEASIBLE

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 20 Oct 80 pp 22-24

[Article: "The Price Would Be Too High--Bonn Sanctions Also Hit Own Economy"]

[Text] It took the opposition in Bonn 4 days to find an antidote for forcing the East Berlin profiteers to their knees.

"Any payments to the GDR not agreed contractually must be stopped at once," demanded the CDU's Germany expert Olaf von Wrangel on Monday last week.

The demand sounds good. It has only one flaw: except as agreed in treaties, no Bonn funds whatever are flowing to the East.

At most the federal government could prohibit private support payments to relatives in the GDR, monetary gifts for purchases in GDR Intershop stores or contracts with commercial gift services in order to put Erich Honecker under financial pressure. These measures would harm the very people who the Christian Democrats too do not think should be affected--the GDR citizens.

The "crazy examples" (as Guenter Huonker, minister at the Office of the Chancellor terms them) reveal the dilemma of the Federal Republic when it tries to cancel one-sided delimitation maneuvers by the SED rulers through economic pressure.

Any reduction in inter-German trade, for example, also affects the FRG economy. Above all, however, any restriction runs counter to the aim at least to maintain the ties between the two German states to the previous extent, as long as they cannot be improved.

A violation of existing treaties might even provoke the other side to engage in phased disruptive maneuvers against Berlin traffic. The peace and quiet concerning Berlin, a political plus of the past decade, would be finished, and too high a price would be paid for the other side forgoing a few millions of foreign currency.

Conversely the GDR with its new walling-in attempt is acting against its own basic interests. Having hardly any raw materials of its own, the second strongest economy of the Eastern bloc depends on increasingly expensive imports also from the Capitalist West, which it must pay for with foreign currency. Without hard currency East Berlin can buy merchandise and machinery on a large scale only in the inner-German barter trade. In turn, it needs the goods made in West Germany to grease

its own production and to be able to supply the Eastern bloc, but particularly also the West.

More urgently than ever, the GDR depends on increasing export yields to introduce Western technology without which East Germany would hardly be able to maintain its leading economic position in the socialist camp.

In supplies from the Federal Republic, the leading item is machinebuilding. Since the beginning of 1977, the GDR has bought machinery worth about 3.2 billion marks--still too little to remove a basic shortcoming of its industry.

As SED boss Erich Honecker lectures, production is "too expensive. Too many materials and energy, too many productive efforts and means of labor are expended per product."

The constraint "to heighten significantly the supply of profitable export products" (as an SED directive put it last year) not only leads time and again to bottlenecks in supply but also prevent pervasive modernization and rationalization; for the very reason that work is comparatively unproductive, the costs in producing "profitable export products" are high, and the yields correspondingly meager.

Moreover, the plants, which normally have orders exhausting their production capacity, lack the means for repairs and maintenance. Such labor-intensive expenditures, plant managers complain, are hardly considered at all in plan projections.

The result: The wear and tear of machinery and construction is considerable, and the procurement of spares laborious and time consuming.

The fact that the GDR economy nevertheless is registering respectable growth rates (4 percent in the past year) can be traced largely to an exceptionally high use of labor. There is good reason why the statistics say nothing about the number of work hours actually expended; chances are that it is far higher than the official 42-hour week of the workers working in two shifts.

As ever, (and SED economists know this only too well), work is done inefficiently, and, according to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in West Berlin, the country has a "huge need for technology" which can be covered only by Western imports.

In the judgment of SED officials, the lag in microelectronics, classified as a "key technology" by East Berlin's most powerful economic official, Guenter Mittag, amounts to about 10 years. As ever, in machinebuilding (a branch of industry in which the GDR occupies the leading position in the Eastern bloc), in the opinion of Western experts, labor proceeds with far too great expenditure in materials and energy.

And heavy Russian diesel locomotives, using an enormous amount of energy, continue to pull the freight trains of the Reichsbahn (GDR Railroad). Electrification of the routes is as yet insufficient--not least because East German industry has to fill orders from the fraternal socialist countries.

These delivery obligations within COME in addition restrict the scope of trade with the West. The East gets primarily technologically sophisticated or, as SED economists say, "intelligence-intensive" products.

East Berlin therefore cannot produce enough "foreign-currency-profitable" goods to enable it to buy Western technology in turn. Since real socialism lacks modern technology and procedures everywhere, works continues to be carried on so laboriously, inefficiently and expensively that the foreign currency intake is too sparse--and in this vicious circle the GDR economy has been turning for the past 31 years.

East Berlin needs economic cooperation with the West more badly than ever. But the people in Bonn cannot either simply stop the economic exchange between West and East. Even employment of the sharpest weapon--abridgment of the interest-free overdraft credit in inner-German trade called "Swing"--gives Bonn hardly any advantages, as was noted by the SPD-FDP people in the cabinet on Wednesday.

The treaty about Swing (enabling the GDR temporarily to finance imports up to a value of 850 million marks) will expire at the end of 1981. Should the Federal Government refuse to extend the agreement, the GDR would have to forgo interest advantages of 60 to 70 million marks a year starting in 1982.

Once before, in 1973, the then Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt threatened curtailment of this credit. One year later the GDR government partly retracted a rise in the compulsory exchange and, at Bonn's request, relieved pensioners entirely of the entrance fee.

This time, however, it is a completely open question as to whether East Berlin will come around again, because contrary to 6 years ago it is now a question not of foreign currency but of the security of the GDR regime, which invariably counts more than economic interests, however important.

If the people in Bonn really should do away with Swing a year hence, the SED would have to consider what kind of policy to pursue over the long term--a strategy of demarcation or a policy of economic coexistence.

In the first half of 1980 Honecker's traders did com. . . with a surplus of 273 million marks in a trade exchange worth 5.7 billion mark. .

The GDR would be hard hit if its export chances in inner-German trade were curtailed by an abridgment of FRG import quotas. About 35 percent of imports from East Germany to West Germany are officially limited as to quantity.

This limit could be lowered further by the Federal Government unilaterally despite the fact that the GDR every year urges that it should be raised. The products subjected to quotas often are the very goods--ranging from wall tiles to bedsheets--which are scarce at home but, because they are cheap, can be sold in the Federal Republic.

Thus in 1981 it will be possible to export 3.2 million kilograms of bed linen consisting "entirely or preponderantly of cotton" to capitalist Germany, as well as panty hose (47 million) and wind instruments (worth 3.6 million marks)--if need be, also at prices not covering manufacturing costs.

Reducing those quotas--a "policy of pinpricks," according to State Secretary Klaus Boellig--would, however, have the drawback that Western firms reciprocally would have to forgo many a lucrative deal.

Besides the people in Bonn are afraid of difficulties at their West Berlin switch point, the half-city consuming fruits of GDR agriculture up to a rate of 26 percent. If agricultural imports from the East were stopped, fresh vegetables, fruit and potatoes would have to be procured instead from West Germany.

All measures of retaliation which do not violate any treaties but nevertheless are to disrupt trade with the GDR, in the judgment of the SPD-FDP government, have undesirable side effects: the ties between the two states become looser, and the Wester German economy runs the risk of less turnover and even doing away with jobs as a result. So far inner-German trade has amounted to 1.6 percent of West German foreign trade.

In the search for a way to pester the GDR gentlemen a little nevertheless, the SPD-FDP people in the cabinet in the end hit on the idea of reducing the annual lump sum payment of 50 million marks for road use fees which had been agreed as recently as 31 October last year.

At that time the people in Bonn had still thought that they had made a good deal--at the expense of the East Berlin party to the treaty. Assuming that the automobile traffic to the GDR would increase further, they had forgone a revision clause.

Since 13 October, when the new regulation concerning compulsory currency exchange took effect, traffic has decreased dramatically, and now it is the GDR that is doing well with the lump sum payment fees.

The cabinet now intends to "examine" the provision. Probably nothing will come of it, for in the discussion last Wednesday the ministers arrived at the wisdom of the diplomats and Ostpolitik proponents that *pacta sunt servanda* (treaties should be observed).

The treaty concerning the road fees runs until 1989.

8790
CSO: 3103

COURT RULES FOREIGN SPYING ON FOREIGNERS IN FRG IS ILLEGAL

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 15 Oct 80 p 6

(Article by Rainer Klose: "Spying On Foreigners Is Punishable Offense Too--Federal Court of Justice Says: Surveillance of Emigrants Usually Concerns FRG Interests")

(Text) Karlsruhe, 14 Oct--In a landmark decision, the Third Criminal Tribunal of the Federal Court of Justice has determined that Section 1 of espionage paragraph 9 of the criminal law code is as a rule applicable also to intelligence activities directed against foreigners living in the FRG or their organizations. In justification, the court stated that such surveillance activity usually touches upon FRG concerns.

With this decision, the court canceled a decision by the criminal law panel of the Stuttgart superior Land court not to proceed with the trial of Bulgarian engineer Milen Budev, 28, who is accused of spying on Bulgarian emigrants living in the FRG and on organizations of exiled Bulgarians on behalf of the Bulgarian intelligence service. The Stuttgart judges claimed that even in view of sufficient evidence of espionage activity, such activity was not directed against the FRG, as specified in the criminal law code. The federal court granted the appeal against this decision lodged by the state's attorney and thereby permitted the trial of Budev, which is to take place before the Fifth Criminal Tribunal of the Stuttgart superior Land court.

The federal judges pointed out that defense against espionage activities by foreign intelligence services was of concern to FRG interests if such activities were "at least indirectly" directed against matters within the sphere of interest of the state. Organizations of foreigners in the FRG frequently have goals involving internal and foreign politics, which usually makes their political planning and activities of interest to the state. In the case of internal political activities, this would be self-evident. In the case of foreign policy objectives and activities it would be evident especially in view of possible conflicts with foreign states, inasmuch as organizations of exiles are occasionally involved in preparing criminal acts which take place either within the country or outside its borders. The FRG's interest in stifling such activities is obvious.

While in the opinion of the Third Criminal Tribunal the surveillance activities of foreign intelligence services might be desirable in combating such criminal actions, in actual practice it does not always end there. Foreign intelligence services are known to be using information they have gained to influence the

behavior of their compatriots, especially to pressure them and their families into cooperating with intelligence work. Information obtained through espionage has occasionally been used to plan and implement attempts on the lives of dissident emigrants.

Dealing with a specific issue, the federal judges determined an infringement on FRG interests because Budev's surveillance activities had as one of their objectives the exertion of pressure on Bulgarian tourists in the FRG and to find ways to blackmail them. In his visits to Munich, Vienna and Paris, he was said to have made several attempts to penetrate organizations of exiled Bulgarian emigrants. During several trips to the GDR, he is said to have met with his superiors there, using a Bulgarian passport with a name other than his own. The accused's attempts to determine the political orientation of Bulgarian emigrants and their suitability for political purposes are taken as proof that more was involved than merely the prevention of possible criminal violations against law and order in Bulgaria. (File reference: 4 BJs 1/7.)

9273
GSO: 3103

DEVELOPMENT OF NEONAZISM, RIGHTEST TERRORISM EXAMINED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Oct 80 pp 37-46

(Text) The "senseless, lunatic attack," as the chancellor described it, was certainly not foreseeable, but had the approaching lunacy not been visible for a long time?

Was the bomb which exploded on the Oktober-Wiesn in Munich the response from the right to the bombs and shots from the left, and, according to the tortuous laws of terror, due in a way? Should not West German security officials have expected it?

A highly placed West German BfV (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) official put it this way: "What happened was worse than our nightmares." Since 26 September the teams investigating extremists have seen themselves drawn down onto the false floor that is the reality of terror: Now they also have to expect indiscriminate violence from the right.

Only last July Bonn's highest national security official, Minister of the Interior Baum, had given assurances that rightwing extremism, as in past years, represented no threat to the free, democratic order—a phrase which has been appearing in this or similar form for years in Federal and Land security reports.

The barely 17,000 rightwing extremists whom security agents have currently registered in the FRG were considered more or less harmless. Rightwing ultras in the FRG, it seemed until now, were political clowns who liked to play Fuehrer.

Weapons fanatics and uniform fetishists set the scene, along with 6-year old troop leaders celebrating the solstice in shorts. And anyone babbling about the "Fourth Reich" over a beer round the table in the backroom really said it only at the table.

When former lawyer Manfred Roeder, as chairman of a "German Citizens' Action Group," asked for "support for our National Liberation Struggle" from idl Amin in Uganda, there were smiles in national security offices, among the West German public and in government offices for both him and his friend Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, who used to crawl through the Bavarian underbrush with his military sport group. As Hans-Josef Horchen, Hamburg's highest ranking BfV official, once formulated the opinion of many colleagues, on the far right "there are many people who do a lot of dreaming."

For a long time there was really nothing more to suspect on the right. After the brushfire of the NPD election successes at the end of the 1960s (Bundestag election 1969: 4.3 percent) the right, which had been halfway unified until then, crumbled into bizarre groups and subgroups. Groups succeeding them, like "Action Resistance," disappeared as quickly as the "W" daubed on autobahn bridges and pedestrian tunnels. Someone like Ekkehard Weil, who shot a soldier at the Soviet War Memorial in West Berlin, was regarded as a dangerously exotic one-time agent--and at the time he was.

Justifiably, West German officials attempted to dispel the impression of a "new Up-With-Hitler" (NEWSWEEK), which surfaced abroad whenever two inebriated high school students somewhere painted swastikas. Social Democrat Egon Bahr once told American journalists: "We have no bigger share of lunatics than other countries."

The scene has changed, however. The image still maintained by many observers, of pathetic madmen who give rightwing speeches over a beer, have a portrait of Hitler in their room and certainly no evil intentions, is no longer accurate. Small conspiratorial groups in the rightwing underground have mobilized against the "national cancer of democracy" and for a "state structured around a Fuehrer."

While the NPD, like the entire domain on the extreme right, continued to shrink (1970: 27,000, 1979: 8,000 members) and the "German Folk Union" of Gerhard Frey, publisher of the Munich NATIONAL-ZEITUNG, is stagnating, violent rightwing radicals are increasingly dominating the arena.

They openly scorn the "democratic crap" which was to be the vehicle to help the Thaddens' National Democrats into power. Unconcerned they yell and daub: "Die, Jew," which in the NPD can lead to exclusion.

BfV officials have so far tracked down 23 neo-Nazi groups. Exactly how many people are active in them is uncertain, investigators have counted at least 1,400--three times as many as 4 years ago. Last year rightwing extremists committed 1,483 felonies, 117 of them involving violence--more than ever since the end of the war. The State Attorney's Office and local prosecutors conducted preliminary investigations against seven criminal or terrorist groups on the right, for the first time rightwing extremists were convicted of having robbed banks and stolen weapons.

Seven kg of explosives, 121 handgrenades, 13 automatic weapons, 44 rifles, 118 handguns, 24 other firearms and about 10,000 rounds of ammunition were discovered in the possession of neo-Nazis.

Just the same, BfV officials announced "a clear falling-off in the activities of some neo-Nazi groups" in the previous year and in July they stated: "This development has continued in 1980."

Things turned out quite differently. There were bomb and incendiary attacks by "German Action Groups" in 1980. In Lörrach a woman was seriously injured by a neo-Nazi bomb, in August in a Hamburg aliens' camp people died for the first time in the FRG following an attack from the right: two Vietnamese refugees were killed after neo-Nazis had thrown homemade Molotov cocktails into the camp.

The attack in Munich and the obvious discrepancy between acts of terror and reports on constitutional security point to an underestimation of the neo-Nazis' potential for violence. Munich psychologist and government advisor on terrorism, Wolfgang Salewski, gave this verdict: "Signals which had been set were not taken seriously."

The rightwing radicals came off looking harmless, if not comical, compared with violent leftists--and yet, as is now becoming clear, there were far right parallels to the type of terrorism from the other radical fringe. Just as leftwing protesters gradually turned into top-flight terrorists, committed rightwingers drifted from legality into the nucleus of neo-Nazi activist groups.

Former lawyer Manfred Roeder, for example, first attracted attention when he was still a CDU deputy. At the time, in 1971, he was attacking porno shops and sex cinemas with a paint can, a year later he founded a "German Citizens' Action Group" with which, still verbally, he fought the "occupation state" and "the lie of the gassings." When he was again charged in 1978 with "defamation of the state," he disappeared and was arrested only last month as the suspected organizer of those who planted the bombs in Hamburg and Loerrach.

Michael Kuehnen, graduate of the Bundeswehr academy and discharged in 1977 for dereliction of duty, first took a look at the Young National Democrats. But the frustrated successors to the NPD were not active enough for the energetic former lieutenant. In Hamburg Kuehnen formed the "National Socialist Action Front" (ANS) and was soon attracting attention with his swastika painting activities. Last year he was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment by the Upper Court in Celle for incitement to racial hatred and glorifying violence.

An acquaintance of Kuehnen's, salesman Uwe Rohwer, also joined the NPD and quickly rose to the position of chairman of the Schleswig-Flensburg unit. In 1977 he switched from the moribund party to Kuehnen's young ANS and shortly afterwards carried out two armed robberies and other serious felonies with more neo-Nazis. Rohwer was sentenced to 9 years in prison as a member of a terrorist organization.

Like the gradual descent of rightwing radicals into political crime, other signs of the extremist right struggle seem like imitations of prevailing models--such as neo-Nazis who have dropped out of sight being able to rely on a monetary fund which--like "Red Aid"--is called "Brown Aid" and is designed to make survival in the underground easier.

For example, when former lawyer Roeder had disappeared from the FRG, he was able to use an account set up in the Bern postal check office under the name Walser with the number 30-53436. In 15 months neo-Nazis raised about DM 173,000 for their leaders in hiding, according to law officials' findings. It was Roeder who had recommended the exodus into the underground on the RAF model to his cofighters: "Like guerillas, we are being forced to create a liberation movement, which means that we float like partisans among the people and attack everywhere. With psychological warfare. With every means at our disposal. Every nation uses force when its rights to life are at stake."

Since then investigators have frequently run up against what they had encountered in their dealings with RAF activists--rightwing extremists disappeared from the field of vision of West German security forces. While searchers are now able to circumscribe the underground of RH successors more and more precisely, they are groping in the dark on the rightwing scene.

The new national socialists have meantime learned from their models what conspiratorial behavior is. Even the poster and paint squads, which previously were very noisy when using building walls for their propaganda, henceforth went on their excursions in absolute secrecy. "Our actions," a neo-Nazi in Lower Saxony revealed in the NSBAP paper KAMPFTRUPP, "are now covered by two-way radio and we always have the police on our frequency."

The ban on the Hoffmann Military Sport Group, announced by Minister of the Interior Baum in January, was not without controversy because the group's activities were already covert. Investigators have long known that such measures only tend to force the adherents of extremist organizations into the underground, where it is difficult to keep them under observation--this is one consideration in search tactics which has so far prevented, for example, a ban on militant K-(Kampf) groups.

For about 2 and 1/2 years there had been a phase in the underground right, just as on the left, when money and weapons were being acquired. In an attack on a merchant in Cologne members of a north German "Werwolf" group made off with weapons, cash and jewelry valued at DM 60,000, in Hamburg in a savings bank robbery ("Don't move, hand over the money") DM 66,000 was taken.

But neither the steady growth in criminal energy over 5 years, which is demonstrated by the acts of the mostly young neo-Nazis, nor the obvious parallels to the behavior of the early RAF activists could shake constitutional security officials in their opinion that rightwing extremists were militant but not nearly as bad as their leftwing counterparts.

Even signs which, in the other spectrum of terror, attest to dangerousness, were misread. While the actions of "revolutionary cells" are difficult to clarify because they are not organizationally linked with each other and they carry out their activities in minicircles, about which other groups know nothing, the "fragmentation" into numerous small groups on the right is considered a sign of harmlessness. "The neo-Nazi groups," said the last BfV report, "have been unable to develop a nationwide organization."

This evaluation that small groups and individual combatants are less dangerous than a nationwide organization additionally misinterprets the peculiarities of rightwing radical violence. Hamburg scientist Joachim Wagner discovered in his study of terrorism under the Empire and in the Weimar Republic that, historically, assassination attempts from the right are carried out predominantly by individual agents and minigroups. The attacks on Erzberger, Rathenau and Scheidemann from the ranks of the rightwing terror "Organization Consul" were probably "perpetrated by a small group of activists." "They acted," Wagner wrote, "on their own initiative, like other rightwing individual agents" such as Count Arco-Valley who shot Bavarian Prime Minister Eisner in 1919.

In addition, Wagner discovered in his highly pertinent analysis of historical material that rightwing terrorism, unlike its counterpart on the left, had been "almost always totally unpredictable." Rightist radicals acted for the most part "spontaneously and unsystematically," the "political goals of their acts remained generally hazy." Erwin Kern, the leader of the plot against Rathenau, had, for example, "turned down any terrorist strategy" (Wagner). According to Kern, the revolution was to be free "of the burden of plan, method and system."

Still, investigators and politicians have always downplayed matters when they had to weigh the risk from the right. Federal Attorney Kurt Rehmann, who last year conducted repeated investigations of terrorist neo-Nazi organizations, was unwilling to draw "any comparison with the beginnings of the RAF scene."

The opposition parties in Bonn certainly contributed to the possibly overcautious evaluation. Whenever anyone spoke out in warning against the danger from the extreme right, such as Willy Brandt, there was a storm of protest from the CDU/CSU.

When Minister of the Interior Baum presented his report on constitutional protection last year--neo-Nazis had already thrown firebombs, stolen weapons and robbed banks--CSU Bundestag deputy Carl Dietrich Spranger said he found the "chapter on extreme rightwing activities" to be "puffed up substantially in length and content." Spranger's party leader Strauss complained that "a Mafia of the far left" was creating "a mood of hysteria against supposed rightist radicalism, principally abroad, with reports about far-right violence."

Supporters in the publishing world joined in with solemn voices. While the SPD fraction was holding discussions with lawyers about how the wave of Nazi symbols and literature uncritical of the NS could be countered, BILD recommended the Social Democrats "to take the blinder from their left eye." The FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE commented after the murder of two Vietnamese in Hamburg that the killings could be adduced at most as "token proof" of a danger from the right. In reality, the paper said, there was little militancy on the right "because it lacks logistic organization, sympathizers willing to fund it and its own ideological talent."

The paper continued to ignore the fact that neo-Nazis have long had functioning contacts abroad. Hardly any attention was aroused by a change in mood which is beginning to take shape on the fringes of West German society: According to a poll conducted by the Emnid Institute, 7 percent of West Germans would vote for a Hitler. A study by the Saarbruecken Institute for Social Research shows that 35 percent of unemployed young people think that democracy is of no help to them--these too are signs that psychologist Salewski recommends should be generally recognized.

The coincidence is almost like an exchange of winks when extreme rightists talk about the "lie of the gassings" or bombs are detonated on transmitter masts before the broadcasts of "holocaust" and CDU leader Strauss dismisses the series as a distortion of history" and speaks of a "right not to want to hear any more about Auschwitz." A broad consensus seems to be taking shape when citizens voice massive resentment against immigrants and simultaneously neo-Nazis are throwing firebombs into hostels for those seeking asylum.

Terrorism observer Salewski thinks that the bombs in Hamburg and Loerrach had a possibly decisive influence in the resolution to perpetrate the deed in Munich. Salewski calls it: "Actually one continuous development."

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VOLKSWAGEN HEAD ON RISING IMPORT OF JAPANESE CARS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Oct 80 pp 85-96

[Article: "No One Can Hide in This Battle"]

(Text) SPIEGEL: Mr Schmuecker, thousands of German drivers are switching to Honda, Mazda, Nissan and Toyota. What makes Japanese cars so attractive?

Schmuecker: First of all, you should not overlook the fact that our Volkswagen and Audi cars are so attractive that they are preferred by hundreds of thousands of German drivers...

SPIEGEL: ...which changes nothing about the fact that the Japanese are achieving astonishing success in precisely the class of automobiles in which VW has been traditionally strong.

Schmuecker: Easy, gentlemen, easy. I just wanted to emphasize that the vehicles offered by ourselves and other European manufacturers are attractive and their technical level is high. If the Japanese are meeting with success here in Germany, it is not because their cars are better. I see three decisive reasons: Japanese cars are good value, comprehensively equipped and currently fashionable—not least of all because the newspapers have something about them every day.

SPIEGEL: It's nothing new that Japanese cars are good value and that they are fully equipped. What is new is their market share of 10 percent: a year ago it was only 5.6 percent.

Schmuecker: I have answered the question why Japanese cars are being bought in increasing numbers. We know that we cannot beat the Japanese where price is concerned. There is the additional fact that now all the Japanese are competing in the German market...

SPIEGEL: ...with the latecomer Daihatsu there are eight...

Schmuecker: ...yes, we can omit the eighth one because no large numbers are involved yet. The fact that the Japanese have acquired a 10-percent share of the market and, in my opinion, will get more, is not a catastrophe in itself.

SPIEGEL: Certainly not a catastrophe. But the trend must surely disturb you?

Schmuecker: The trend is the problem, that is correct.

SPIEGEL: In August alone every seventh car registration was a Japanese make. If that continues, their share of the market may reach 20 percent this month.

Schmuecker: I would like to put that in perspective a little. The figures for August are objectively distorted because VW, as the market leader, has its work vacation in July and August, and that naturally affects the registration figures strongly. That has been the case for years. But I do concede, the trend, a growing trend, towards Japanese cars is there, and that must cause us concern.

SPIEGEL: Mr Schmuecker, it cannot be a question of price alone. You yourself recently admitted at a conference in front of your company's managers that, as far as quality is concerned, Japanese cars are better than German ones.

Schmuecker: At the conference in Brussels I said that the Japanese are qualitatively better in some areas. But I admit that we can no longer flatter ourselves that we have a clear lead in quality over the Japanese.

SPIEGEL: So the matter is undecided. Sometimes Volkswagens are a little better, sometimes Toyotas or Nissans?

Schmuecker: I don't see it that way. There are things in Japanese cars that we would not offer our customers, for example, a rigid rear axle. Their driving characteristics are often worse as well.

SPIEGEL: What do the buyers say about that? Does the average driver really notice what kind of axle is linking the wheels?

Schmuecker: In fairness I will admit that the mass of customers do not rate such details very highly. However, in borderline situations these chassis details can save your life--please do not forget that.

SPIEGEL: In which areas are the Japanese better?

Schmuecker: One example: All the European manufacturers occasionally experience problems with what is called delivery quality...

SPIEGEL: ...door handles and window glass are missing...

Schmuecker: ...not in our products. What I mean are dirty carpeting, adhesive strips not cleaned off properly, things like that.

SPIEGEL: Now we're starting with minor things. Don't you have more serious worries?

Schmuecker: Little things are important too. But you are right, there are things that are causing us to think hard.

SPIEGEL: Good, that's what we would like to discuss.

Schmuecker: Primarily, it's the reliability statistics that are making us rack our brains. The tables show how often an automobile has to go into the repair shop or how often it breaks down in traffic.

SPIEGEL: You are thinking of the ADAC [Allgemeine Deutsche Automobil Club] statistics, in which you do not come out very well?

Schmuecker: The ADAC statistics show that Japanese cars do very well in the first 12 months. VW is in the upper middle range, other well-known German firms are far below it. The ADAC statistics also show that in the second year of operation VW is far ahead of almost all the Japanese in reliability.

SPIEGEL: Do your cars have to be extensively repaired--at the customer's expense--before they run properly?

Schmuecker: No, certainly not. We doubt that statistics like that have any objective accuracy. I admit that the Japanese have achieved a very high quality level. But we have no reason to be embarrassed in this respect.

SPIEGEL: Don't your own breakdown statistics show that the Rabbit is the car that is in the repair shop more often than all the Japanese cars?

Schmuecker: That is incorrect. The Rabbit, the Polo and the Derby are doing excellently in these surveys today. I must concede that we had a problem with the electrical system in the Rabbit 2 to 3 years ago. But I can assure you: it has been taken care of.

SPIEGEL: Did you copy the Japanese to find out how it should be done right?

Schmuecker: So far the Japanese have copied more from us than we from them.

SPIEGEL: The mountains of material that you have produced about the competition from the Far East do show that you are looking very carefully, that you want to know why the Japanese are so good.

Schmuecker: We know . . . i need to know about our Japanese competitors. We test every competitive vehicle, not just the Japanese, down to the last detail. That is international practice.

SPIEGEL: To the last detail? Have you ever disassembled a Toyota down to the last component part?

Schmuecker: Of course. We want to find out where we stand and what the competition is capable of. Now we know precisely, as I said, that the Japanese have achieved a good standard of quality.

SPIEGEL: Give our readers a tip: Which Japanese make is the best?

Schmuecker: Your readers will still do best if they choose a Volkswagen or an Audi. There are no real innovations in Japanese cars. They have a lot of nice little touches, but the German buyer often does not want them.

SPIEGEL: For example?

Schmuecker: There are cars in which a robot voice reminds you that you have to use the starter or should close the door. These are gimmicks, not technical innovations.

SPIEGEL: The Japanese don't need them either; they are simply less expensive, and so a Volkswagen is perhaps not always the best recommendation.

Schmuecker: May I say right away and without fear of misunderstanding: if we did not have the problem of cost compared with the Japanese, I would order champagne immediately. Then I would be the most relaxed automobile manager in Europe.

SPIEGEL: This much belabored cost advantage of the Japanese--how big is it really?

Schmuecker: All together it's at least 20 percent of the manufacturing costs. Quite apart from the disproportion between the yen and the D-mark, which again increases the price advantage of the Japanese.

SPIEGEL: But isn't it mainly because the Japanese build their cars more simply?

Schmuecker: Wrong. The Japanese have more parts per car than we do. And because that is the case, they have reserves for greater efficiency which we have not had to this degree for a long time.

SPIEGEL: You think that a Toyota Corolla, for example, is not yet as cleverly manufactured as a VW Rabbit?

Schmuecker: That's right. The Japanese could build their cars even more efficiently.

SPIEGEL: Although they are already manufacturing at so much more of a cost advantage than the Germans? Can you still sleep soundly?

Schmuecker: Don't worry, I'll sleep soundly even after this conversation.

SPIEGEL: Mr Schmuecker, the price of Japanese cars is often almost DM 2,000 less than for comparable German models. You say that more efficient manufacturing is not the reason. What is it then?

Schmuecker: For example, the fact that the Japanese work substantially more days per year than the Germans, they have less vacation and they are also sick much less. While, on the average, 10 percent of the workforce at VW is absent because of illness, it is far below 4 percent in Japan. The difference means a lot of money, it goes into hundreds of millions of marks.

SPIEGEL: Does the industrious Japanese worker still get less money than his German colleague?

Schmuecker: Ordinary basic wages have equalized a bit, but the additional social benefits, which make up 80 to 90 percent of the basic wage, are under 20 percent in Japan.

SPIEGEL: Of course nothing much can be done about that. Or do you think that the Italian workers in Wolfsburg will work faster and take fewer sick days just because Toni Schmecker is having trouble with the Japanese?

Schmecker: We would be making a big mistake, if we thought that nothing can be changed. The Japanese represent a challenge which we can survive only by summoning all our energies.

SPIEGEL: What do you want to change, would you like to reduce wages, shorten vacations?

Schmecker: All groups affected are being asked to contribute their part, so that we can be successful against the Japanese. That holds true for our parts suppliers, it holds true for our dealers and it holds true for the workforce and the union as well.

SPIEGEL: What are your suppliers expected to contribute?

Schmecker: As you know, about 55 percent of our total costs comes from the purchasing side. We must convince our suppliers that we cannot afford large cost pushes in comparison with Japanese parts.

SPIEGEL: As one of the largest buyers you are in a good position to push prices down.

Schmecker: It's not just a matter of prices. We would like to have prices lowered through higher volumes, and that will only be possible by standardizing parts.

SPIEGEL: That would mean, for example, only one factory which manufactures transmissions for all the European producers?

Schmecker: Or two factories for several.

SPIEGEL: What does IG Metall's boss Eugen Loderer, who is after all chairman of Volkswagen's supervisory council, say to your plans for the future?

Schmecker: Mr Loderer is as well informed about the situation as I am. I say quite openly: More than profits are at stake, jobs are at stake. We should at least seriously consider whether everyone will not have to lower his demands somewhat.

SPIEGEL: Let's decode that: you want to limit wage increases considerably and postpone additional shorter working hours?

Schmecker: For me it is absolutely unthinkable for us to introduce additional shorter working hours. We would no longer be able to absorb this cost factor.

SPIEGEL: So you are agreed about this in the concern, in management and in the supervisory council?

Schmecker: In July we presented a detailed study on the topic of Japan to our supervisory council and we have discussed the study openly. No one was spared.

SPIEGEL: Self-criticism?

Schmecker: Yes, we did not spare management. We announced what we plan to do, we described exactly how we want to improve manufacturing more through our considerable investments and how we want to standardize further. We also made it clear to our suppliers that they will have to help as well. Our dealers have known for a long time what they have to do.

SPIEGEL: Is Eugen Loderer cooperating as well?

Schmecker: We have said in all clarity: If even one of the groups involved thinks it can simply hide, then this struggle will end in a bitter defeat.

SPIEGEL: Do the representatives of the workforce, the council members, see it the same way?

Schmecker: It seems to me the awareness of the problem is there. Among the workforce too. Of course, I know that the way from awareness to corresponding behavior can be a long one.

SPIEGEL: Aren't discussions scheduled in your concern about extending work breaks?

Schmecker: We are still considering increasing the break from 24 to 40 minutes per shift. Naturally that would be an enormous cost burden.

SPIEGEL: You would like to put that off for another year or forget it completely?

Schmecker: If you ask me that way, I would like to forget about it completely. But it must still be discussed.

SPIEGEL: Do you agree with the minister of economics when he says that the German worker should work a bit harder?

Schmecker: I am not really sure that Count Lambsdorff said it like that.

SPIEGEL: He said something like that.

Schmecker: I am not asserting that our workers are less industrious than others. The problem is elsewhere. For approximately the same physical labor, we must give our workers the means to work more efficiently. That is the secret on this side.

SPIEGEL: Previously you indicated that the Japanese still have better opportunities for efficient production than the German manufacturers. Can VW continue to lower costs with additional and more modern machines?

Schmecker: The answer is unambiguously "yes." The DM 2.5 to 3 billion that we will spend in each of the next few years, basically for products and in investments for greater efficiency, will help us along considerably.

SPIEGEL: The conclusion you draw from your study of Japan is then: a sharp increase in efficiency, more pressure on the dealers, more pressure on the parts suppliers and cutting back on wage increases for the workforce. Is that all?

Schmecker: As long as our point of departure is that we intend to defend our base in the FRG to the utmost, that's it.

SPIEGEL: That sounds like a threat addressed to the unions: If you don't help out, we can still produce in South Korea.

Schmecker: That is your interpretation.

SPIEGEL: Mr Schmecker, why are you making things so difficult for yourself? Why don't you demand the easiest thing: stiff customs duties or quotas on the import of Japanese cars?

Schmecker: You are recommending me to call for protectionist action?

SPIEGEL: No, we are only asking why you are not calling for it?

Schmecker: If the sum of all our efforts is not enough, then the politicians would have to intervene. After all, every seventh employee in the FRG earns his living directly or indirectly from the automobile industry. The entrepreneurs are not exclusively responsible for our social system, which is clearly better than the Japanese, but which also creates clearly higher costs.

SPIEGEL: So the answer is yes: in an emergency the state must help.

Schmecker: I meant it somewhat differently: the Japanese, whose achievements I respect greatly, will certainly not ignore in the long run how dangerous it would be for them to continue as they have been doing. They must recognize how vulnerable they themselves are becoming as a result. We Europeans and Americans can sooner manage without the Japanese car market, the Japanese would be lost without their export markets in our countries.

SPIEGEL: So the Japanese should gradually restrict their car exports in their own interest.

Schmecker: I think so.

SPIEGEL: Mr Schmecker, do you sometimes reflect on how much more pleasant it must be to work for Toyota as the boss instead of in Wolfsburg?

Schmecker: You fail to see the situation. If you think about the Japanese a little bit, the thought must come to you that perhaps we need this challenge. Possibly it's coming at just the right time to be able to get some of the things moving in our industry that have become bogged down.

SPIEGEL: How nice that we have the Japanese!

Schmecker: They are certainly somewhat troublesome. But it may be that our automobile industry will be grateful to the Japanese one day for this challenge.

SPIEGEL: Mr Schmecker, thank you for this conversation.

MARCHAIS SAYS PCF'S AUTOMATIC DEPENDENCE TO PS OUTDATED

Partie LE MONDE in French 15 Oct 80 p 11

(Report on an Interview with Georges Marchais, secretary general of PCF (French Communist Party) on "Cartes sur Table" television program, 13 October)

(Text) Appearing on Channel 2's 13 October edition of "Cartes sur Table," Georges Marchais was pressed to reveal the attitude of the PCF on the second ballot of the presidential election. While emphasizing his refusal to be "confined" to the question, the secretary general of the Communist Party indicated that his party's approach implies that it considers the automatic desistance on behalf of the leftist candidate in the best position to be "outdated."

The PCF adopted a similar attitude in the period preceding the March 1978 legislative elections. At that time, it explained that the "republican discipline" of standing aside on the second ballot should be relegated "to a museum." The Communist Party has always considered that an election entente should rest on a political accord. In this sense, the rejection of the automatic desistance is not a new position. The new element is the fact that the PCF no longer presents the conclusion of an agreement with the Socialist Party as a goal to be attained and that it deems such an accord impossible before the first ballot of the election.

At the 23d Congress of his party in May 1979, Marchais stated that agreements with the Socialist Party would be concluded at the proper time, following the affirmation of a sufficiently powerful "people's movement." Expressed in election terms, the statement means that the PCF intends to gather the maximum votes before putting its "forces," as Charles Fiterman said Monday on France-Inter, "in the service of change."

Marchais said that he had "always supported the idea that the presidential election was an election of a special type and that it was for the Communist Party a very great sacrifice to agree to present a common candidate, as we did in 1965 and 1974 (...) because obviously, in a presidential election, the party that would be absent too often would risk the consequences of that situation."

The secretary general of the PCF further stated that if he proposed that the presidential election should be the occasion for a debate "with dignity" (LE MONDE, 14 October), it was not "because he feared that one might speak of his past -- that is, the 1940 period." He said: "I do not fear that. I have said once and for all what I had to say. My conscience is clear."

When questioned about the fact that Henri Fiebelin, member of the bureau of the Communist Federation of Paris, was not able to express his views at the 11-12 October conference, Marchais said: "I have difficulty understanding why he now regrets not having been sent as a delegate to the conference when he should have participated in it in a completely normal fashion. We elected him to the Central Committee at our last congress. It is he who resigned, against our will."

Explaining the PCP's position on the second ballot of the presidential election, Marchais said: "What is fundamental for us is to change things. Now then, it so happens that to date, the path we have followed seems not to have been the right one and at any rate, we did not succeed in obtaining the necessary change thereby. (...) Francois Mitterrand was the candidate in 1965, there was another candidate in 1969, he was the candidate in 1974, and Giscard d'Estaing is still in office! The longer that continues, the worse things are! Consequently, we are not going to repeat 'unity, unity, unity (...), elections, unity, elections,' like parrots."

"Make Our Heads Work"

"We are going to make our heads work and we are saying: Since we have not succeeded on that path, we must find another."

The secretary general refuses to let himself "be confined" by the question of desistance on the second ballot. "We must create the conditions that are indispensable for the ratio of forces, that would force the implementation of a new policy." When questioned about the remark of Robert Ballanger, president of the communist group in the National Assembly, who said "I shall not vote for an 'Atlantist' socialist" (LE MONDE, 10 October), Marchais said: "In the party, every comrade expresses himself in accordance with his own feelings, his sensitivities." Referring to the report presented by Charles Piterman, member of the Secretariat, to the national conference (LE MONDE, 12-13 October), the secretary general said: "When one analyzes in detail what the policy of the Socialist Party is today, one must come to the conclusion that the conditions do not now exist for an agreement between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party (...). It is not likely that those conditions will be created between now and 26 April." He added: "First of all, let the campaign develop, then let the people vote, and on the evening of the first ballot, every person will decide."

Marchais emphasized that "what is fundamental is for the communist candidate to gather the greatest possible number of votes. If that is not the case," he added, "there is no prospect of change." The secretary general then went on to say: "We have the feeling of having chosen a new policy (...). The formula (of automatic desistance on behalf of the leftist candidate in the best position) is now outdated, as experience shows."

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REPORTERS CONFERENCE DISCUSSES PCF ROLE, INTELLECTUALS, UNION

Union With PS

Paris L' HUMANITE in French 14 Oct 80 p 8

[Report on PCF Central Committee member Henri Malberg's statement; place and date not given]

[Text] Henri Malberg, a member of the Central Committee, feels that the Communists' "strong point" is the fact that their campaign will be "based on the interests of the workers and the need for change."

He denounced the political maneuvers of the right and the PS [Socialist Party], which are aimed at "making the workers disgusted. Those who have the greatest need for change." The secretary of the Paris Federation insisted that they have to "denounce those who are inspiring this campaign and their reasons for conducting it."

He then showed what that change "specifically" involves. He was talking of the interoccupational minimum growth wage, employment, the democratization of culture and education, the workers' role in management. He feels that responding to "change for the better for some, it means for the worse for others, the capitalists."

The secretary of the Paris Federation then tackled the question of unity. "We are called on," he said, "to renew the union of the left, to meet with the PS." But then he said: "We are deadlocked on the reality of the PS." He feels that "responding to these appeals would be going out to meet the change we want" and that today we must "contribute a new response" to the problem of union. The speaker recalled how the Socialists had broken off the union 3 times: at the time of the Popular Front, the liberation and in 1977. He explained that, "to prevent that from happening again," the workers "at the bottom" have to achieve the conditions for union through their struggles, "to guarantee with their weight the advancement of and respect for political agreements when they can be reached."

"Are we giving up the union of the left? Certainly not," and Malberg reminded us of the path chosen by the PCF [French Communist Party] to achieve socialism and union, but that this involves the intervention of the workers.

"What is dead," he said, "is not the union of the left, but the illusion that the documents alone could provide a guarantee against the fragility of the PS."

"Voting for the Communist candidate is 10 times, 100 times more effective than crying over the union that has disappeared, than waiting — but through what prodigious feat, the PS being what it is — for the union to be reborn through the good will of the Socialist leaders.

"They were able to break with the joint program because popular pressure had fallen off and because the PCF was not strong enough.

"The union we are still ready to join — naturally not one under false pretenses, a union to work for change — will not be reborn through incantations.

"It will be reborn if the popular movement attains the necessary size and the only way to make it grow, to materialize its power, is to win over worker by worker, youth by youth, Frenchman by Frenchman to vote Communist on 26 April. That is the situation, the only situation.

"I would like to add one more word.

"The PCF has spent its life fighting for the union, demanding it, knocking on doors, negotiating, warning against the backsliding of its allies.

"It has only encountered an echo when Socialist leaders have found themselves in a situation where they couldn't do otherwise.

"The path of the 23d Congress is to learn a lesson from all this, to put the issue in its true perspective: the intervention of the workers and influence of the PCF, of the party that is fighting for change and union."

Role of Intellectuals

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 14 Oct 80 p 9

[Report on PCF Political Bureau member Guy Hermier's statement; place and date not given]

[Text] Guy Hermier, a member of the Political Bureau, focused his statement on party tasks directed toward the development of the struggles the intellectuals are engaged in.

First, he noted, "as a new and positive factor, that the election battle is not being engaged in in a wait-and-see climate, but in terms of struggles. Things have begun to change in comparison with the time when elections were marked by an atrophying of these struggles while passively waiting for the election verdict. During the summer and since the return from vacation, the struggles have been numerous." Then Guy Hermier stressed the fact that "the idea of the possibility of imposing setbacks, of making gains has grown" and cited several successes achieved in his region of Marseilles.

He then insisted on the necessity "of, for example, making it clear where responsibility for the European policy lies, that of the PS or what the national importance of the struggles engaged in is" in these struggles.

After making this remark, Guy Hermier got to the point of what he had to say: "The party is going to direct its efforts toward the most exploited workers, but also toward engineers, staff personnel and technicians and all intellectual workers. Even before our campaign has gotten off the ground, some people are dragging out the hoary accusation of laborism, as is the case with Patrick Jarreau in *LE MONDE*.

"We have no intention of letting such twaddle be bruited about. As one of our chief tasks, the 23d Congress specified the winning over of the mass of intellectuals to the democratic struggle and more than tens of thousands to the party itself. Since then, we have made progress in that direction."

Guy Hermier cited the many initiatives launched by the party in that direction. Then he went on: "Our task is no longer to create the conditions for a new offensive, but to give it full rein and effectiveness. We can see it happening now with people back from vacation, with the presence of the Communists in the struggles being conducted in the schools, universities and in the creative world. If we want to find out who is missing, we have to look to the PS, completely absent from the field of battle in this sector, and among the Socialist leaders of the CPDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], the PDE [National Education Federation] and the SEI [expansion unknown], who are doing their best to break up these struggles. Today, the outlook for the Giscard government is a France whose culture is distorted, diminished, dependent. In short, France's cultural identity is threatened (...). So the struggles are evolving. But then again, in these struggles we must speak frankly, work to clarify these struggles and the conditions [required] for change, to cast light on, rather than obliterate, the nature of the kind of problems we are facing."

Then he went on: "There is no inevitable reason that would lead intellectuals to have to choose only between the right and social democracy. All the more reason to step up our campaign in their direction (...)."

Another reason is the acuteness of the ideological confrontation today.

On this point, Guy Hermier insisted on the importance of spreading "revolution." Then he concluded his statement with this sentence: "There is no doubt that in the days to come the party's 70,000 intellectuals will make every effort to rally the greatest number of votes to Georges Marchais, the only candidate working for change for our society and culture."

PCP's Role in Society

Paris *L'HUMANITE* in French 14 Oct 80 p 7

[Report on PCP Political Bureau member Francette Lazard's statement; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] Francette Lazard, a member of the Political Bureau, devoted her statement to the "significance and unprecedented importance" of the Communist candidacy:

"We frankly, clearly and most vigorously say that the key issue on which any real change depends is the power, position and responsibilities our party holds at all levels of national affairs.

"We are not making this a partisan or situational issue while waiting for better times. Quite the contrary, we are making it a fundamental issue of the present and the future, and we maintain that it is the only new issue that can appear in French politics, the sole event likely to change the course of affairs.

"This idea will not take hold by itself. For a new idea is never introduced without a fight..."

"All the more so since this question involves a fundamental issue in France, at the heart of the crisis-stricken imperialist system of domination, of one of the foremost crisis-stricken capitalist powers..."

"Why is the question as to the PCF's position and power being raised in new terms? It is crucial for us to gauge what is changing and how it is changing in the social movement, in the balance of power, to become aware of the problems that are in evidence and of the possibilities opening to us to take action as soon as we possess the trump cards which make change not only necessary, but materially possible in the France of the 1980's..."

"But contrary to Guy Mollet's claim, the French middle class is not 'the dumbest in the world.' It realizes that the decisive issue is the mass influence of a revolutionary party capable of revealing and exposing the causes of the crisis..."

Then Lazard tackled the problem of the "consensus" and determination of the right and of social democracy to launch the PCF on a "historic decline."

"This undertaking has been defeated and it is a major political fact that leaves all chances for change open in France. On the other hand, we are talking frankly to the workers, to all those who desire change, of the absolute necessity of strengthening the influence of our party.

"We affirm this necessity for a bigger revolutionary party in terms of our pluralist view of things.

"The necessary union can progress & i consolidate itself only on condition that the PCF also progresses and enjoys a strengthened and respected position.

"We rigorously and constructively propose solutions in the form of objectives of our struggle, without prejudging beforehand or deciding from above on the rate at which we set in motion, expand and consolidate a popular movement that we want to be victorious.

"This situation calls for new responses for which there is no model. Formulas that were positive in their time cannot be repeated nor simply adapted or updated..."

"We are not strong enough to have the assurance that the opportunities for change that are open to us have been seized, and effectively seized, by the popular movement (...).

"That is to say, the responsibilities we have, the commitment the decisions made at our national conference imply..."

"We are advancing over new ground and every effort will be made to at the very least keep us from advancing."

SNECMA DEPUTY DIRECTOR SOLLIER INTERVIEWED

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 1-14 Aug 80 p 23

[Interview with Jean Sollier, deputy director of SNECMA (National Company for the Study and Construction of Aircraft Motors); place and date not given]

[Text] [Question] As a prelude to the Farnborough Exhibition, you participated in a colloquium in London with the theme, "Aerospace in the 1980's and Beyond." According to you, the structure of the engine industry will change considerably in the next 10 to 20 years. In what way?

[Answer] In my view, this structure derives from the technical objectives to be attained; that is, from the needs of the market. These objectives have evolved. For example, in 1970, the major technical objective for engine manufacturers was reduction of engine noise. Today, of course, the objective is to cut fuel consumption while preparing to utilize new fuels (like hydrogen). This will be in a few years... The objective while awaiting these possible new fuels is to utilize present fuels with broader specifications.

There are a certain number of familiar paths to attain these objectives. There will be no revolution. Put in other terms, there is nothing similar to the bypass section engine which made its appearance in the early 60's. The main thing will be to effect continued progress, closely connected to materials and the manner in which they are transformed. And it is on this last point and because of this last point that I believe there will be a change in the structures. It can easily be imagined that machining will be extremely reduced, to the profit of forging and casting.

[Question] Also according to you, the European industry is far from having won that portion of the world market to which it may rightfully attain. What trump cards do the Europeans hold to reach this goal?

[Answer] This is a difficult question. Effectively, the European engine industry--and fuselage industry, too--has not yet reached the point of selling the European share of fleets on the world market--roughly a ratio of 1 to 2. Thus, we have a long way to go... There is no miracle solution. Not only must the Europeans adapt their products to the needs of the market and sell them, but they must also offer satisfactory after-sale service. This will take time--10, even 20, years are necessary to build up customer confidence.

To be avoided are political measures such as a return to import restrictions. This is certainly not the way to encourage competitiveness.

[Question] Do the goals of European engine manufacturers necessarily include plans for collaboration? If so, upon what bases do you feel this collaboration should be established, and what role does SNECMA intend to play?

[Answer] There are many myths concerning collaboration. In the domestic area and in the European market, for example, no engine manufacturer--and this holds true for fuselage manufacturers--can hope to make more than half his sales in his national market or in the European market if it is a European partnership.

That is to say, from the moment when the goal of collaboration is to insure the success of a product by enlarging the market, European participation is not sufficient. It is imperative to achieve transatlantic collaboration, in order to be able to penetrate the American market to a significant degree. In this market, currency concerns foster reticence vis-a-vis 100 percent foreign products....

At SNECMA, we have chosen this step for a range of domestic products, by collaboration with General Electric.

[Question] And in the military domain?

[Answer] On this point, things are totally different. First you sell to your own government, and then you export. In this domain, commercial success is strictly dependent upon the national defense and foreign policies of a government. Therefore, as long as interested governments on the European level will not agree, in a lasting way, on a common national defense policy and a common policy on exportation, European collaboration will remain a come-on.

[Question] Materials and components play an increasingly significant role in the design and manufacture of engines. What sort of measures do you, as a French manufacturer, intend to take on this point to insure the independence of your materials?

[Answer] For a long time, SNECMA was the only engine manufacturer with a forge and foundry (in Gennevilliers). Today, it can be stated that practically all engine manufacturers are moving towards the creation of methods specifically for this field, or contracting with a particular ironsmith or founder, or a combination of these two.

At SNECMA, we have made considerable progress in the past 10 years in the development of materials, thanks to our own methods, and each year we invest significant sums into what we call technical advances.

Even so, these efforts do not insure the independence of our supply sources of cobalt or titanium, for example. That is a problem which we cannot solve on our own. We take a certain number of precautions, but their effectiveness is only short-term--say, 4 to 5 years.

We, too, like all the other engine manufacturers, are dependent not only upon the French government, but also upon other governments....

[Question] You hope that the airline companies participate in a more significant way in the technological investment efforts of the engine manufacturers. But they seem doomed to squeeze their budget to the maximum, in order to remain competitive. It is hard to see how they could respond to your appeal. What do you think?

[Answer] First I will make a statement. In general, people will not pay the actual cost of public transportation. Therefore, to remain competitive, the companies have had to lower their rates as much as possible. This is an abnormal situation which will sooner or later lead to bankruptcy or nationalization. I understand that they feel reluctant to pay higher prices for engines. However, looking at the total constant price, the company could pay 5 percent more for an engine which will allow a decrease in specific consumption of 1 percent. The rate of exchange is thus extremely high today and should allow the companies to pay a normal price. This normal price will, in turn, permit the engine manufacturers to invest and realize the technological advances which the companies need.

9171
CSO: 3100

GENETIC ENGINEERING, RESEARCH FUNDS INCREASED

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 27 Sep 80 pp 88-89

[Article by Yves Christen: "Giscard Gives Priority to Genetics"]

[Text] Cultural and genetic patrimony: these are the two leitmotifs of the official report that will be submitted to the chief of state on Wednesday. By increasing the research budget this year, VGE [Valery Giscard d'Estaing] has decided to play the future.

Our president of the republic is said to be a great devotee of science. Thus, one has to think of him as spoiled: a few months ago, he was given a voluminous report on the life sciences, and today, experts in all the disciplines have just prepared a white paper on research for him. Mr Aigrain, secretary of state to the prime minister in charge of research, will submit it to him next Wednesday.

As a fair turnaround, Mr Aigrain has himself been spoiled by the president and the prime minister: the draft research budget is indeed better than it has ever been. "It is customary to say that the budget is not too bad, but this time I would say that it is frankly good," Aigrain declared to us. After a period of stagnation--that is, of decline--between 1970 and 1980, a new impulse seems to have been given. Mr Aigrain is no charlatan, and if he says this, it is with the figures at hand: a 17.6-percent increase. The minister wonders whether research is on the way to becoming the "super-priority" sector. He himself is somewhat surprised: "Everyone knows that we are going into an election period and that there is nothing particularly demagogic about favoring research. It is rare, in periods like this, for such a long-term interest to be taken in it."

A long term that constitutes the key to the future, but that already concerns us closely. This can be seen from the eight big interorganism programs (the sectors assigned priority): food and nutrition, medicines and pharmacology, biotechnology (genetic engineering, etc), microelectronics and its applications, meteorology and climatology, production of liquid fuels, machinery and materials, and finally, the technologies and development of work.

The white paper does not involve just figures or decisions; rather, it represents above all the thinking of some of our most eminent researchers--on the basis of this observation: the political powers have neglected scientific research for the last 10 years. And today, "they" still "blame sciences for the nuisances and dangers, more or less imaginary, of our technological society, while forgetting the role it has played in the beneficial achievements that profit everyone without their thinking about them." Genetic manipulation, nuclear power, not to mention vivisection--a great many areas of research are attacked by the forces of ignorance. Which justifies the words of Jacques Monod: "In society, science has won its place in practice but not in people's hearts."

One can, of course, always try to reassure oneself by saying: "There is at present an immense store of knowledge in pure sciences, only a small proportion of which has been utilized. So let us declare a 'moratorium': let us ask the scientists to exploit this store for practical purposes rather than try to increase it further by new discoveries." But in this case more than in all the others, the ideology of zero growth is an indefensible myth. "It rests," explain the authors of the white paper, "on a naive view--that of a 'store' of knowledge that is conserved, so that anyone at all can draw from it whenever he likes. In reality, scientific knowledge ages quickly, and some of it is soon wiped out by new ideas."

In this domain, he who does not advance regresses ineluctably. One must always go farther ahead and choose those who can lead us there: science is doomed to elitism. Whence the necessity of a selection process which, the authors quite rightly regret, is not "frankly accepted by the scientific community."

A Choice of Society

The highly technical character of advanced science is not the only thing that imposes this elitism; there is also the new importance of the scientist in society's great choices. The authors of the report do not try to conceal this; they intend, with their colleagues, "to indicate to humanity the directions to take to survive its population explosion, by means of new sources of energy, mastery of the mechanisms of life, and deepening of its cultural identity." Culture and genetics are without doubt the two key words in this report. They are found throughout. Indeed, the authors of the report have deliberately associated them: "Our genetic identity is not the only thing concerned; our cultural identity itself is a patrimony." To become aware of this is to give the possibility of an expansion of the soul. It is to accept, with the philosopher Martin Heidegger, the highest technology as our roots of today. But it also means benefiting from some fallout, which, to be very matter-of-fact, is nonetheless very useful. It is also necessary to make choices. The authors of the report invite us, for example, to launch on the great adventure of biotechnology--with, as starting points, not immediate miracles but rather, for the next decade, "the fixation of nitrogen (a veritable revolution in agriculture), bioconversion of

cellulose wastes, the ethanol and methanol programs (new energies), the bi-specific idea and integrated biological struggle, production of hormones and medicines by 'genetic engineering' (genetic manipulation) and of antibodies by hybridomes, depollution engineering, etc."

And this is only an example. The seven other priority programs provide many others.

A sign of the times: the human sciences ("the most necessary of all the sciences," said Alexis Carrel) have not been forgotten. To be sure, the writers of the report do not ignore the existence of a notorious "inequality" among the research groups—which is one way of saying that alongside some teams that are given over to permanent prattling, others choose a more scientific approach. Obviously, there is much to do. Thus, our country is the only one that ignores the philosophy of science (Popper, Wittgenstein) so much. Furthermore, while history and demography pose few problems, much could also be said about psychology and sociology. At least, the weight of idealizing—as heavy as it used to be—is not so crushing as in the countries of the East: "In the Soviet Union," the authors write, "an ideology issuing from a 19th-century theory serves as the foundation of the regime and legitimizes the power of the party. In the West, no ideology comparable to Marxism-Leninism is taught as a state truth."

By drawing closer to the other sciences—especially to biology—sociology, psychology and ethnology are giving themselves the opportunity for a genuine renewal. The adepts of the human sciences have nothing to lose and much to learn, and in particular, by working in accordance with more rigorous standards, they can provide the scientists with valuable data. Thus, with regard to the well-known debate over the innate and the acquired, one could seek "the way in which the rules and values of social origin influence the genetic patrimonies in small groups in which it may be supposed that rules and values have remained relatively stable for a sufficient period of time." This means, of course, admitting that in the last analysis, genetic patrimonies must be different. But what scientist could seriously deny this?

As regards the human sciences, the report reveals several "weaknesses." Scientific psychology finds itself reduced to very few things. And at the turn of a page, one comes upon a curious eulogy of the "indispensable critical role of antipsychiatry" and of the challenging of psychopharmacology and a few pages on, psychopharmacology is flattered). This is what the geologists, working in quarries, would call an outlier: a deliberately preserved vestige of past time—in a word, one way among others of measuring the distance traveled.

11267
680: 3100

RETURN TO NATO MILITARY WING POSES CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

Athens TO VIPA in Greek 22 Oct 80 p 3

Article by Giorgos Kasimatis, Professor of Constitutional Law, Athens University Law School

Text 1. The government decision to reintegrate our country into the military wing of NATO, beyond its political significance which this writer is in no position to assess, raises the problem of properly observing the constitution and safeguarding the functioning of the political system. It is true that during the 5 years of our constitution, the respect for and faithful observance of its clauses has often caused problems and deviations. The significance of the foreign policy for the nation, however, and especially the current issue of our relations with NATO, makes the respect for the constitution a much more acute and serious issue than ever before. The responsibility for finding a correct solution falls no doubt on the government and the Chamber of Deputies.

The constitutional problem created by the reintegration into NATO is whether the agreement reached after long negotiations between the Greek government and NATO should be ratified by the Chamber of Deputies with a formal law.

Before we examine the peculiarities of the reintegration, let us take up the relevant constitutional clauses in their logical sequence:

Article 36, paragraph 2 states:

"Treaties concerning commerce, taxation, economic cooperation, and participation in international organisations or unions, and all other treaties which contain concessions which cannot be granted according to other constitutional clauses without a law, or which burden Greek citizens personally, are not valid without a formal law ratifying them."

Article 28, paragraph 3 states:

"Greece freely agrees, by a law enacted by the absolute majority of the entire number of deputies, to accept limitations to the exercise of its national sovereignty, provided this is dictated by an important national interest, does not adversely affect human rights or the foundations of the democratic polity and is accepted on the basis of equality and on condition of reciprocity."

Article 20, paragraph 2 states:

"To serve an important national interest and to promote cooperation with other countries it is possible to accept the jurisdiction of the organs of international organisations, according to the constitution, by signing a treaty or an agreement. The law ratifying such a treaty or agreement requires a three-fifths majority of the entire number of deputies."

The above clauses and especially article 36, paragraph 2, which is the basic clause on the signing of international treaties, show that our constitution, as is the case with the constitution of almost all other modern democracies, assigns the decisive authority for approving the important international agreements to the Chamber of Deputies. The government retains the authority and political responsibility for the negotiations. It carries out this responsibility in the context of its more general responsibility assigned to it by the constitution (article 82, paragraph 1) which states that (the government) "determines and directs the country's general policies according to the constitution and the laws." The last word, of course, belongs to the Chamber of Deputies which ratifies the treaty by passing a formal law. Naturally it has the authority to reject the ratifying bill but without it, according to article 35, paragraph 2, the treaty is not in force. It is generally agreed that without this law the treaty is invalid not only under domestic law but also with regard to the contracting parties or international organizations as provided by international law.

One may note that the provisions of the three articles presented above require a different majority for the enactment of the ratifying bill, depending on the significance of the obligations assumed under the treaty. In general, article 36, paragraph 2 requires only a simple majority of those present, provided the treaty does not fall under the other two articles. If the treaty imposes "limitations to national sovereignty," article 20, paragraph 3 requires the absolute majority of all the deputies (at least 151 affirmative votes). If the treaty contains the acceptance of "the jurisdiction of the organs of international organisations"—in other words, if the treaty grants to organs of international organisations such as NATO or the EEC responsibilities which the constitution itself assigns to constitutional organs such as the Chamber of Deputies, the government, the courts, and so forth—a three-fifths majority of the entire number of deputies is required (at least 180 votes).

2. Let us see which of the above clauses applies to the treaty for the reintegration into the NATO (military structure). There can be no serious doubt that the agreement contains limitations to our national sovereignty. Moreover, since there is a provision for the transit and stationing of allied troops on Greek soil, the treaty is subject, in addition to article 20, paragraph 3 and to article 27, paragraph 2 which require for the special case of transit or stationing of foreign troops, to a law approved by an absolute majority of the entire number of deputies (151). Beyond that: with the reinduction of our country into NATO we grant to certain organs of this organization command responsibilities over Greek armed forces. but the constitution assigns to the government the command of the Greek armed forces. (Article 45 states: "The president of the Republic is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the government exercises their command as the law requires.") In addition to this responsibility, the NATO organs determine, with binding force for Greece, the strategy and tactics of our national

defense. This responsibility being a political one belongs also to the government which determines and directs the country's policies according to article 82, paragraph 1. All this shows that our country's reintegration into the NATO military wing falls under article 26, paragraph 2 which requires ratification by a three-fifths majority of the total number of deputies. This view was accepted and applied during the ratification of the EEC treaty.

3. As we said previously, the agreement for the reinduction into the NATO military wing presents certain peculiarities. The peculiarities must be studied in order to solve the constitutional problem. Since we do not have the entire "file" of this case and since we have only incomplete information, we must base our reasoning on certain guesswork.

Let us look at this question following the sequence of events:

a. In August 1974, following the military invasion of Cyprus, our country withdrew from NATO's military wing, denouncing with a declaration of the premier of the first post-dictatorial government the protocol of 22 October 1951 which was ratified by Law 1289 of 12 February 1952, and which provided for the country's joining the North Atlantic Treaty.

According to press reports, the denunciation of the treaty had not been done properly (with a written declaration, and so forth). However, the denunciation does not require a law, neither under our constitution nor under international law. For this reason it cannot serve as an argument as to whether the agreement of reinduction requires ratification by law. If the withdrawal was not done properly with a declaration signed by the president of the Republic, it would be, in my view, incompatible with international norms and the spirit of the constitution to claim that because of the absence of proper procedural steps the initial treaty remained in full force and consequently the "reintegration" agreement is not a new agreement. Such arguments would be hard to accept even in private contracts under the most formalistic private law. Indeed, no one can dispute that 1) the withdrawal was real since 1974 to the present, 2) that all the member-states of the alliance recognised this fact, and 3) that this reality was the basis for the long negotiations with the other interested parties for the reintegration.

b. The long negotiations for the induction started and were conducted on two politically irrefutable bases: 1) that our country was out of the NATO military wing, and 2) that our reintegration was subject to new terms--regardless of whether it resulted in new terms or not. From what we know, neither the alliance nor any of the member-states considered Greece bound to the NATO military wing during the last 6 years.

c. We do not know the content of the new agreement. If it includes new terms, it is either a new agreement or an amendment of the old one and therefore there is no doubt that it requires ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. If it does not include new terms it is nevertheless a new, subsequent agreement which has followed--even if de facto--the partial dissolution of the first. And in such a case no one can deny that ratification by the Chamber of Deputies is essential.

The preceding indicate that the authority of the Chamber of Deputies to ratify the agreement cannot be bypassed. To claim that there was not a legally proper denunciation and ignore all the reality of governmental statements, negotiations, and so forth during the last 6 years, or that the agreement of reintegration is based on the old induction argument is like playing, in a way, "hide and seek" with the constitution and the popular assembly.

With these lines we do not seek to give a legally perfect and faultless solution to the question of observing the constitutional requirements with regard to the reinduction agreement. The major effort here is to underline the significance of observing the constitution and respecting the Chamber of Deputies in this instance. Anyway, the validity of the treaty is of interest to all and not just to the Greek side. The agreement will have no validity unless the constitutional requirements for ratification are observed. Parliament, debate and a vote of confidence may cover only the handling of the negotiations but they cannot cover the validity of the agreement. Even the basic treaty of NATO requires the observance of constitutional requirements, which in its article 11 follows the norms of international law. The question, then, must not be treated lightly. If there is indeed any desire to bypass the Chamber of Deputies without jeopardising the validity of the agreement, we should have--it is not too late for that--an effort to obtain the opinion of our specialists in our law schools, and to have a respected foundation at least from the fields of constitutional and international law.

Beyond the validity of the agreement, how can one tell the Greek people, in a political sense, after 6 years of hearing that the country was no longer part of the military wing of NATO, that the country had not been disassociated from NATO's military wing and that the Chamber of Deputies has no part to play with regard to the reintegration?

The legalistic arguments concerning the authority of the Chamber of Deputies--even if they could be presented in a respectable form--are designed to justify the effort to bypass the Chamber of Deputies. but this definitely does not reflect respect for the constitution and the popular sovereignty, especially when such an important national issue is at stake. The basic will of the framers of the question was to assign to the Chamber of Deputies the decisive vote, since it is there where according to the constitution both those supporting and those opposing the reintegration "represent the nation." Seeking arguments to bypass this will is neither in keeping with the political system nor is it politically prudent because any government effort to bypass the popular assembly and the popular will always prepares the ground for dangerous developments.

7520
CSR 14908

HUNGARY CHALLENGES EEC ACCESSION

Athens HELLENEMS EXPRESS in English 9 Oct 80 p 6

[Text] The Hungarian Government has taken action over Greece's imminent full EEC membership. During discussions on this subject at the latest GATT meeting, Hungary expressed reserve over the "legality" of Greece's accession to the EEC (Editor's comment: Why not similar reserve over the "legality" of the accession of the UK, Eire and Denmark, a short while ago?). Hungary also foresees "catastrophic" results on its trade with Greece as a result of such accession (and yet it is only last week that Hungary signed a new agreement with Greece on economic cooperation (refer item 5 in last week's issue). Hungary maintains that, according to the terms of its agreement with GATT, the conditions under which Greece is being admitted to the EEC constitute discriminatory treatment at the expense of Hungarian interests and against those of other countries with State-managed economies. The point is made that, whereas in the past, import restrictions which Greece felt obliged to impose at various times to preserve its gold and foreign currency reserves, used to affect all Greece's foreign suppliers equally, EEC exports to Greece will be immune from such restrictions from the 1st of January, 1981 onwards.

The common EEC agricultural policy is also a bone of contention about which, apart from Hungary, other nations as well such as the USA and Australia, have raised complaints. EEC representatives at the GATT convention made clear they are not willing to negotiate on this last point because the EEC has already made its policy on the subject known at the time when it was enlarged to include the UK, Eire and Denmark. Canada and Japan seem unhappy about the effect accession may have upon their participation in Greek Government procurements adjudication business. The talks on all these matters are likely to be protracted but it also seems clear that Greece will consider that appropriate EEC quarters collectively are more competent to deal with these complaints by third parties rather than its own diplomatic representations.

CSO: 4920

VOLUNTARY IMPORT RESTRAINT CONTINUES

Athens HELLENNEWS EXPRESS in English 9 Oct 80 pp 3, 4

[Text] In the light of the results mentioned in the preceding article, the Editor would like to refer readers back to item 1 on page 4 of HN 1197 of July 24th 1980, item 2 in HN 1198 of July 31st 1980 and item 3 in HN 1203 of September 4th 1980, all of which dealt with the vexed question of the indirect import restriction exercised over a fair range of goods through what has been known as the "gentlemen's agreement for self-imposed restraint on imports." This, it will be remembered, came into being early in the Spring of this year, after an outright five-month ban on imports of certain lines of goods imposed when the balance of payments took a very ugly turn in November 1979. It was an arrangement proposed by the State and accepted by importers in lieu of the outright ban which offended the letter of EEC practice to which Greece had committed itself in the meantime. After a few months' rumblings from the EEC and finally a letter from Mr. Thorn himself brought to the surface EEC objections to this arrangement also. Meanwhile, HELLENNEWS had forecast, in the extracts mentioned above, that despite any assurances which might be given to the contrary, one of them being that the voluntary restraint arrangement would be allowed to end on October 1st, 1980, the facts of the balance of payments situation remained basically unchanged, irrespective of whether the final sum on 31st December, 1980 might be \$2,300 or \$2,800 million in the red. It is largely because importers honoured their pledge that the year's deficit will now be much closer to the former than the latter figure.

Last week, Greek bankers at the IMF meeting in Washington, were busy arranging certain additional loans from various banking consortia to cover such gaps as the remaining inflow of net capital might fail to bridge. Under such circumstances, the situation is obviously back to square one where the option lies between allowing Greece to continue covert import controls over a sufficient range of articles to maintain the present healthy turn in the balance of payments account or pressing for the immediate implementation of earlier promises to free imports entirely which could well use up the entire gold and foreign currency reserve in a very brief period after which, willy-nilly, there could be no imports at all no matter what had been promised or agreed. As this would be an absurd situation, the forecast can again be ventured that, in one form or the other, voluntary or otherwise, import controls will have to continue in Greece in accordance with how the balance of payments shapes out.

CSO: 4920

THREAT TO SPLIT GENERAL CONFEDERATION REPORTED

Athens 1 VRAITHI in Greek 4 Oct 80 p 3

Part 7 The fronts professing democracy and the unity of the workers and employers are threatening to split the syndicalist movement of the country. Greek General Confederation of Labor (GSEE) Secretary General Ehr. Karakiteos revealed the divisive activities and the preparation of the plan for splitting GSEE during yesterday's first working session of the General Council which heard his progress report for the period since the Nineteenth Panhellenic Congress took place in November 1978 in Kalamata.

Referring to the important subjects of unemployment and inflation which have become particularly acute recently, Karakiteos said that they have hit especially the working people of the EEC countries and because of the explosive problems they have created, many organizations have been forced to project as their primary demand the ensuring of jobs for all working people.

With regard to the country's admission into EEC, Karakiteos said that GSEE unanimously approved such a step and had also worked very actively among various EEC agencies and friendly syndicalist organizations for ensuring that the admission will not be at the expense of the Greek workers and employees.

He then spoke on various General Council business and on the most important GSEE demands, especially those concerning increases to the minimum wage, the daily wage, and pensions. He pointed out the need for a cost-of-living increase in wages, salaries, and pensions on the basis of a jointly acceptable price index and also the need to cover the difference which resulted from the increase in the price index during 1980.

With regard to the government income policy and the economic situation of the working people, Karakiteos said that the minimum daily wages lost 1.9 percent of their purchasing power in 1979 while the minimum salaries lost 2.4 percent.

"Today," he said, "we are facing a new failure as concerns the government outlook for a price index increase by 15 percent in 1980. For this reason we denounce the General National Employment Collective Agreement and at the same time we insist on the recent GSEE demand for increasing the special untaxable limit of the annual income of unskilled workers and for adjusting the income tax scales to the cost-of-living index on a regular basis so that the income of the working people will not be jeopardized by nominal increases.

Investments

On the question of investments the GSME secretary general stressed the need to chart a national policy with the concurrence of all parties and to enact a law framework which will facilitate the immediate implementation of public and private sector investments with the participation of organizations whose reserve funds should be utilized by investing part of them in creating new employment opportunities.

Social Insurance, Housing Loans

With regard to social insurance and the protection of the health of the working people, Karakitsos pointed out that the GSME exerted great efforts toward their improvement. He said that:

- a. The federation continues its efforts for the establishment of minimum pensions at 80 percent of the unskilled worker income.
- b. The Social Insurance Foundation IKA is not fully manned and, thanks to GSME efforts, the government committee is holding discussions for the purpose of filling the vacancies.
- c. IKI has a deficit of 1.5 billion drachmas due to uncollected legislated resources instead of having a surplus which should reach 8 to 9 billion drachmas.
- d. Measures have been taken for improving the conditions of the health relief given to working people.
- e. Increase of the allowances, and so forth.

In the area of housing for the working people there are great delays and GSME insists on its demand for the immediate appropriation of 1.7 billion drachmas (for 1980) and 5.5 billion drachmas more for 1981.

Karakitsos pointed out the need to establish a Working Peoples Bank as well as consumer and procuring cooperatives for serving the needs of the working people.

With regard to GSME's position toward the Social and Economic Policy Council, he reiterated the federation's demand for equal representation in the administrative bodies and revealed that the government has given assurances that the demand will be satisfied.

Mr. Papageorgiou

The GSME General Council meeting was opened by N. Papageorgiou who in his remarks referred to the progress of the country's syndicalist movement and to the criticism exercised by all sides and concluded:

"In order to properly serve the working people we represent, we must first serve properly the nation, the democratic system, and the social whole. Any other definition about our class struggle is wrong and misleading. With the conviction that all delegates will appreciate the various speakers and that the latter will reciprocate, I salute our General Council and wish success to its meeting."

The General Council sessions continued into the afternoon with reports by GSKE executive councilors and speeches by representatives of federations and labor centers. GSKE Executive Councilor Dim. Doukas spoke on organisational matters and pointed out that the main factors for coping with organisational weaknesses are three:

- a. The movement unity which is the alpha and omega of the whole labor syndicalist movement.
- b. The mass expansion of the labor unions.
- c. The renewal of the movement through its reorganisation and restructure on modern foundations.

Doukas said that the splintering of the movement's organised forces impairs its organisational foundation and impedes its proper development, its becoming massive, self-sustained, strong and able to respond to its social mission. He added:

"With conviction and determination to develop a massive, united, renewed, strong and able syndicalist movement not only for promoting the interests of our class but also for defending our democratic system of government, the freedoms and rights of the Greek people and for safeguarding civil democracy as well as social democracy, let us all together and united join in the struggle for the promotion of our ideas and for further strengthening the foundation of the institution." Pavrikos, Gryparis, Baskainas, and Theofanopoulos spoke on matters concerning auxiliary insurance funds, work compensation, Law 3239/55, working women, and international relations.

The General Council sessions are continuing today also with discussions on the administrative progress report and relevant recommendations. The meeting will be adjourned tomorrow following the debate on the recommendation to restructure the budget from 10 January 1980 and 1982 and after voting for approval of the administrative and financial progress reports and for the election of 10 Administrative Council members, 17 General Council members, 4 Auditing Committee members and a 7-member committee which will monitor the implementation of the special rules of procedures.

The committee under whose supervision the elections will take place consists of Baskainas, Basinas, Iordanidis, Thomaidis, and Khristopoulos. The GSKE General Council presidium received from councilors, representatives of federations and labor centers of the extreme Left (United Antidictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating) a memo stating the following, in part:

- a. The position of the country's working people is becoming worse day by day as a result of the inflation, high prices, and the government's policy of austerity.
- b. Responsible for this situation are not only the government, big employers, and monopolies, but the GSKE administration as well.
- c. The split in the syndicalist movement is due to the implementation by the GSKE leadership of the tactic concerning sanctions and dismissals.

Finally, a proposal is being debated to hold a special congress within 1 year for amending the constitution.

NEW INDUSTRIAL PLANTS BANNED IN ATHENS, SALONICA

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 8 Oct 80 p 3

Text The draft law introduced in the Chamber of Deputies on new incentives for regional economic development as approved by the Government Committee is designating Athens and Salonic as zones where the establishment of new plants is banned for economic reasons. On the other hand, for the areas of Lavrion, Korinthia nome, and a strip in Attiki nome bordering Korinthia nome, some subsidies will be provided but only for expanding or modernizing already existing plants. As is known, the draft law provides for free state subsidies to private enterprises.

Since no financial assistance is provided for private investors in the above areas (editor's note: besides the fact that for pollution reasons the establishment of new plants or the expansion of existing ones is closely watched by the Ministry of Industry), these zones can be characterized as "closed" for economic reasons.

The level of the state assistance provided by the draft law for other sections of the country depends on the area as well as on the nature of the enterprise and can reach up to 60 percent of the total investment. (Editor's note: The areas and the percentages of the economic assistance are given at the end of this article.)

Other Conveniences

In the meantime, the Ministry of Coordination continues the effort of facilitating the investors by eliminating some difficulties, simplifying certain bureaucratic procedures, and so forth. Thus, at a meeting of Stratigis and Sofoulis, secretaries general of the Ministries of Coordination and Civilization, respectively, and other employees of the two ministries it was decided that:

a. The Archeological Council should meet once a month to investigate the location the investors have proposed for plants, while a group from the Civilization Ministry will make an on-the-spot study of the very location of the installations and give a prompt report to the concerned parties.

b. Later, an agency should undertake to prepare maps for use by investors, industrialists, and so forth, showing the zones banning the installation of plants for the protection of the environment and so on, as well as the areas where no obstacles exist (such as the possibility of existence of archeological items, and so forth) for the installation of plants.

Areas

For industrial and tourist enterprises the draft law divides the country into the following areas.

Area A: It includes the Attiki nome except for the Kythira province; the Korinthia nome section beyond the canal (Corinth) and bordering Attiki nome; the Salonica province in Thessaloniki nome except the section west of the Axios River and the Hellenic Industrial Development (ETVA) area. (Editor's Note: State assistance will be granted only for the modernization of units for saving energy or for the protection of the environment, and so forth.)

Area B: This area includes Korinthia nome, except the section beyond the canal and bordering Attiki nome; Akhaia nome except the Kalamata province; the Thivai province in Voiotia nome; Evvoia nome except the island of Skyros; Magnisia nome; Larissa nome except the Kassan province; Pieria nome; the Imathia province in Imathia nome; the Giannites province in Pella nome; Kilkis nome except the 20-kilometer zone from the border; the Langadas province; the section west of the Axios River and the ETVA industrial area in Thessaloniki nome; Khalkidiki nome; Fthiotis nome except the Domokos province; the ETVA industrial areas in the Irakleion nome (Crete) and the city of Irakleion. (Editor's Note: In this case the state assistance represents 20 to 30 percent of the investment depending on the nature of the enterprise.)

Area C: This area includes the rest of the country's areas. (Editor's Note: For this area the state free assistance fluctuates between 30 and 50 percent depending on the enterprise's activity.)

Note: By exception, the Lavreotiki municipality in Attiki nome; the Korinthia nome section beyond the canal and bordering Attiki nome; and the Salonica province in Thessaloniki nome except the section west of the Axios River and the ETVA industrial zone are considered as Area B areas for the enterprises of the cases a, b, c, and d of paragraph 1, article 2 of the present law which (enterprises) existed in these areas when the law went into force for productive investments or for modernising their installations in accordance with the limitations provided in paragraph 1, article 12 and paragraph 3 of article 13 of this law.

Hotels: For implementing the provisions of the law on hotel enterprises the country is divided as follows:

Area A: It includes Attiki nome except the Kythira province; Thessaloniki nome; Irakleion nome (Crete) except the provinces of Pyrgiotissa, Kainourgion, Mono-fatsion, and Viannos; the Mirambellos province in Lassithion nome (Crete); the municipality of Rhodes and the communities of Trianda, Koskinou, Kremasti, Kalythies, Psinithos, Paradeisi, Maritza, Thologos, Damastris, Pastida in the island of Rhodes; the municipality of Kos and the communities of Asfendion and Pylion in the island of Kos; the municipality of Kerkira (Corfu) and the communities of Alepou, Evropoula, Kato Korakiana, Moraitika, Banites, Strongyli, Gastourion, Kynopiasta, and Kanali in Kerkira island; and the islands of Skiathos and Mykonos (no assistance is given to enterprises in this area, but, by exception, for traditional buildings an assistance equal to 50 percent of the investment is given just as is the case in other areas).

Area B: It includes Evvoia nome except the island of Skyros and the Isthmia province; the nomes of Veiotia, Fthiotis, and Larissa except the Klasson province; Magnisia nome except the island of Skiathos; Akhaia nome except the Kalavryta province; the nomes of Korinthia, Argolis, Pieria, Khalkidiki, and Rethymni except the provinces of Amarin and Agios Nikolaos; Khania nome except the provinces of Selino and Sfakia; the provinces of Kavala and Nestos in Kavala nome; the provinces of Siteia, Lasithion, and Ierapetra in Lasithion nome (Crete); the provinces of Pyrgiotissa, Kainourgion, Minofatision, and Vianos in Irakleion nome (Crete); the islands of Tinos, Paros in Kyklades nome; the municipality of Dafni in Fokis nome, and the islands of Rhodes, Kos, and Kerkira except for their sections included in Area A. (Editor's Note: In this area the free financial assistance is up to 20 percent.)

Area C: It includes the rest of the country's areas. (Editor's note: The assistance in this case reaches up to 35 percent.)

7520
CSO:4908

PROGRESS IN SOLAR ENERGY APPLICATION REPORTED

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 18 Sep 80 p 18

(Text) Within the framework of the government's mobilized effort on behalf of solar energy which the articles of OIKONOMIKOS have called forth, the following governmental announcement was issued which is of particular interest because of its informative nature:

In a general review of the present situation concerning research and applications in the sector of solar energy which took place at the meeting of 25 July 1980 at the Ministry of Coordination under the chairmanship of Secretary General S. Stratigis, reference was made to the following specific activities and programs which are now at various stages of development:

1. Active and passive systems: Solar systems in building construction. (Production of hot water and the heating-cooling of buildings).

1) Solar village No. 1. Frangokastellon, Crete. Agency: National Energy Council (ESE). Expenditure for the first phase of the study--around 9.6 million drachmas (\$244,000), of which 7 million drachmas (\$183,000) represents the participation, in foreign exchange, of the U.S. Department of Energy. The next phase of the project, which will be an applications study, is expected to be a purely Greek concern, with an expenditure of about 6 million drachmas. There are prospects for some financing of the applications by the EEC or by international organizations.

2) Solar village No. 2. Workers' housing. Agios Nikolaos, Crete. Agency: Research and Applied Technology Service (YEET), with the participation of the Autonomous Organization for Workers' Housing (AOEK) and the ESE. Expenditure--720,000 drachmas for a study by two designing offices of a heating and hot-water solar system for two complexes in this housing project.

3) Solar village No. 3. Workers' housing. Lykovrysi, Attiki. Agency: YEET, AOEK, with the ESE participating and in cooperation with the German Ministry for Research and Technology. Expenditure: First phase of study--1.3 million drachmas; second phase of study--Greek share of 14 million drachmas, German share of 3.7 million marks, of which 1.1 million marks will go to a Greek study group. Also expected is a significant German contribution to construction costs in covering the additional expenditures entailed by the project's prototype character.

4) Planning of communities and their energy systems. Agency: EEE. International program for energy-saving systems at the community level, including both solar energy and passive systems. Greek share: 870,000 in drachmas. International share: \$170,000 (United States, West Germany, Italy). The program is being handled by the EEE with the help of a Greek designing office.

5) Study on passive systems for saving energy in the Greek home. Agency: Polytechnic School of Salonic, Prof N. Papadopoulos. Financing: 850,000 drachmas from the YΕΕΤ. Also, the above group headed by Prof N. Papadopoulos has been commissioned by the EEE to do an additional study of the technical and economic possibilities and the institutional and organizational prerequisites for successfully effecting heat-insulation improvements in existing buildings. Agency: EEE; total expenditure: 970,000 drachmas.

6) Heating of swimming pools (Agios Nikolaos and Irakleion in Crete, Pyrgos, Ilyria near Athens, Larisa, Xanthi). Agency: General Secretariat of Athletics. Total expenditure: 62 million drachmas. A relevant proposal for partial financing has been submitted to the EEC. It is estimated that more than 800,000 liters of petroleum can be saved per year.

7) Children's village in Vari, Attiki. Agency: YΕΕΤ. Expenditure: 500,000 drachmas for an applications study of solar systems.

2. Agricultural applications:

1) Construction and operation of new greenhouse systems. This includes the utilization of solar energy for their heating. Agencies: YPGE/AGSA (expansion of YPGE unknown; expansion of AGSA: Supreme Agricultural School of Athens). Total expenditure: 47.5 million drachmas, of which 9.5 million drachmas are covered by the Research and Technology Program (EPET) of the Scientific Research and Technology Service (YΕΕΤ) (sic), and the remainder by funds of the agency.

2) Study on adapting new farms in the area of Frangokastellon, Khania in line with the prevailing climatological conditions. In this program as well, some heating of greenhouses with solar energy is anticipated. Agency: Khania Institute of Subtropical Plants and Olive Trees. Total expenditure: 38.44 million drachmas, of which 14.62 million drachmas is from the YΕΕΤ within the framework of the EPET, and the remainder from the budget of the agency.

3) Drying of fruit by solar energy. Program is within the framework of a bilateral cooperation agreement between the YΕΕΤ and the German Ministry for Research and Technology. Agency: Agricultural Research Center of Crete and Islands. Expenditure: The drawing up of the budget for this project is being done jointly with German experts.

3. Systems for the production of electric power:

1) Participation in the program of the International Energy Organization for the construction of two solar stations for producing electricity with a power of 500 kilowatts each in Almeria, Spain. One station is operated by the central-tower system and the other by a parabolic mirror with a linear focus. Agency: EEE. Expenditure: 2 million German marks over a 4-year period (1979-1982).

2) Construction of a solar station with a power of 10 kilowatts, using a plane mirror. Agency: "Demokratiki" Research Center, within the framework of the bilateral cooperation agreement with the German Ministry for Research and Technology and the YIET. Expenditure: 4-5 million drachmas on the Greek side. On the German side, providing a significant part of the field of collectors and the special low-temperature turbogenerator for the production of electricity.

3) Photoelectric station with a power of 50 kilowatts, with an experimental station of 2 kilowatts at Kythnos. Agency: Joint program of the DEI (Public Power Corporation), the EVA (Hellenic Industrial Development Bank), the YIET, and the EEC in cooperation with the French COME organization. Expenditure: Total of about 5 million French francs. Greek share is 30 percent in drachmas. COME share is 20 percent, and research funds of the EEC, 50 percent. The relevant proposal has been submitted to the EEC.

4) Arrangements between the EEC and the U.S. Department of Energy for a joint program on the study and construction of a photoelectric station for pumping water in agricultural applications. Agency: DEI, EEC, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy. Anticipated expenditure: A maximum of \$500,000, with 50-percent Greek participation, mainly in drachmas, and 50 percent participation by the U.S. Department of Energy.

5) Work toward the construction of a large solar station for producing electricity with a power of 20 megawatts in Crete, Rhodes, or the southern Peloponnese. Agency: Joint program of the EEC and YIET with the German Ministry for Research and Technology. Expenditure: 650,000 drachmas, with Greek researchers assigned the task of choosing and evaluating suitable sites in the Greek area.

Estimate of total costs of the study for and construction of the project: About 500 million marks, of which 27 million have already been spent by the German Ministry for Research and Technology, and another 45 million marks are expected to be spent for the complete applications study on the system and for the testing of its components. The remaining expenditures concern the construction and experimental operation and evaluation of the station if the German ministry decides to go ahead with its construction.

For there to be good chances that the project will be constructed in Greece, it must count on a Greek participation of 60-70 million marks, for the most part in drachmas, which will include land, infrastructure projects, buildings, certain equipment and machinery, and personnel for assembling, operating, connecting up to the supply grid, and evaluating this installation.

4. Development of Technology

1) Prototype plane solar collector at the University of Patras. Agency: University of Patras; Prof. B. Filippidis. Financing during the first phase: 3 million drachmas by the EEC. Second phase: 6.5 million drachmas by the YIET.

2) Programs by the University of Athens for a photoelectric cell and by the University of Thessaloniki for a solar station of 5 megawatts. Agency: YIET.

Aside from the above-mentioned programs, there are also many others in various agencies, such as in the Advanced Educational Institutions, in governmental

research centers such as the "Dimokritos," as well as in private enterprises and industries. Also, certain programs are being planned in the biomass sector, which is a very important possibility, and these programs are receiving the special attention of the YEET and the EEE.

This review of the present situation has shown that the activities which are in progress today in Greece in the sector of the utilization of solar energy are already noteworthy, but their coordination and the securing of continuity is of the utmost importance for their completion.

With these activities, what we are looking for is the development of solar applications always to the extent that these are economically competitive with other means for meeting our energy needs, and we also want to acquire a technological infrastructure such that with the anticipated gradual development of these applications the country will be able to play a significant role in solar-related construction and industrial production.

It should be pointed out that we should expect the gradual application of systems for exploiting solar energy based on economic criteria will meet about 2 percent of the total needs of our country in the next 5 years, with a gradual increase in this percentage in subsequent years. For this reason, we should not reduce our effort to develop other energy sources as well, nor the effort to save energy both in the household and in the industrial sector, which offers great possibilities. Thus, for saving on energy in buildings, the importance of insulation and of passive systems has just as much weight.

In any case, since Greece has the basic raw material to a better degree than other European countries and since, as was mentioned above, it has already done significant work in the sector of the development of research and applications, the intention of the government in the solar-energy field is to develop whatever is economically best in the area of exploiting solar energy.

This aim also includes on the one hand the procuring of additional funds both from local and from international sources, and above all from financing anticipated from the European Community, and on the other hand the realizing in Greece of research and applications programs with international participation. Thus, soon our country will develop into an international center for the studying and developing of systems for the economic collecting and conversion of solar energy.

12114

CCN: 4010

SUPREME COURT DECIDES AGAINST PENSION CEILING

Athens : KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Sep 80 p 4

(Text) A real commotion has developed recently among the insurance funds because of Decision 913/1980 by the plenum of the Areios Pagos, with which the barrier of pension ceilings which certain insurance funds place on their pensioners was judged unconstitutional. This decision refers to the obligation of such a fund to henceforth pay the pension without restriction, because otherwise this "violates" the constitutional provision concerning equality, but it made the decision appealable on the basis of Article 559, Number 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Of course, Deputy Minister Ger. Apostolatos, who is in charge of social-insurance matters, found himself at the center of this whirlpool, and he spontaneously reacted against such a development, which would permit pensions to paid henceforth at that level of 222,000 drachmas per month which was publicized by a certain bank.

Ger. Apostolatos undoubtedly has done a noteworthy job in his sector. With 35 institutional bills and about 200 presidential decrees, he has reformed the institution of social insurance and has created the necessary legislative network for a balanced social treatment in this sector.

For this reason, we asked Mr Apostolatos to comment on the consequences of the decision by the Areios Pagos.

"It is," he says, "a decision which upsets the insurance equilibrium existing up to now, and which in any case creates critical conditions which markedly alter the social insurance sector. I am not qualified, of course, to judge a decision by a supreme court such as the Areios Pagos, but I can draw certain conclusions from my daily insurance experience and the conditions which prevail in other countries."

But let us first look at the grounds adduced for this decision, which state, among other things, the following:

"Reasons of a more general social and public interest do not justify the legislating of the unfavorable discrimination in question against certain insured parties who are relatively better remunerated compared to the others. In no way are these reasons valid here, nor does the concurrence of a need to safeguard the economic stability of the fund emerge as such a reason, when it is achieved through the fixing of a pension ceiling to the detriment of those who have received a greater pay while burdening these through the payment of insurance

contributions of a greater amount, to the benefit of the financially weaker insured parties and pensioners. Therefore the regulation in question conflicts with the constitutional provision concerning equality, and consequently it is unenforceable and incapable of being applied."

The Social-Insurance Contribution

Gen. Apostolatos continues by saying that we need to stress that two important factors have weight with respect to the level of the pensionary grant:

1. The distribution system now existing for awarding a pension. That is, the fact that more insured persons are paying contributions in order that the corresponding amounts will be created when the grants to the pensioners are paid. Never do these contributions reflect in terms of equivalence the monies of the multiplied grant. For this reason, all insured people desire to claim and purchase years of insurance, since they know that these sums which will be paid in will be collected by them many times over.

2. The fact that in most insurance funds there are extensive social-insurance monies which, in the eventual grant are distributed to the detriment of the low-income pensioners. Thus, if the community as a whole contributes 50 percent of its resources to a fund, the 60,000-drachma pensioner will benefit from a 30,000-drachma social fund, whereas the 6,000-drachma pensioner will avail himself only of 3,000 drachmas. This is socially unjust, since the social revenues ought to be distributed proportionately to everybody as long as they do not represent individualized contributions. This finding, continues Gen. Apostolatos, confirms the view that:

a) There should be an insurance "ceiling"--that is, a maximum pensionary grant at reasonable levels and within the more general capabilities of the economy.

b) Highly-paid insured persons should contribute by dues above those of the level of their insurable salary for the sake of strengthening the revenues of the fund so as to improve the position of the low-income pensioners. By the way, this practice is successfully implemented in West Europe.

Furthermore, he says, I want to point out that accepting the position of the plenum of the Areios Pagos gives rise to a whole series of successive complications in the insurance system, since:

- It will circumvent the socially just principle which was established recently by Law 825/1979 so that the dues of the funds would not be stripped away by fictitious high wages in the last 2 years before pensioning for the purpose of receiving correspondingly large grants.

- It will suspend the likewise recent settlement on the reasonable distribution of the successive insurance coverage and grants in the separate agencies, since it will permit high salaries of the recent period alone to be awarded by large pensions disproportionate to the level of the monetary amounts which were paid into insurance funds previous to the most recent agency.

Contra, Decision by the Council of State

But these are not only our own views. There are decisions of the Council of State which confirm the soundness of the kind of insurance practice being followed domestically and internationally. I will mention, says the deputy minister, the characteristic grounds of the recent Decision 2183/1980 by the plenum of the Council of State.

In regulating the insurance contributions and grants, in principle a correspondence must be observed between the contributions and the insurance grants. But it is not dictated either from the constitutional principle of equality or from a general principle of law on social insurance that the insurance contributions and grants must be fixed on the same payroll basis, and consequently it is not precluded that following an assessment of the risks covered by the insurance organization a payroll basis can be stipulated as a regulation for the calculation of pensions which is different from that on the basis of which the insurance contributions are prescribed.

Appeal to the Special Supreme Court

These diametrically opposite positions of the two highest courts of our country obliges us, concludes Ger. Apostolatos, to resort to the special supreme court whose convening is provided for by Article 100 of the Constitution.

I have, he says, assigned already the drawing up of the text of the appeal, and I hope that this process will make headway very soon.

Meanwhile, we will suspend, of course, approval on decisions of insurance funds having these extremely critical insurance conditions, such as the case which was revealed at the Agricultural Bank of Greece, whose insurance fund would otherwise have to pay, according to its obligation, to a certain pensioner a principal pension of 164,569 drachmas a month and a subsidiary pension of 57,687 drachmas--that is, a total of 222,256 drachmas.

Moreover, the suspension of the decision of the Areios Pagos will permit a continuation of the regular flow of the so-called minimum pensions--that is, levels of grants which are barely adequate and inadequate, in proportion to the contributions which the low-income pensioner has paid, which often are insignificant or almost nonexistent.

The judicial judgment of proportional contributions will bring these pensions to the unacceptable levels of only 250 or 300 drachmas per month.

12114

CGO: 4918

LABOR LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS REPORTED

Athens ELEFTHEROYPIA in Greek 24 Sep 80 p 8

[Text] The maximum compensation to wage-earners provided by Law 2112 is being increased from 600,000 to 1,000,000 drachmas. The dismissal of a pregnant worker whose terms of employment were for an indefinite period of time is forbidden and is absolutely invalid, provided that the pregnancy is known to the employer. In the future, all young workers from the age of 15 up and workers who have reached their 65th birthday, and who up to now have not had the right to be insured, will be covered by unemployment insurance.

The above are provided for in the draft of a law in which provisions of the present labor laws are replaced, modified, and supplemented--a legislative act which will be debated in the Chamber of Deputies and which is considered to be one of the most important acts of the Ministry of Labor within the last 3 years.

Included among the other provisions of this bill are also the following:

The provisions of articles of the decision by the second-degree court (No. 6/1979) are ratified which concern: A reduction in the working hours, the equal treatment of all salary-earners with respect to the duration of leave time, a 50-percent increase in leave time for working pupils, students, and undergraduates, and the introduction of a special 6-day study leave with full pay for working students.

A prohibition is introduced against the intercession by natural or legal entities for the enlistment of Greeks for employment abroad, and severe penalties are provided for violators.

The issue, unresolved for decades, about the manner of calculating the holiday bonuses (Christmas and Easter) is being settled in a permanent way: in the future, these will be called "holiday allowances." At the same time, the granting of these allowances is dealt with in a decisive way with respect to all categories of workers who offer their services to an employer not providing permanent employment.

On the basis of other provisions of the bill:

- Incentives and monthly monetary support are ordered for the children of Greek workers abroad who will be attending classes of the host country or tutorial departments of professional and vocational education for the purpose of acquiring

the means for their entry into the educational system of the foreign country.

- The provisions are put into effect of collective agreements or arbitration decisions which concern accountants or assistant accountants in the private sector and those employed in this field, on their access to infirmaries and other institutions which are designed for the protection of the public health.
- Provisions are made for Greek participation in expenditures for the vocational training of Greek workers in West Germany, the purpose being to improve their position in that country and also, in case of their return, so that they may have the chance of being employed at last as a skilled labor force.

In his statements to the journalists yesterday, Minister of Labor K. Laskaris said that "the principle of the bill has already been ratified unanimously by the parliamentary committee--a fact which offers the well-grounded hope that this bill will be passed also by the section of the Chamber of Deputies in a very short time."

Provisions for Special Categories

On the basis of the same bill, the following provisions are made for those employed in the Social Policy Organizations--which are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor:

1. a) All the contracts of the employee and technical personnel who are employed in organizations under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor and who have a private-law employment status are converted by law into agreements of indefinite term. Also, the possibility is offered that the workers in this category may be given permanent status and placed in vacant permanent positions or in new positions formed in accordance with the needs of the organizations.
- b) A number of other matters are settled concerning the employees of the Ministry of Labor and the Social Policy Organizations under its jurisdiction.

2. As for the longshoremen:

- a) Provisions are made for the formation of a special account for the purpose of granting a marriage benefit to both freight handlers on land and at the ports, and other related matters concerning them are settled.
- b) Personnel matters are regulated concerning the compensation funds of longshoremen.

Finally, the following provisions are also made in the same bill:

It is envisaged that salaried employees be given a detailed settlement memorandum on the level of their pay and the withholdings which were made, so as to provide them with complete information and so as to avoid complaints and disputes with their employers.

The outdated system now in effect for checking those receiving unemployment compensation, who have been obligated to appear twice a week at the appropriate services, is now abolished. Thus, the unemployed will not suffer undue hardship and about 8,000 man-hours will be saved monthly for use in other sectors under the jurisdiction of the DAZD (Labor Force Employment Organization).

IRAKLEION CITY EXISTICS PLANNED

Athens TA Nr. in Greek 29 Sep 80 p 5

[Article by N. Vidakis]

(Text) Irakleion--The final phase has been reached of the design for the conversion of Irakleion into one of the nine rival cities of Athens (by KEPA (Productivity Center)), and for better or worse, this will be decisive to the future of the area.

The third and last phase was discussed at the last meeting of the municipal council, at which the views of the local leading figures were formulated. A public posting of the plan still remains to be done, and the presidential decree remains to be drawn up, as is provided for by Law 947 "concerning ekistic areas."

Following a report by the city-plan committee and by the Technical Chamber of Greece-Eastern Crete Section, the municipal council settled on a final text with the views which it thinks should be contained in the presidential decree.

These groups accept the proposal of the designing office that the Irakleion urban complex be divided up into seven districts with a total population of 180,000 residents by the year 2000, which will extend from the present limits of the community of Alikarnassos up to about the limits of the community of Gazi. To the south, the study's proposal is also accepted on establishing as a limit the new national highway of Agios Nikolaos-Irakleion-Khania, aside from an enclave in the area of Agios Giannis-Fortetsa, where a new ekistic district is being formed.

The Airport

As for the matter of the airport and the harbor, the municipality and the Technical Chamber find themselves in confrontation with the designing office. Specifically, the local agencies are asking that an expediency study be done before any new work, whereas the design favors the extension of the airport toward the sea without a preceding study.

As for the port of Irakleion, the local agencies also prefer its more systematic and gradual development, whereas the designing office bases the projects concerning an ample expansion of the port in the first phase of the designing study.

There is complete disagreement with this design in what concerns the cemeteries, the vegetable market, and the area for the garbage dump. The municipality is requesting that it alone be allowed to choose these areas.

Significant disagreements have arisen also on the subject of locating the industrial sector. On the one hand, the local agencies agree with the proposal on the greatest expansion possible of the existing industrial area, but they are in disagreement with respect to the two new areas which the design proposes for incorporation in the plan. The locations in question are an area south of the national highway at the "Poinikia" site, and the "Skafidara" area, a portion of which is presently being used for the dumping of the municipality's refuse.

Of course, there is not complete agreement among the local agencies on the subject of the industrial locations. The Technical Chamber does not concur on legitimizing the industrial region of Poinikia, which is already polluting Irakleion and which splits it in half, whereas the municipality agrees on the one hand that an industrial area should be established there, but it wants this to be smaller in area than what the design provides for.

In the opinion of the TEE (Technical Chamber of Greece), it is considered unlikely that the EYVA (Hellenic Industrial Development Bank) will buy back this area, where the cost of land is large, in which case the industries which will locate there will not have the benefits conferred by the nome. It is emphasized in addition that:

The area of Poinikia is one of the most fertile areas in southern Irakleion, in which a few years ago one of the smallest but most important irrigation projects of the nome was carried out.

The University City

The municipality and the TEE-Eastern Crete Section also disagree with the designer about certain of the proposals which it makes for the permanent location of the university.

They propose to commit themselves to a larger area than the 1,000 stremmas provided by the designer for the future needs of the university. And specifically they propose that the area from Metokhi of Agakos up to the national highway should be committed--an area of about an equal number of stremmas more.

They also do not accept the proposal to develop various small residential sections in the vicinity of the university, their argument being that the university area is adequately large for every activity connected with the staying there of the students.

"Metokhi of Agakos," which the designing office specifically proposes to develop realistically, was the area which was initially expected to become the university city, but this came to nothing because the well-known pressures were exerted by the family of Kefalogiannis.

As for the areas of illegal structures, which form a tight ring around Irakleion, the municipality and the TEE-Eastern Crete Section propose different systems of construction from those provided for in the design.

As is known, the illegal structures are profuse in Irakleion. Their number exceeds 5,000 buildings. And they cover a large part of the area of the new city plan. The scientific experts believe that if the houses frames which have been constructed illegally up to now are completed, they can house a large part of the future population which the ministry anticipates will move to Irakleion. These structures, many of which are built for investment purposes and are five-story and six-story buildings, have been constructed entirely without planning, and they create miserable environmental conditions for the residents, and they often turn into social "ghettos."

On these grounds, the proposal of the design study was not accepted on putting into effect in the areas of illegal structures the system of "regulatory terms on construction," and instead it is proposed that the designer for the next phase (city planning) should stipulate that system of construction. It is also stressed that the "regulatory terms on construction" is the system which has prevailed up to now and which has had the result that cities such as Irakleion have not completed their regulatory plan even after decades of its implementation.

More specifically, the TEE-Eastern Crete Section believes that at this phase we should not commit the city-planning studies to establishing a system of construction for any reason.

The Extension of the Plan

Differing proposals have been made by the municipality and the TEE-Eastern Crete Section in connection with the extension of the plan to new areas. And especially west of Irakleion, toward the community of Gazi. In this area and on the outskirts of the planned city there is the well-known "Khalepa of Kefalogiannis," with an area of about 1,000 stremmas, whose landlords have reached the final stage of proceedings on the creation of a settlement there. If the proposal to develop these areas of the Gazi community by the system of "active city planning" is finally accepted, immediately the Kefalogiannis family will have the opportunity to proceed to the legalization of its settlement. The benefits from such a concession are figured to be in the billions of drachmas.

For the present, the Technical Chamber is opposed to having these areas incorporated into the Irakleion urban complex. And it justifies its view with the argument that the efforts ought to be concentrated on only a few areas where it is feasible for the necessary infrastructure projects to be carried out, and that Irakleion should not be spread out to such an extent that its development will be uncontrolled, resulting in a return of the present anarchy.

On the other hand, the municipality of Irakleion sets conditions for accepting the incorporation of these areas into the plan. Specifically, it puts forward the positions:

The development of these areas should not be done by private agencies and should not take precedence over other development, but should come after the reconstruction work in the areas of illegal structures, and the municipality should participate decisively in the partnership for the organized construction.

Concerning all these things, the TEE-Eastern Crete Section observes that they cannot be brought to force because there is relevant legislation on this which

cannot be overturned by a presidential decree like that which will be effected for the Irakleion of the year 2000.

The municipality and the TEE are requesting that nothing be enacted except that which the local agencies of Irakleion agree to for their city. And they are asking for the studies on the city-planning phase which follows to proceed forward as rapidly as possible, as well as the studies on those projects which it is thought are of urgent importance for Irakleion. Such studies are the developmental study, the reconstruction of the substandard-dwelling areas, the completion of studies on the water supply and the sewer system, a traffic and airport study, remodeling of the city within the city walls, an administrative center, and so forth.

Among the projects which they request should be begun on a priority basis are the road from the port to the Katsamba junction, the coastal thoroughfare, the parking areas around the city walls, the opening up of the streets of the present city plan, the development and extension of the present industrial area, and so forth.

12114

CSO: 4908

WOMEN DETERMINED TO CHANGE 'FAMILY LAW'

Athens EXORMISI in Greek 4 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Athina Rapitou: "Women's Equality in the 'Drawer'"]

[Text] It seems that--for yet another time--Greek law will deal with us women like eternal minors and intellectual invalids, legislating our position in the four walls of our house. Here are several of its principles:

1. It allows us to marry at the age of 14, but we lose our surname, citizenship and nationality and pass from paternal authority to the guardianship of our husbands.
2. It gives us the right to work, as long as our husband allows it, at the same time giving our husband the right to control us in daily transactions and correspondence and it compels us--according to the law, at any rate--to look after the house.
3. We are deprived of any right to make decisions about the children who we bring into the world, care for and rear.
4. It obliges parents to provide a dowry for daughters who--certainly--do not have the right to manage their dowry.
5. It compensates for our "honor," when this is harmed, with the payment of a proportionate amount of money (how much is it worth, in truth?).

All these degrading things which, in the opinion of Minister of Justice Stamatis, build the institution of the family--since they are in danger of disappearing with the proposal of the Gatzis Committee's draft-law for reform of the Family Law--became the reason for the committee's draft-law to be "revised" by a seven-member law-preparative committee which Stamatis himself appointed.

Thus, it appears that the work of two years done by the 17-member Gatzis Committee will be "surgically operated on" in the record time of two months, even though by 31 December 1982, according to the 1975 Constitution, all the laws which consider women second-class citizens must be abolished.

But the patriarchal and retrogressive perceptions of Stamatis are not the only things hindering reform of the Family Law. The government's procrastinating and negative position, all these years, is the framework within which is interposed the formation of a revisionary committee by Stamatis.

"The whole formation procedure," stresses the Union of Greek Women (EGE) in its communique, "and the composition of both the Gazis Committee and the revisionary committee--without our wishing to affect the prestige of the members--clearly show the government's intentions which are: first, to not proceed to a substantial implementation of the articles of the constitution concerning equality and, in the end, for only marginal changes to be accepted and, second, to exclude the participation and dialogue of the interested parties.

"Thus is explained," EGE continues, "why Stamatis wishes to use the codes system in the case of reforming the Family Law and to deprive the national assembly of the right of article-by-article discussion, bringing it the dilemma of whether or not to vote against the code.

"We are asking: for the issue to stop being entrusted to closed circles of technocrats and to be an object of essential dialogue with all the interested parties; and for the normal procedure to be used, not the codes system.

"EGE believes that in order for social liberation and change to become a reality, there is only one route, the creation of a democratic family."

Let us look at several of the obvious inequalities abolished by the Gazis Committee's draft-law, which were considered "radical" and "dangerous for the institution of the family":

1. The dowry and all the provisions of the Civil Code related to it are abolished. It is an institution which treats the woman like merchandise.
2. Paternal authority is replaced by parental care; same rights and obligations of the two parents as regards the child.
3. "The man is the head of the family" is abolished. Common decision of spouses on all matters is legislatively provided.
4. The woman retains her surname after marriage.
5. Joint obligation of spouses, analogous to the powers of each, for all economic and practical needs of the family is instituted.
6. For illegitimate minors, parental care belongs to the mother.
7. The articles of the Commercial Law which impose restrictions on the exercise of commerce by women are abolished.

Moreover, in the committee's introductory report, proposals are made for other amendments of the Family Law--which are not included in the draft-law--like enactment of civil marriage, establishment of divorce by consent, etc.

The legislative changes proposed in the Gazis Report are certainly in danger of remaining in the cards. But women know that their equality is not ensured by laws and institutional changes alone. Equality is not given, but is won with struggles for deep changes in the institutions and structures of society and the mentality which considers women created for the home and rearing of children, incapable of

responsibilities and political and economic activities. Women must fight for there to be an awareness that the equality of the two sexes means a better quality of life and a fundamental humanization of society.

A protest march which will move from the propylaea of the university to the Chamber of Deputies is being organized on Monday, 6 October at 1700 hours by the committee struggling for change in the Family Law. The women are determined to fight for radical change in the Family Law and for the abolition of laws which debase and humiliate them.

9247
CSO: 4908

FLORINA DIOCESE CONVENTION RESOLUTION PUBLISHED

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 9 Oct 80 p 7

[Text] "The work which the church performs today is under fire from visible and invisible forces which directly or indirectly proclaim "Overthrow the church." Whatever we, as small workers for the church, build, the so-called means of mass communication and entertainment destroy...." This is stressed, among other precise observations and courageous proclamations, in the resolution issued after the end of the Eleventh General Priests' Convention for which 110 priests from the Florina, Prespa and Eordaia Metropolis assembled some days ago.

The full text of this important resolution, which elucidates with frankness our ecclesiastic affairs, is as follows:

Resolution

From 29 September to 1 October, we priests from the Holy Metropolis of Florina, Prespa and Eordaia met in the Milokhorion-Eordaia Agia Paraskevi Monastery and accomplished the Eleventh General Priests' Convention. The general theme of the convention was "the church in apostolic times." After listening to introductory speeches which depicted for us the ideal church of the apostolic period, we examined the situation of the modern church. And we pass the following resolution:

1. We believe that it is necessary for us to awaken as a church. We ought to become a fighting church. The crisis through which the church is passing has weakened it. Our prelacy must begin at the top and confront the great issues of our time. The forces of the church must be activated. We must stop being a state church, in accord with every political regime, and be the living church which will follow the footsteps of the martyr church of the early years.
2. We are making a protest because the work which the church performs today is under fire from visible and invisible forces which directly or indirectly proclaim "Overthrow the church." Whatever we, as small workers for the church, build, is destroyed by the so-called means of mass communication (cinema, theaters, television, lewd printed matter, atheistic books, cassettes with pornographic songs, night clubs); it is destroyed, moreover, by the atheistic and anti-Christian propaganda which is occurring unhindered in our country. The church is struggling for us, as Greeks, to maintain our orthodox traditions and moral life and all the factors to which we referred are working frantically for us to lose our Greek orthodox identity.

3. We are worried about the attempted "union" with the heretic Papists. We criticise the effort for pseudo-unity and resumption of the treacherous endeavors of Ferrara and Florence. We declare that we will fight, remaining faithful on the ramparts of the orthodox faith.

4. We express our indignation because the Greek Government, in view of our entry into the EEC, has issued anti-Christian laws concerning the Chiliasm, abortions and automatic divorce and it is preparing to issue other such anti-Christian laws. We are informed that it is getting ready to completely break up the Greek family by amending the Family Law, based on the well-known "Cassis plan." Every Greek Christian is provoked by the thought that the government is now regulating the life of the nation according to EEC principles and orders.

5. We express our support to the decent, struggling metropolitan of Ydra, Yerоtheon, who is waging a hard fight against nudism. The authorities are sacrificing all our moral principles and traditions at the altar of tourism, that modern deity. There was a minister who insulted the bishop and Christians who opposed the establishment of nudists at Prinioni.

6. We express our uneasiness about the attempted discolorization of education. Religious studies have already been totally abolished in the upper classes of the technical and professional lyceums. But where religious studies are taught, teachers and professors are left free to serve up their atheistic creed.

7. We think that one reason for the withdrawal of mankind from the church is that religious feeling is being exploited by priests from the large cities with the so-called suppliant fees. We seek abolition of all fees so that the mouths of those "wanting an opportunity," who call the churches "priests' shops," will be closed. With the abolition of fees, there will be an end to the inequality among clerics which turns some into patricians and others into plebians. Let us all confine ourselves to our salary which, however, must fill the needs of modern times.

8. We stand by those Christian clerics and laymen who are persecuted because of their Christian faith. We stigmatize the crushing of religious consciousness, wherever and by whomever it occurs. We stand by those priests who are in prisons, convicted by completely atheistic regimes. We especially stand by our brother Christians in neighboring Albania where they have been denied every trace of religious freedom. Unfortunately, the Greek state, while it has commercial relations with Albania, has taken no step for the hundreds of thousands of Greek Christians whose religious consciousness is being crushed. We hear the moans of our tortured brothers and we pray that God will grant them "freedom and rest."

9. We declare yet another time that we are on the side of our reverend metropolitan who is being threatened with trial and imprisonment because he will not sign the automatic divorce.

10. We ask the authorities to hear our voice. It is the voice of priests from a frontier area who, like frontier men, stand and guard the national, moral and spiritual borders of Greece.

The 110 priests of the convention, Andreas Toulios, Triantafyllos Xiros, Dimitrios Evtymiadis, Dimosthenis Papado-poulos

BRIEFS

THREE BANKS BORROW ABROAD--The National Bank of Greece is borrowing DM 250 million on the Euromoney market while the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank and the National Investment Bank for Industrial Development are jointly borrowing \$60 million on the same market. The first loan is of 10 years duration and is being granted at a rate of interest based on the Frankfurt interbank rate, plus one-half of one percent for the first two years after which a fixed rate of interest will be set. The second loan is being granted also for a ten year period by a small consortium of about eight banks, led by Security Pacific and Standard Chartered. Interest will be at LIBOR plus half of one percent for the first three years, 3/8 percent for the next five and 3/4 percent for the last two. [Text] [Athens HELLENNEWS EXPRESS in English 9 Oct 80 p 4]

LABOR CONFEDERATION POLICY--The General Confederation of Labour concluded its annual meeting proceedings this week. The debates largely concerned 1981 policy the main issue being the claim that future wage and salary adjustments should be linked to the cost-of-living index in all collective labour agreement bargaining. A second demand which, as previously reported by HELLENNEWS is to be firmly supported, is that salary earners should enjoy a tax-free amount of income equal to the annual earnings of a non-skilled manual labourer, according to whatever collective labour rates are in force for the period concerned. A third demand, on which it seems unlikely that the Confederation will give way, is that the Government should pay out immediately the Drs 1,700,000,000 of workers housing loans already approved. The Confederation points out that, when the corresponding loan applications were approved formally, the prospective beneficiaries lost no time in signing various purchase contracts with building companies, contractors, etc., but now find themselves in danger of losing their deposits for breach of contract, after the Government's retro-active decision to hold back on housing loans generally, as one of the measures for taking some more heat out of the economy. [Text] [Athens HELLENNEWS EXPRESS in English 9 Oct 80 p 7]

CSO: 4920

MEDIOBANCA ANALYSIS OF 1,000 FIRMS FOR 1968-1979

Rome RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 3 Oct 80 pp 843-847

[Text] The usual annual survey on the economic-assets and liabilities results of a group of about 1,000 Italian manufacturing and service companies was concluded recently by Mediobanca. The period examined is 1968-1979, covering, therefore, rapid economic growth followed by a recession phase and by the recent recovery, especially noteworthy for most of the companies. The results characterizing fiscal year 1979 are a cumulative loss of 2,022 billion [lire], attributable primarily to the enterprises under public control and lower than the 1978 loss, and a self-financing 1,600 billion (about +60 percent) greater than in 1978. An appreciable improvement in overall industrial activity ensued, always greater for private enterprises, with an increase in internal resources that made a greater share of new investments possible and that improved the indebtedness index of the 924 firms in question. Table 1 gives the breakdown, by enterprise category, of the ratio between the increase in fixed assets and self-financing starting in 1968. It can be observed how a period of progressive reduction in that ratio (contraction of investments absolutely or of coverage of self-financing) was followed by a recovery in 1973 with subsequent fluctuations and decrease up to 1977, followed finally by a positive recovery. An analysis of the trend of the petroleum sector, objective of those notes in the broadest general context, shows rates constantly above average and at their maximum levels in the most recent fiscal years. That demonstrates a tendency to invest even in periods characterized by unsatisfactory economic results. The data in the table confirm the clear gap between the group of private and public enterprises that have been a restraining mass on the average value of the economic index in question. Emphasis should also be placed on the good trend of the medium-sized companies and the very definite recovery of companies with a constantly positive result in balance whose 1978-1979 investments were covered by internal resources amounting to from 55 to 80 percent. Consequently, the companies' indebtedness and the indebtedness of those companies under private control especially improved. In 1979, their debts were four times lower than the debts of public enterprises.

Still with reference to the total group of enterprises, the Mediobanca report points out how the increase in circulating capital was greater than the increase in gross fixed assets, giving a measure of the repercussions of inflation on business balance sheets. The effect of inflation is also taken into account in determining the amount of annual investments, which, overall, at constant prices, turn out to be decreasing constantly since 1971 (from 2,800 billion to 1,800 billion in 1979). Another positive factor in fiscal year 1979 was an increase in overall turnover greater than the average wholesale and consumer price indexes (+27 percent compared with +15 percent, approximately), primarily due to the development of sales on the domestic

markets (+10 percent). That should be compared with higher annual percentage increases since 1974 for activity abroad. Table 2 gives the development indexes by sector with regard to turnover, fixed assets and number of employees. It must be borne in mind, in evaluating these indexes, that the petroleum, chemical and transportation equipment building sectors contributed over half (51.4 percent) to the increase in sales in 1979. In this case also, moreover, the petroleum sector shows a vitality greater than most of the other enterprise categories, due considerably, however, for turnover, to the constant, sizable increases in the cost of imported crude oil. With regard to fixed assets in the period involved, the petroleum sector shows lower than average increases, while, to a more pronounced extent, they are greater in comparison with the number of employees. It should be noted, with regard to this last-mentioned parameter, how public enterprises, whose results are still negative and lower than the medium-sized enterprises, recorded an increase of about 44 percent in comparison with a general decrease of 27 percent. The overall balance-sheet of the group of firms, given in table 3, shows, for 1979, a smaller incidence of personnel expenditures and of financial burdens on turnover in comparison with 1978 and a worsening of the cost of consumables.

On an overall basis, the balance of ordinary operations leaves, for private enterprises, a margin corresponding to the amortization for the fiscal year, while for public enterprises, the margin represents less than a third of the appropriate amortization. As final significant factor for 1979, it is noted that the number of employees increased for the first time since 1974 (+4,723 for public enterprises and -2,513 for private firms), while the average unit cost increased by about 2 million. The percentage increase was a good 18.4 percent, attributable in part to the high incidence of managerial personnel and employees on the total number of persons employed (from 31.9 percent in 1978 to 32.3 percent). Tables 4, 5, 6 show data pertaining to the trend of the petroleum sector from 1968 to date, from the point of view of assets and balance-sheet in detail, with reference to the most significant fiscal years. The progressive improvement in assets, both in terms of results for the fiscal year, positive for 2 years now after a negative period that culminated in 1975, and of distributed dividends, can be seen in table 4. Nevertheless, we observe a stability of own means in absolute and an appreciable increase of short-term debts (as much as about 45 percent of the total liabilities in 1979), after the reduction made in medium-term and long-term indebtedness. Finally, the number of employees, approximately stable since 1970, increased last year by about 1,000 units (approximately +4 percent). In table 5, we note the positive increase in amortization and the definite growth of the gross turnover in 1979 and the almost steadiness of the financial burdens. The last table gives the balance-sheets of the sector, from which it is seen how the larger turnover in 1979 was practically balanced by the higher cost of raw material. The better and appreciably positive fiscal year results last year seems to be owing to the greater balance between turnover and costs in view of the stability of the overall financial and tax burdens (financial burdens down, tax burdens up).

(Tables follow, next pages)

Table 1
Ratio Between Self-financing and Increase in Gross Fixed Assets

	1964	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	(1)
(2) Abbigliamento	62.8	64.8	36.0	104	—	123.4	50.7	—	—	—	90	33.7	15.3		
(3) Bevande alcoliche	70.4	55.2	91.8	116.3	103.0	121.6	61.7	91.2	155.4	187.5	248.1	211.8	137.0		
(4) Confezioni	90.2	102.6	56.1	46.1	106.0	91.6	60.5	—	145.2	41.4	59.4	110.4	73.1		
(5) Cucinato	78.2	136.4	109.6	96.7	100.1	60.7	78.8	—	—	—	—	—	99.3		
(6) Molti e pastifici	29.7	32.3	60.4	122.0	—	141.4	111.5	261.8	140.7	65.7	41.2	90.5	105.0		
(7) Oliera	—	40.4	262.8	42.5	59.2	145.6	123.5	—	119.7	—	239.0	280.0	129.8		
(8) Saccottiere	99.6	68.1	67.4	36.0	183.7	—	67.4	107.6	106.3	58.7	92.4	78.8	76.4		
(9) Sartorie tessili	4.8	—	—	—	—	70.6	23.2	27.1	—	—	—	—	—		
(10) Lattaria	94.7	63.1	48.8	42	22.6	143.8	118.1	38.9	19.7	—	64.1	123.5	61.2		
(11) Cementizio	194.1	110.2	95.5	34.8	69.7	75.6	102.5	104.1	86.9	136.8	171.7	190.2	106.3		
(12) Chimico	79.5	61.1	17.6	—	—	—	128.9	20.4	19.3	—	—	631.2	22.0		
(13) Veicoli e altri trasporti	99.3	72.6	56.2	49.2	61.6	71.8	64.8	68.4	219.3	122.2	699.7	30.9	74.3		
(14) Distrib. dettaglio	77.3	66.5	49.9	24.8	57.2	149.3	146.4	—	—	—	636.5	100.8	121.1		
(15) Elettronica, radio, TV	31.6	25.9	—	—	—	137.8	113.5	69.4	240.3	149.4	152.5	132.3	102.0		
(16) Permanenze cosmetiche	134.3	141.7	90.9	92.9	239.0	176.3	80.2	92.5	106.2	104.2	263.4	217.7	136.8		
(17) Fibre artific. e sintetiche	114.1	117.6	34.2	—	—	298.7	93.2	—	—	—	—	—	—		
(18) Gomme e cerri	90.3	82.9	49.3	41.7	49.1	121.3	121.8	103.9	280.2	129.8	310.0	2.2	90.0		
(19) Grafica editoriale	62.6	139.7	66.8	107.5	168.8	106.8	59.0	82.7	240.6	83.3	177.8	48.9	141.9		
(20) Imprese costruz.	113.0	97.1	62.5	132.4	131.7	251.4	148.1	146.1	114.7	120.7	121.9	125.0	125.7		
(21) Macchine	121.2	97.1	80.5	55.8	93.8	147.1	110.2	138.7	131.6	133.2	140.6	121.6	121.2		
(22) Mineraria	—	—	—	—	—	—	129.5	—	—	—	—	—	—		
(23) Pneumatici	63.1	58.2	54.2	49.0	100.6	88.7	61.2	90.3	111.4	148.8	259.5	248.7	114.9		
(24) Servizi pubblici	49.8	49.4	46.6	37.0	37.3	53.4	27.0	38.2	45.7	45.8	41.8	35.3	38.7		
(25) Siderurgia e metalli	53.0	72.4	45.2	14.3	11.3	58.7	74.8	20.0	20.9	—	—	7.7	16.9		
(26) Tessile commercio	59.6	61.1	61.3	67.2	75.6	111.6	98.2	—	82.6	—	—	134.8	43.2		
(27) Tessile lavorato	92.2	97.7	103.2	131.8	132.1	178.8	54.9	—	172.1	101.0	—	—	—		
(28) Tessili diversi	118.3	99.8	96.0	37.7	37.1	279.2	103.4	41.2	104.1	47.4	4.7	182.0	74.1		
(29) Vetro e ceramica	53.2	61.1	103.7	61.8	107.4	210.0	63.5	59.1	197.4	258.6	194.1	166.2	131.5		
(30) 924 società	60.6	62.4	45.7	26.2	31.9	68.4	61.3	35.3	62.9	38.9	41.5	34.9	48.6		
(31) Società con risultati costantemente positivi o in progresso	69.8	77.9	76.3	90.2	95.5	82.6	62.2	128.4	185.2	115.8	808.8	555.6	148.1		
(32) Società con risultati non costanti nel periodo	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
(33) Medie imprese	61.9	66.3	43.6	20.4	23.8	76.1	64.4	29.1	48.6	23.8	30.9	47.3	41.6		
(34) Imprese pubbliche	63.8	107.3	32.2	30.1	54.6	102.7	92.5	121.5	146.3	105.6	96.5	119.1	109.0		
(35) Imprese private	49.2	47.7	54.5	19.0	24.2	35.9	33.2	17.7	29.9	10.2	18.1	35.5	26.4		

Key: 1. average; 2. apparel; 3. alcoholic beverages; 4. canned goods; 5. confectionery; 6. milling and pasta-making; 7. vegetable oils; 8. sugar-producing; 9. shipbuilding; 10. paper-making; 11. cement-making; 12. chemical; 13. transportation equipment building; 14. retail distribution; 15. household electrical appliances, radio, TV; 16. cosmetics, pharmaceuticals; 17. artificial and synthetic fibers; 18. tires and cables; 19. graphic arts, book-publishing; 20. construction enterprises; 21. machine-building; 22. mining; 23. petroleum; 24. public services; 25. iron and steel, metalworking; 26. cotton textiles; 27. wool textiles; 28. miscellaneous textiles; 29. glass and ceramics; 30. 924 companies; 31. companies with constant positive results or in balance; 32. companies without constant results in the period; 33. medium-sized companies; 34. public enterprises; 35. private enterprises.

Table 2
Development Indexes per Sector in the 1966-1979 Period
(Percentage Variations)

	(1) Turnover		(2) Turnover		(3) Turnover	
	%	Position	%	Position	%	Position
	(1966-79)	(1966-79)	(1966-79)	(1966-79)	(1966-79)	(1966-79)
(5) Produttivo						
6) Imprese pubbliche	107.9	67.4	1	1	1.6	1
7) Imprese	107.8	49.2	1	7	10.3	10
8) Industria	107.1	32.9	4	4	20.6	17
9) Imprese	107.0	31.4	3	3	17.6	4
10) Industria, non di trasporto	107.0	47.2	9	9	11.7	10
11) Distribuzione, al dettaglio	107.4	101.2	19	210	20.0	14
12) Imprese	107.1	41.9	2	2	17.6	18
13) Electronica e apparecchiature radio-tv	107.8	41.9	9	9	17.6	22
14) Industria, metallurgia	107.4	41.9	10	11	20.6	10
15) Industria, chimica	107.4	47.4	11	6	17.6	15
16) Imprese	107.3	41.3	12	12	17.6	11
17) Industria, edilizia	107.3	40.7	13	13	17.6	4
18) Industria, abbigliamento	107.8	47.9	14	9	17.6	6
19) Industria, alimentare	107.1	39.8	17	18	20.6	12
20) Imprese, diversi	107.8	17.9	16	16	17.6	24
21) Imprese, diversi	107.1	37.3	7	17	18.1	15
22) Imprese, diversi	107.9	34.0	8	19	14.9	21
23) Imprese, diversi	107.6	31.7	9	20	14.9	22
24) Imprese, diversi	107.1	36.6	20	18	27.6	4
25) Imprese, diversi	107.1	29.4	21	21	17.6	10
26) Imprese, diversi	107.1	28.8	22	22	14.9	21
27) Imprese, diversi	107.1	27.1	23	23	14.9	21
28) Imprese di costruzione	107.0	34.2	24	24	20.6	21
29) Imprese, diversi	107.2	22.1	25	27	10.0	11
30) Farmaceutico e cosmetico	107.1	22.8	26	25	20.6	12
31) Imprese	107.6	18.7	27	27	10.0	10
32) Industria	107.9	22.8	28	28	11.8	26
33) Fibre, artificiali, sintetiche	107.1	18.5	29	29	11.8	27
34) Trasporti, ferrovieri	107.1	17.6	30	30	11.0	25
35) Imprese	107.1	16.1	31	30	11.0	24
36) Società con risultato crescentemente positivo e						
37) in progresso	107.1	47.1			17.6	17
38) Società con risultato crescentemente negativo	110.3	67.0			40.2	18
39) Società con risultati non costanti nel periodo	107.0	45.0			27.0	21
40) Media imprese	107.5	29.4			29.3	12
41) Imprese pubbliche	107.1	28.7			28.9	13
42) Imprese private	107.0	48.9			21.6	8

Key: 1. turnover; 2. fixed assets; 3. number of employees; 4. position on list; 5. petroleum; 6. public services; 7. paper-making; 8. iron and steel; 9. machine-building; 10. transportation equipment building; 11. retail distribution; 12. chemical; 13. household electrical appliances, radio and TV sets; 14. milling and pasta-making; 15. vegetable oils; 16. mining; 17. graphic arts, book-publishing; 18. apparel; 19. canned goods; 20. miscellaneous transportation; 21. miscellaneous textiles; 22. cotton textiles; 23. glass and ceramics; 24. shipbuilding; 25. tires and cables; 26. alcoholic beverages; 27. cement-making; 28. construction enterprises; 29. wool textiles; 30. pharmaceuticals, cosmetics; 31. sugar-producing; 32. confectionery; 33. artificial and synthetic fibers; 34. railroad transportation; 35. 924 companies; 36. companies with constantly positive results; 37. companies with constantly negative results; 38. companies without constant results in the period; 39. medium-sized companies; 40. public enterprises; 41. private enterprises.

Table 3
Economic Cost Structure

	(1) 924		(2) private		(3) public		(4) medium		(5) large	
	1978	1979	1978	1979	1978	1979	1978	1979	1978	1979
(6) Personnel costs	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(6) Personnel costs	65.2	71.0	65.5	70.7	65.3	71.4	65.4	71.4	65.5	71.4
(6) Personnel costs	22.7	21.2	21.1	21.9	22.2	20.0	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1
(7) Open Reserves	81	78	75	74	83	84	82	79	81	79
(7) Reserves	22	21	21	20	20.5	21	20	20	20	20
(7) Reserves	23	19	20	19	24	20	20	20	20	20
(11) Amortization	38	35	40	44	32	31	40	44	31	41
(11) Amortization	38	34	40	44	32	31	34	31	34	32
(13) Spec. revenue	-18	-19	-16	-18	-16	-16	-12	-13	-15	-19
(13) Net of other costs & gains	-11	-12	-12	-12	-11	-12	-12	-12	-12	-12
(13) Net of other costs & gains	-10	-10	-10	-10	-11	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10
(14) Results without	-27	-20	-27	-41	-24	-21	-28	-21	-25	-29
(14) Results without	-27	-20	-27	-41	-24	-21	-28	-21	-25	-29

Key: 1. 924 companies; 2. private enterprises; 3. public enterprises; 4. medium-sized enterprises; 5. large enterprises; 6. net turnover; 7. net consumables; 8. personnel; 9. financial burdens; 10. financial receipts; 11. amortization; 12. deferred expenditures; 13. balance of other costs and revenue; 14. corrected results.

Table 4
Petroleum Sector Assets and Liabilities

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
ATTIVITÀ												
Attivitá imprese	1.527.664	664	1.606.469	973	2.158.477	723	1.591.209	963	4.067.095	613	4.079.395	713
Prodotti	669.277	164	611.297	153	611.297	153	627.981	153	1.010.000	113	4.110.275	613
Magazzini	170.130	79	216.615	94	172.680	84	189.461	116	1.040.000	113	1.040.000	113
Officine	270.042	102	161.572	111	161.572	111	151.572	143	1.620.000	164	1.620.000	213
Altri attivi	511.278	213	642.115	214	1.624.467	213	1.515.148	203	1.641.724	183	1.590.000	183
Partecipazioni	109.150	16	118.149	17	109.150	14	109.150	14	1.000.000	113	2.040.000	213
Capitali versati ordinari	126.012	610	126.012	610	127.479	620	126.012	617	940.000	113	1.000.000	113
Finanzi e credite fisco	8.421	61	4.651	62	1.117	12	2.714	61	1.040	113	1.000.000	113
Capitali versati ordinari	80.469	12	14.870	11	110.700	25	72.794	12	90.000	11	237.000	213
Spese di amministrazione	68.839	24	101.700	32	100.150	43	70.120	12	51.614	61	61.614	61
Prove	179.361	61	204.464	61	209.704	61	208.704	62	270.300	25	270.300	25
(14) Totale	2.590.159	1063	3.171.269	1063	4.445.000	1063	4.047.751	1063	1.062.100	1063	6.064.918	1063
(15) PASSIVITÀ												
Attivi finanziari	147.126	152	416.871	153	261.641	153	189.087	151	1.697.417	153	1.186.469	153
Riserve	177.460	125	97.150	125	145.150	113	83.750	93	1.170.150	113	1.170.150	113
Capitali di imprese controllate	779.426	618	788.114	123	497.171	247	276.567	211	2.020.577	211	1.110.877	113
Capitali di imprese controllate	68.146	124	104.195	124	151.460	164	191.000	243	2.117.000	206	2.071.000	206
Altri capitali	419.744	1016	562.400	172	671.470	162	1.600.911	152	1.307.450	152	1.600.911	152
Capitali di imprese controllate	10.260	614	1.460	627	3.079	611	1.360	151	800	151	800	151
Capitali di imprese controllate	129.728	416	157.131	416	415.960	311	654.109	410	527.110	613	654.109	613
Capitali di imprese controllate	117.443	111	200.011	121	300.446	81	264.476	114	1.040.000	113	1.040.000	113
Altri capitali	17.111	111	71.300	123	47.977	119	1.200	113	461.124	113	461.124	113
Altri capitali	979.734	362	1.195.841	412	1.994.198	153	2.124.628	162	1.621.869	162	4.157.020	413
Finanzi e debiti	268.897	1926	562.044	111	197.800	123	621.070	93	1.771.721	112	1.771.721	112
Finanzi e debiti	62.181	24	18.473	12	139.716	159	467.641	71	739.426	611	1.271.000	1063
Finanzi e debiti	216.418	82	127.776	111	279.194	612	396.877	911	889.740	911	889.740	911
Altri finanzi e debiti	411.838	171	318.964	171	641.912	164	637.043	93	1.070.777	113	1.070.777	113
Altri finanzi e debiti	1.475.119	982	1.625.729	916	2.061.000	913	1.789.989	913	1.010.777	113	1.010.777	113
Altri finanzi e debiti	46.429	12	61.283	14	67.987	112	97.561	123	1.277.860	113	1.277.860	113
Altri finanzi e debiti	12.829	613	18.861	613	26.111	463	18.821	463	51.614	463	51.614	463
Altri finanzi e debiti	-14.863	117	-17.400	117	-14.914	117	-12.194	117	51.159	117	51.159	117
Totale	2.590.159	1063	3.171.269	1063	4.445.000	1063	4.047.751	1063	1.062.100	1063	6.064.918	1063
(16) Attività finanziarie												
Attività finanziarie	2.667	146	3.186	146	3.001	213	21.184	113	17.430	213	17.430	113
Attività finanziarie	26.227	111	31.864	111	21.184	213	21.184	113	21.184	213	21.184	213
Attività finanziarie	24.527	111	20.110	111	22.110	213	21.187	113	1.644	213	2.111.000	213
Attività finanziarie	1.929	111	1.674	51	1.701	113	1.674	113	1.674	113	1.674	113
Attività finanziarie	84	51	271	113	1.674	113	1.674	113	1.674	113	1.674	113
Attività finanziarie	1.615	113	1.615	113	1.615	113	1.615	113	1.615	113	1.615	113

Key: 1. millions of lire; 2. assets; 3. gross fixed assets; 4. circulating capital; 5. storage; 6. customers; 7. other assets; 8. participations; 9. credits to associated companies; 10. fixed income securities; 11. cash, banks and checking accounts; 12. expenditures to be amortized; 13. miscellaneous; 14. total; 15. liabilities; 16. open debts; 17. authorized paid-in capital; 18. reserves; 19. amortization funds; 20. retirement funds; 21. medium-term and long-term debts; 22. bonds; 23. banks; 24. associated companies; 25. others; 26. short-term debts; 27. suppliers; 28. associated companies; 29. banks; 30. others; 31. total debts; 32. other liabilities; 33. fiscal year results; 34. corrected results; 35. distributed dividends; 36. number of employees; 37. hours worked (thousands); 38. hours lost (thousands); 39. owing to labor union troubles; 40. owing to absenteeism.

Table 5
Petroleum Sector Balance-sheet Data (millions of lire)

	1968	1970	1972	1973	1975	1977	1978	1979
1) Patrimonio lordo	2.979.651	3.406.552	4.051.990	4.796.722	10.216.242	17.316.409	20.054.423	28.321.631
2) Di cui all'impostazione	279.474	342.164	527.362	577.986	411.962	846.583	1.332.398	1.626.424
3) Onere dei personale	122.508	161.236	108.916	231.191	349.360	432.541	489.261	604.524
4) Onere finanziari	47.707	62.966	82.627	92.032	244.701	434.073	331.307	312.534
(5) Ammortamenti								
6) Risultato netto da c/c nuovo	-17.653	-21.031	-35.077	-19.651	-125.041	-92.549	-28.095	102.974
7) Ammortamento normato	113.036	128.022	154.778	209.818	253.066	381.670	502.340	631.375
8) Ammortamento ordinario	99.120	96.207	121.163	116.173	172.831	252.984	306.472	370.645
9) Ammort. esigenze	479	821	706	3.838	174	1.828	43.167	89.911
10) Ammort. spese plurienni	23.447	30.954	32.939	39.807	50.061	126.878	152.501	170.817
11) Scavamento netto a redd. di c/c nuovo	4.855	15.036	18.772	19.840	49.211	22.422	30.595	68.168
(12) Totale	186.038	122.427	138.473	213.887	171.239	311.543	304.860	502.517
(13) Variazioni patrimoniali rapporto all'annuale precedente								
14) Immobili, macchinari elettrici	153.584	221.036	137.607	240.967	601.628	304.393	245.701	322.701
15) Investimenti	167.911	247.555	196.468	156.767	216.241	231.196	265.067	371.284
16) Imp. per riprese fiscali	1.292	3.169	5.780	15.075	—	6.468	11.191	—
17) Riavallamento monetaria	—	—	—	—	409.299	92.224	—	—
18) Appalto	—	—	—	72.360	—	37.660	608.605	—
19) Riavallamento	2.270	—	—	—	—	—	1.943	—
20) Disinvestimenti	-21.629	-27.688	-45.143	-27.062	-10.912	-27.518	-32.502	-48.581
21) Scoperte	—	—	—	—	—	-37.640	-608.605	—
22) Capital nominale	2.128	46.892	3.590	262.450	8.000	79.000	113.454	128.551
23) Riserve	-1.287	3.756	-10.759	-9.540	106.020	-99.402	17.966	-128.551

Key: 1. gross turnover; 2. including exports; 3. personnel cost; 4. financial burdens; 5. self-financing; 6. recorrected results; 7. budgeted amortization; 8. ordinary amortization; 9. advance amortization; 10. amortization of multiannual expenditures; 11. net allocations to retirement funds; 12. total; 13. variations in assets compared with previous fiscal year; 14. gross fixed assets; 15. investments; 16. increases for tax recoveries; 17. currency revaluation; 18. assets brought in; 19. revaluations; 20. disinvestments; 21. heavy expenses; 22. authorized capital; 23. reserves.

Table 6
Petroleum Sector Profit and Loss Statement

		1974		1975		1976		1977		
		(1) (milioni di lire)	(%)	(milioni di lire)	(%)	(milioni di lire)	(%)	(milioni di lire)	(%)	
(2)	Conto dei profitti e delle perdite									
(3)	Turnover netto	67	6.129.790	100,0	12.463.697	100,0	14.762.247	100,0	22.051.655	100,0
(4)	Rimanenze iniziali		148.257		1.223.801		1.503.695		1.359.097	
(5)	Acquisti di beni e servizi e costi vari	-6.932.679		-11.718.190		-13.911.784		-21.255.266		
(6)	Nuovi impianti	137.028		175.920		166.422		212.702		
(7)	Rimanenze finali	677.391		1.503.695		1.554.067		1.951.754		
(8)	Conto del lavoro	-281.909		-437.541		-466.141		-604.524		
		(b)	4.568.454	97,4	-11.098.317	-83,8	-13.971.601	94,7	21.054.453	99,1
(9)	Saldo									
(10)	conti finanziari	1.366	2,6	765.780	6,1	788.467	5,5	997.202	4,5	
(11)	conti finanziari capitalizzati	-188.423		-404.073		131.307		312.334		
(12)	conti finanziari netti	669		114		235		739		
(13)	Proventi finanziari		-187.754	-2,8	-403.999	-3,3	131.072	-2,2	311.785	-1,4
(14)	Saldo conti e proventi finanziari	77.207	1,2	119.622	1,1	145.103	1,0	177.714	0,8	
(15)	Open tributar	-110.947	-1,8	-288.157	-2,2	-187.960	-1,2	-154.081	-0,8	
(16)	Ultimo fondo imposte e/o riserve nette	-9.401		-36.150		-97.136		-181.629		
(17)	Ultimo fondo imposte e/o riserve nette	1.146		4.457		12.160		48.765		
	Open tributar netti		8.215	0,1	31.193	0,3	81.976	0,6	122.864	0,6
		(c)	119.782	-1,7	-321.750	-2,5	-269.945	-1,8	246.945	1,2
(18)	Saldo		c) ± d) = e)							
(19)	Ammortamento		58.534	0,9	444.050	3,6	518.655	3,3	730.297	3,1
(20)	Avviamento vari	-214.467	-3,2	-382.471	-3,1	502.553	-3,8	-631.604	-2,9	
(21)	Ultimo di fondi d'accantonamento	-2.241		-24.249	-0,3	-76.504	0,3	-90.094	0,2	
(22)	Contributi	2.115		8.156	0,1	1.509		9.856	0,1	
(23)	Spese varie	-42.606	0,8	-117.736	1,0	146.607	1,0	171.924	0,8	
(24)	Pendite diverse	-55.578	0,8	-266.000	-2,3	-129.494	0,9	-94.009	0,4	
(25)	Proventi diversi	51.123	0,7	67.479	0,5	86.100	0,6	141.799	0,6	
		(d)	-176.440	-2,7	-499.169	-4,0	474.436	-3,2	492.296	-2,0
(26)	Prodotto netto		e) ± f) = g)							
(27)	Rivalutazioni		-117.986	-1,8	-55.119	0,4	44.259	0,3	277.959	1,3
(28)	Stabilizzazioni		-	-	3.776	-	1.943	-	-	-
(29)	Il fondo pluriennale da reinvestire	-	-3	-	-	-	186	-	-	-
(30)	Accantonamenti e/o utili di riserve	-13.909	-0,2	-674	-	-1.722	-	-6.448	-0,1	
(31)	Risultato d'esercizio	1.072		-1.640		4.327		-1.425		
			132.870	-2,0	-93.637	-0,4	48.619	0,3	270.086	-1,2

Key: 1. (millions of lire); 2. statement of profits and losses; 3. net turnover; 4. opening surplus; 5. acquisitions of goods and services and various costs; 6. new plants; 7. final surplus; 8. labor cost; 9. balance; 10. financial burdens; 11. capitalized financial burdens; 12. net financial burdens; 13. financial receipts; 14. balance of financial burdens and receipts; 15. tax burdens; 16. use of tax funds and/or taxable reserves; 17. net tax burdens; 18. balance; 19. amortization; 20. various obligated funds; 21. use of sources of obligated funds; 22. contributions; 23. deferred expenditures; 24. miscellaneous losses; 25. miscellaneous receipts; 26. corrected results; 27. revaluations; 28. depreciation; 29. to be reinvested in capital gains fund; 30. obligated funds and/or use of reserves; 31. fiscal year results.

10,042
CSO: 3104

DEFENSE MINISTER STOLTENBERG DEFENDS DEFENSE BUDGET

Oslo FORSVARETS FORUM in Norwegian 18 Oct 80 p 3

[Interview with Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg by Ole Johan Sagafos]

[Text] "The economic situation for the rest of the year is good and in my opinion the prospects for 1981 are satisfactory. But since defense, like the rest of society, is not static we will naturally have to make adjustments and reestablish priorities along the way. Therefore I hope that those who have criticisms to make will try to acquaint themselves with the total picture."

These words were spoken by Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. He was glad it had been possible to maintain the goal of a real growth of 3 percent in the 1981 budget. The budget for the upcoming year will probably make it possible to carry out some of the tasks that have been assigned high priorities recently. With regard to the Home Guard it will be possible to maintain activity at the level planned. There will also be an increase of roughly 33,000 days in the area of refresher exercises.

Stoltenberg also stressed that it had been possible to get additional funds for maintaining naval and flight activities for the rest of 1980. And with the new budget he expects that air and sea activity can be maintained during next year as well.

The defense minister pointed out that the defense budget is increasing from a scant 8 billion kroner this year to almost 9.4 billion kroner in 1981. "This means we will have a nominal increase of 17.1 percent while the total state budget is increasing only 12.7 percent. This gives us a real increase of 3 percent after inflation has been taken into account. Few other NATO countries are able to do this. This is particularly satisfying when we consider the economic situation in Norway."

Professional Operation

[Question] Recently there has been some sharp criticism of cuts and priorities. Do you think such problems can be avoided in 1981?

[Answer] It is easy for people to forget that defense is a very big operation. In 1980 we had around 8 billion kroner at our disposal. More than 50,000 work

years are put in here. As a result this is one of the country's biggest labor markets. We have also invested in materiel worth perhaps more than 30 billion kroner. We know that the "operation" is being run professionally. And this is constantly being confirmed by statements from our allies. But it must also be obvious that there is room in such a big "operation" for improvements. Not all activities can be given an equally high priority. Therefore, just as in any other economic activity, we are faced with constant adjustments and priority decisions. But these adjustments are a minority of the many "transactions" that are carried out each year.

Plans Are Followed

[Question] Then by and large you expect that your plans can be followed . . . coming year?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, but here too we face challenges. I am thinking specifically of the enormous push required for the F-16 project and the changes this has necessitated in carrying out other important projects. For instance I could mention the plans to acquire new submarines.

[Question] In other words the problems have not been solved?

[Answer] I wouldn't exactly call this "phenomenon" a problem. In my opinion there is no reason to paint a gloomy picture. If we are realistic we must admit that there is always a certain amount of leeway. We don't suddenly arrive at the point where a tank or submarine is ready for the scrapheap. A delay of 3 or 4 years in getting new acquisitions is not a catastrophe.

Oil Money Provides Possibilities

[Question] Couldn't the oil money be used to speed up some of these projects?

[Answer] The oil money is already being used. It helps finance the state budget recently presented. A lot goes to pay off loans we obtained abroad. But it is true that defense can present strong arguments when it comes to future use of the billions in oil revenues. To a large extent we use equipment that must be purchased abroad. Therefore it does not increase pressure here at home at first. But this equipment has to be used and this will have an impact on the Norwegian economy.

[Question] Regardless of that, would things have been very different if we hadn't used so much money on the F-16 acquisitions?

[Answer] Honestly, I think we should stop painting a gloomy picture and eliminate the claims that we "should not have bought the F-16." Instead we should make an effort to make ends meet until it is time to replace other items.

Increase in Maneuvers

[Question] There has been sharp criticism of maneuver reductions, especially among reserve officers.

[Answer] Here too we need to provide some nuances in the picture. For example we participated with honor in one of the biggest NATO maneuvers ever carried out--Team Work. Statements from Team Work on all defense branches are encouraging. In 1980 we conducted two big exercises along with several smaller ones. I mentioned that in 1981 we plan to increase the number of maneuver days by 31,000, making a total of 400,000 maneuver days.

[Question] What about the Home Guard which has been in a critical situation recently?

[Answer] There too we expect to achieve the planned figures with the budget proposal we presented.

Changing Situation

[Question] How does the cabinet minister view the officer situation in the years ahead?

[Answer] Some time back you may recall that the pilot situation was being widely discussed. Today it is claimed that the flight from the Navy to the oil industry in Vestfold is creating problems. In the future we may be feeling this problem, which we share with other nations, in still other sectors. But in a few years the oil industry will not need as many people. All this shows that social developments keep presenting the armed forces with new challenges. This means we have to keep evaluating and reevaluating our economy as conditions change.

Nothing New

The flow from the armed forces to civilian jobs is nothing new, cabinet minister Stoltenberg emphasized. There has always been a certain turnover. Therefore it is vital to maintain our sense of proportion so that the problem is solved in a rational way. We can ask ourselves why officers turn to civilian jobs. Is it the pay, the job environment--or the fact that the oil industry represents an irresistible challenge? It is unlikely that we will find a clear answer. Perhaps we should emphasize the value of defense education and training. Personally I think there would be a public outcry if officers were not sought after. That would really give rise to serious concern. It can be useful in the long run for officers to go into civilian jobs. It is a good thing to have so many service people working throughout society.

6578
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LABOR PARTY ORGAN DEFENDS GOVERNMENT'S PRIOR STORAGE STAND

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 21 Oct 80 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] We have nothing against the Conservatives or any other political party wanting to stick to the nation's defense and security policy. This policy was largely shaped by the policies of the Labor Party as was our ability to live up to the obligations we have within the alliance which has made us a respected and trusted partner in the defense cooperation. To take a current example, everyone knows that it was the Labor government that formulated the principle of prior storage of allied military equipment in our country and gained Storting acceptance for it. At the moment talks are being held with the Americans on how to put this principle into practice when it comes to prior storage of American army equipment. The Norwegian starting point is that such forces should be stationed in Trondelag. Trondelag was chosen because the government viewed that as the best solution on the basis of a total military and security policy evaluation. Military circles have also approved this as an acceptable solution.

Against this background we feel it is a gross overstatement that the Conservative parliamentary leader, Kari Willoch, in his speech during yesterday's government presentation debate made it appear that the government deserved no credit for defense and security policy, giving the country a special need for a new government. Another exaggeration we must note is Willoch's charge that in regard to prior storage the government has shown a lack of respect for constitutional provisions. This was effectively refuted during the debate by Gro Harlem Brundtland, deputy parliamentary leader of the Labor Party and new chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Both she and Prime Minister Odvar Nordli made it clear that the Labor Party will continue to pursue the defense and security policy which up to now enjoyed support across political lines.

It is especially important for a small country to have broad political backing for its defense and security policy. We see it as a big advantage that there has been such a fundamental agreement in our country, not only among political leaders but also among the vast majority of the Norwegian people. This is largely due to the position of the labor movement on these matters. LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions] chairman Tor Halvorsen said at a recent

conference that the "Norwegian defense and security policy is rooted in the Norwegian labor movement in the same way as economic policy, social policy, etc."

Naturally in a big Social Democratic party like the Norwegian Labor Party this does not mean that there is 100 percent support for such a line. Foreign, defense and security policies have always been widely discussed in the Labor Party. This has provided a firmer base for the decisions made. We regard such discussions as part of Norwegian democracy and Norwegian reality. But the discussions and the internal opposition expressed in them have never led to any doubt as to where the Labor Party stands as a party or any doubt as to the policy being pursued by a Labor government. That is also the situation today. The government's special responsibility and right to make decisions concerning the nation's defense and security are accepted by everyone including those Labor Party members who are critical of some aspects of this policy.

Even in an election year we think the Conservatives should reconsider reaping possible short-term gains at the expense of sowing doubts about the country's defense and security policy. Through such destructive actions the party could break down much of the trust and credibility enjoyed by Norwegian defense and security policy both inside and outside our borders, factors that took a long time to build up.

In yesterday's presentation debate it was our impression that the Christian People's Party and the Center Party are beginning to look more realistically at these questions and to accept the government's word initially. This may be because people in these parties have discovered that it is not unnatural to have to tolerate some internal opposition even on such issues. Now that the Conservative Party has grown in size we think even Kari Willoch will probably have to come to the realization that he alone cannot determine what every single Conservative member believes even in the area of defense and security. The day the main line of a party's policy cannot tolerate a debate there is something wrong with the policy. There is no such danger for the Labor Party's defense and security policy.

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CSO: 3108

NEW OIL, ENERGY MINISTER JOHANSON COMMENTS ON POLICIES

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 20 Oct 80 p 6

[Article by Roy Helge Simonsen]

[Text] A privilege to sit on the oil tank. Criticism from various quarters expected. Moderate extraction tempo will continue. "Alexander Kielland" accident a matter of concern. Nuclear power for Norway out in this century. A decision around Christmas on year-round drilling off Trondelag. Storting report on Statfjord gas due in the spring. Statoil's operator responsibility clarified by beginning of next year.

Those are some of the views our new oil and energy minister, Arvid Johanson, revealed to ARBEIDERBLADET after only a scant 2 weeks as head of the ministry in Tollbugata 31. His first weeks were concerned mainly with conferences and talks to acquaint him with the many big and complex matters waiting on his desk.

Wasn't it a big transition from the work at Lovebakken to the almost hopeless administrative and political mission represented by this cabinet post?

"I am familiar with many of the issues from my time as chairman of the Industrial Committee and other Storting activities. Thus the transition is not that great. But of course it isn't easy to take over this ministry from such a distinctive personality as Bjartmar Gjerde."

Does it feel good to sit on the nation's oil tank and supervise the billions being pumped up from the ocean?

"I consider it a privilege to head the Oil and Energy Ministry. At the same time it is a great challenge which I am approaching with deep respect and modesty."

Should we expect any big changes in the nation's oil policy just because you have taken over the cabinet post?

"No, I'll be sticking to the line already indicated by Gjerde, a moderate tempo of extraction but one that must also be stable," said Arvid Johanson who met us in his new office which bore absolutely no signs of being the work room for an

oil and energy minister. The only visible sign we could see at a glance at any rate was a map of the Norwegian continental shelf prepared by the Oil Directorate.

Arvid Johanson's appointment came as no great surprise. Many people were of the opinion that he was in line for a cabinet post. Johanson is the only one of the former silver boys, as Odvar Nordli, Guttorm Hansen, Ragnar Christiansen and Arvid Johanson were once called, who had not reached the very top.

Johanson entered Storting as early as 1956--as an alternate from Ostfold. He delivered his maiden speech before he was 27 years old. He was the youngest man at Lovebakken since 1814 when he entered Storting in 1956. He was originally a journalist but since 1957 he has practically been a permanent Ostfold representative and has served as chairman of both the Industrial Committee and the Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee and as vice chairman of the Finance Committee. Since 1978 the position of editor for the HALDEN ARBEIDER-BLAD has been open to him and he decided not to run for reelection as Storting representative.

Was it a surprise when Nordli asked him to join the government?

"The thing that surprised me was that Bjartmar Gjerde would step down," said the always forthright man from Halden who is distinguished by his honest but biting replies when the situation calls for them.

How did he feel now about withdrawing from national politics and returning to his home town of Halden?

"I will definitely not accept renomination to Storting. That doesn't mean I will withdraw from national politics. The spring election will determine whether or not I will remain in this cabinet post."

Which things was he concentrating on most in the first stages of being a minister?

"First of all the question of bringing the Statfjord gas ashore. This is a comprehensive issue with complex dimensions, involving billions of kroner. I am expecting a detailed proposal from the Statfjord group in November and after that we will make a final decision on bringing the gas ashore. During the spring we will produce a Storting report on the matter."

What about year-round drilling on Haltenbanken and Statoil's takeover of operator responsibility for Statfjord?

"These matters are also in the works. Hearings are being held on year-round drilling off the coast of Trondelag. A decision on our part can be expected around Christmas. With regard to Statoil assumption of operator responsibility for Statfjord I also expect a clarification by the first of the year. It is a question of finding a flexible transition that will satisfy everyone. A gradual assumption of responsibility is not unlikely."

"But the first thing will be a Storting report on Statoil's activities in 1981."

You don't expect to be very popular with the Environmental Protection League as nuclear expansion proposals emerge from your office?

"I am well aware that I can't be friends with everyone when I have this job. But I would like to say that environmental protection--whether it involves oil or waterpower--will not be brushed aside while I am head of this ministry.

"I will stick to a fairly even but stable extraction tempo and there is no talk of breaking the 90 million ton figure. The 'Alexander Kielland' accident was a cause for great concern and obviously such matters will be taken into account in the future when it comes to oil and gas extraction.

"I am not the head of a road hog ministry aimed at putting all the waterfalls into pipes and constantly stepping up the tempo of extraction and exploration. One can see enormous involvement politically and among special interest groups with regard to waterpower expansion and oil activity. No one can hope to please everyone and I expect criticism from both expansionists and conservationists," said Arvid Johanson.

Johanson also said he was glad the artificial distinction between drilling south and north of the 62nd parallel is now gone. "Now we are finally united into one nation when it comes to oil activity," he said with a smile and also expressed pleasure that drilling at Tromsøflaket and Haltenbanken has gone so well during this summer season.

Doesn't an oil and especially an energy minister have to keep nuclear power in mind with respect to future energy supplies?

"I am not especially concerned with nuclear power. It isn't much of a possibility in this country, at least not in this century. Waterpower is still the cheapest and cleanest power available to us in the foreseeable future. A cautious expansion of waterpower will be our line," said the energy minister.

Have you asked for help or advice from your predecessor in the period since you became a cabinet member?

"I have talked to Gjerde several times but I have not asked for direct advice or help. Anyway he has gone up to the mountains where he is building a hut," said Johanson who will act as host for visiting foreign ministers in the beginning of next month. The British oil and energy minister, David Howell, will be making an official visit to Norway at that time.

6578
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CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR SEPARATION OF POWERS IN FOREIGN POLICY

Lisbon: MAAOE E DEFESA in Portuguese Apr-Jun 80 pp 35-42

[Article by University of Lisbon and Catholic University of Portugal Professor Jorge Miranda]

[Text] The Constitutional Powers in the Foreign Policy Area

1.1 The two fundamental principles, closely interrelated, which govern the structure of political power in the Constitution are those of the separation of the organs of sovereignty and their interdependence (Article 114, No 1).

1.2 The first is reflected in the assignment of specific powers to each organ, involving typical actions; the second at all times entails the relationship (imposed by the unity of the state and the pursuit of the public's interest) among the organs, and is often reflected in a mutual determination of conditions or participation in the same state function (as it may be defined theoretically).

2.1 The Constitution does not authorize foreign policy as such (or the administration of foreign policy, as Article 81, No 7 of the Constitution of 1933 ostensibly did); it does not separate it, either horizontally or vertically, from any other sectors of the country's policy (financial policy, social policy, etc.)

2.2 No regulation is referred to it expressly. There are, on the one hand, regulations which call for some of its manifestations (the most important, to be sure); and, on the other hand, general rules of the system of government that are projected over it.

2.3 In view of these regulations, the legal framework within which the organs of power must operate becomes complex, reflecting the overall complexity of the constitutional system, which can be clarified only by a careful interpretation and observation of practice.

3.1 Without relying on the courts (including the Constitutional Commission, according to the terms of Article 282), whether with respect to applying rules of international law (Article 8), or possibly with respect to judging their constitutionality (Articles 207 and 280), all the political organs of sovereignty intervene in the international relations of the Portuguese State and the organs of the autonomous regions as well.

3.2 The president of the republic intervenes therein by virtue of the following provisions.

3.2.1 He "represents the Portuguese Republic" (Article 123), something which, not being *per se* an exclusive function but only a definition, is a repercussion or reminiscence of the traditional principle of "*jus representationis omnimodae*" [right of all types of representation] of the heads of state, and serves as a "*tête de chapitre*" [chapter heading] for other regulations (such as Article 132, on absence from the national territory, and Articles 138 and 139, No 3, line b).

3.2.2 The president appoints (and dismisses) ambassadors and special envoys, at the government's proposal (Article 138, line a, part 1). Representative of the state in international relations, it is incumbent on him to appoint the representatives to other states and international organizations, and others subject to international law.

3.2.3 He accredits foreign diplomatic representatives (Article 138, line a, part 2).

3.2.4 He ratifies (in the broad sense, including the ratification as such and adherence) international treaties, after they have been duly approved (Article 138, line b).

3.2.5 He signs the decrees of the government's approval of international agreements (agreements in a simplified form) (Article 137, No 1, line b, part 2, and Article 200, line c).

3.2.6 He declares war in the event of actual or imminent aggression, and makes peace, with authorization from the Council of the Revolution (Article 138, line c).

3.2.7 In the event of a political veto of a decree of the Assembly in foreign relations (whether it be a resolution for approval of an international treaty, or, possibly, a law), it will only have to be promulgated if its confirmation wins a two thirds majority of the deputies present, and not an absolute majority of the deputies actually in service, as is the general rule (Article 139, No 2, and Article 139, No 3, line b).

3.2.8 The president of the republic represents the territory of Macau in international relations, and that representation may be delegated to the governor of the territory (Article 306 and Article 3, No 2 of the statute approved by Law No 1/76, of 17 February).

3.2.9 It is incumbent on the president of the republic (assisted by the Council of the Revolution and in conjunction with the government) to perform all the actions necessary for the promotion and guarantee of self-determination of East Timor (Article 307).

3.3 The Council of the Revolution (so long as it still exists, until the first constitutional revision) intervenes as follows.

3.3.1 As an organ of consultation and support of the president of the republic, it may advise him with regard to the performance of any of the actions included in Article 138, Article 139, No 3, line b, Article 306 and Article 307 (Article 145, line a).

3.3.2 As an organ of limitation on the president, the declaration of war and the making of peace (Article 145, line b), absence from the national territory (Article 132 and Article 145, line d) and, when an acting president of the republic is involved, actions concerning diplomatic representatives (Article 140) are contingent on its authorization.

3.3.3 As a political and legislative organ, it is responsible for approving military treaties and agreements relating to military affairs (Article 148, No 1, line b), although this authority must be exercised in conjunction with the government or the Assembly of the Republic.

3.3.4 As an organ of guarantee for the Constitution, it engages in inspecting the constitutionality of international treaties and agreements (all, without exception), whether by preventive inspection (Article 146, line a, Article 277 and Article 278), or a posteriori inspection (Article 146, line c, Article 280, No 3 and Article 281); and it also engages therein with regard to laws and decree-laws associated with foreign relations (even rulings).

3.3.5 Also as an organ of guarantee for the Constitution, it is responsible for recommending to the legislative organs the necessary legislative measures for making practicable the constitutional rulings involving international relations that are not practicable of themselves (Article 146, line b, and Article 279); but the occurrence of this eventuality must be considered rather remote, because such rulings (with those in Article 7) will ordinarily be made practicable through international conventions, and not laws.

3.4 The Assembly of the Republic is preeminent in the following areas.

3.4.1 Associated with its realm of legislative authority are certain matters with an effect or a possible effect on the state's international position, even though they may not be concerned with foreign relations in the strict sense (for purposes of Article 139, No 3, line b), such as the general terms for loans and other credit operations (Article 164, line d); the determination of the limits of territorial waters and Portugal's rights to the contiguous ocean floors (Article 164, line 1); the acquisition, loss and reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship (Article 167, line a); the capacity of individuals (Article 167, line b); the organization of national defense (Article 167, line 1); and the monetary system (Article 167, line s). The first two are absolutely reserved rulings and the others are relatively reserved rulings, in other words, rulings which allow for legislative authorization for the government (Article 168).

3.4.2 It is incumbent on the Assembly, in cooperation with the government, to make laws on any aspects of foreign relations subject to treatment by law (Article 164, line d); for example, diplomatic and consular organization. And it may submit for ratification decree-laws on the same subjects (Article 165, line c, and Article 172), except those concerning the organization of the government for such relations (Article 201, No 2).

3.4.3 It is incumbent on it, with absolute reserve, to approve (Article 164, line j) treaties:

- which relate to matters within the exclusive legislative authority of the Assembly (that is, matters cited in Articles 164 and 167);
- Portugal's participation in international organizations (or rather, treaties constituting international organizations and, in such instances, affiliation with certain international organizations) for friendship, peace, defense and the rectification of borders;
- which, although dealing with other matters (including military ones), the government has submitted to it (in such instances, the authority for the government's approval is precluded).

3.4.4 The Assembly may assess the government's foreign policy action (Article 165, line a, part 2), specifically through oral and written questions (Article 159, line b, and Article 180, No 2), and interpellation (Article 183, No 2, line a).

3.4.5 The absence of the president of the republic from the national territory requires the consent of the Assembly, if it is in session (Article 132, No 1); however, the consent is dispensed with in instances of movement in transit or trips of an unofficial nature lasting not over 10 days (Article 132, No 2).

3.5 The government is preeminent in the following.

3.5.1 It is responsible for proposing the appointment (as well as the dismissal) of ambassadors and special envoys (Article 138, line a).

3.5.2 The actions of the president stipulated in Article 138 and Article 137, No 1, line b require a ministerial confirmation (Article 141, No 1 and Article 200, line a).

3.5.3 It is incumbent on the government, and it alone, to negotiate and adjust international conventions: all (formal) treaties and all accords (in simplified form), including those which require the approval of the Council of the Revolution, that is, military treaties and accords (Article 200, line b).

3.5.4 The government approves all accords in simplified form, in conjunction with the Council of the Revolution, when they are military accords (Article 200, line c, part 1).

3.5.5 The government approves international endeavors the approval of which is not within the authority of the Assembly of the Republic or which is not subject to it, with military endeavors approved in conjunction with the Council of the Revolution (Article 200, line c, part 2).

3.5.6 The government has concurrent legislative authority with the Assembly of the Republic in the realm of foreign relations (Article 201, No 1, line a), and reserved legislative authority in matters related to its own organization for that purpose (Article 201, No 2).

3.6 The organs of the autonomous regions also are preeminent with regard to matters of specific concern to them, as a result of the concept of politico-administrative autonomy adopted by the Constitution.

3.6.1 In fact, it is one of the powers of the autonomous regions to participate in the negotiations for international treaties and accords which directly concern them (Article 229, No 1, line 1).

3.6.2 Because of the nature of the matters, these organs must be (even though the Constitution may not say so) the regional governments (Article 233, Nos 1, 4 and 5).

4.1 Moving from the spectral analysis of powers and actions to a broader consideration from the standpoint of the constitutional system, it is worthwhile to recognize that it is in the realm of the relations between the president of the republic, the Assembly of the Republic and the government, and between the president and government in particular, that the problem of the administration of foreign policy is posed.

4.2 The government is the organ for administration of the country's general policy and the superior organ of public administration (Article 185, No 1, and Article 203, No 1, line a), without choice of subject matters, except that relating to the Armed Forces (Article 148). Hence, foreign policy and diplomatic administration come under its authority.

4.3 Nevertheless, the government is politically answerable to the president of the republic and the Assembly of the Republic (Article 193); and the president is free to dismiss the prime minister, after having heard from the Council of the Revolution (Article 136, line f, and Article 147, line a). The Assembly is free to bring about the dismissal of the government, by passing motions of rejection for its program or motions of censure, and by not passing motions of confidence (Articles 195 to 198), specifically for reasons of foreign policy.

4.4 There are considerable differences between the government-Assembly of the Republic combination and the government-president of the republic combination, with a considerable effect on the area of foreign policy.

4.4.1 The government's political responsibility toward Parliament is subject to far more stringent and restrictive rules than the government's responsibility toward the president of the republic; hence a greater and more constant influence that the president can wield over the government than what the Assembly can wield.

4.4.2 The direct, specific intervention of the Assembly of the Republic in the international activity of the state is confined to approval of treaties and principal laws, notwithstanding the use of mechanisms for inspection, such as questions and interpellations.

On the other hand, the president appears in the exercise of the three traditional rights of the state ("jus legationis" [right of embassy], "jus tractuum" [right of enforcement] and "jus belli" [right of war]) (Article 138); and he does not appear symbolically or in ornamental fashion, because he has been elected by universal suffrage, and because the government is answerable to him.

4.5 Although the administration of foreign policy (the determination of its major options and its everyday execution) belongs to the government, the most significant acts whereby it is reflected are also contingent upon acts of the president of the republic.

4.5.1 For example, the appointment of the state's representatives to others subject to international law depend on him, as does the ratification of treaties (which, as a result of a very old international custom, is a free act of the president), or the signing of decrees for the approval of accords in simplified form (which may be refused, through an absolute veto, as is the rule regarding any decrees of the Council of the Revolution and the government).

4.5.2 But if the president performs such acts, they are subject to ministerial confirmation, which means that, although they may not be imposed on the president, the president cannot impose them on the government, or produce their effects outside of the government, either.

4.6 From the two points just stressed (which are direct corollaries of the aforementioned principle of interdependence of the organs of sovereignty) there clearly stems the need for a practical arrangement between the president and the government in the foreign policy realm.

4.6.1 However, this practical arrangement, or "institutional solidarity" (to use the carefree expression that is tending to become generalized and does not necessarily imply either coincidence or total coincidence among policy plans) can hardly be described in exact legal terms. It lies more in the area of concrete policy, and its preparation or refinement must be based on practice.

4.6.2 In legal terms, what can be asserted for certain is the government's obligation to inform the president of the republic on all foreign policy action to be undertaken (prior information, not merely that given a posteriori or after faits accomplis).

5. Apart from the general system that has just been cited, there are two special or exceptional systems (depending on how they are interpreted) for the state's foreign policy (those relating to Macau and Timor), wherein the president's presence is more prominent than that of the government; because it is the president who directly assumes Portugal's responsibilities toward those territories.

5.1 Insofar as Macau is concerned, as has been observed (3.2.8), the administration of foreign policy is incumbent on the president of the republic, without any intervention by the government.

5.2 Insofar as Timor is concerned (3.2.9), the administration of foreign policy is ascribed, in common, to the president of the republic, assisted by the Council of the Revolution, and to the government, which makes the coordination of the action of each more necessary.

5.3 It should be noted that the acts of the president of the republic concerning Macau and Timor are not subject to confirmation (Article 141); therefore, they are acts wherein the president of the republic is given a leeway and autonomy that are unparalleled in other areas of foreign policy.

CARVALHO DEFINES POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF FUP PARTY

Maputo, NOTICIAS in Portuguese 1 Sep 80 p 3

[Report on press conference held by Maj Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho on 31 August in Maputo, Mozambique]

[Text] During a meeting with journalists in Maputo yesterday Maj Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho declared that the Portuguese electoral law is unconstitutional in view of the discrimination of which his political movement is a victim. According to the MOZAMBIQUE NEWS AGENCY (AIM), Otelo was specifically referring to the electoral challenge made against the FUP (People's Unity Force) in certain electoral circles based on legalistic criteria.

The challenge is based on the fact that the FUP registered as a party 1 day after the established time limit, since the final day happened to fall on Sunday.

However, the FUP leader was confident that the matter can be straightened out based on contacts he has had with various Portuguese state organizations, specifically the Council of the Revolution, the president of the republic and a government representative.

Currently in Mozambique on a short visit, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho was the military brains behind the 25 April coup d'etat which overthrew the fascist dictatorship.

Defining the FUP as "a political force of the nonaligned revolutionary left," Otelo asserted that the current attempt to sideline this organization is due "to the troublesome presence it would have in parliament.

"In the new phase Portugal is experiencing we must profit by the elections to foment political unrest and, if possible, infest parliament with a cancer," he stated.

Calling upon the revolutionary potential of the people's movement which emerged in Portugal after 25 April, the FUP insists on considering itself distinct from the other democratic and progressive political forces on the basis of "ideological differences."

Otelo expressed the opinion that in the next elections the leftist forces could very well defeat those of the right. He also categorized Soares Carneiro, the AD [Democratic Action] candidate, as a profascist alternative and said that if Carneiro were elected he would restore Portugal's profascist atmosphere.

During the press conference Otelo made it a point to emphasize FUP's "nonaligned position" referring in this regard to its excellent relations with Arab political organizations, particularly the Ba'th Socialist Party of Iraq, where Otelo recently journeyed at the invitation of President Saddam Hussein.

With regard to Mozambique, Saraiva de Carvalho stated that to the best of his ability "he is persisting in his efforts to contribute to the existing cooperation" with his country.

"Since the FUP is now a legalized party in Portugal, I am hopeful of better relations between the FUP and FRELIMO," [Mozambique Liberation Front] he said.

Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is scheduled to leave Maputo today and return to Lisbon.

Meanwhile, yesterday evening a group of Portuguese working in Mozambique arranged a banquet at one of Maputo's hotels to celebrate Otelo's birthday; he was 44 years old yesterday.

8568
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CUNHAL ASSESSES ELECTION RESULTS, PCP'S FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 14 Oct 80 p 3

[Interview with Portuguese Communist Party Secretary General Alvaro Cunhal, in Lisbon, by Augusto Pancaldi; date not given]

[Text] Lisbon--The legislative elections are now behind us. But there is no time to scrape the posters and writings of the battle just finished from Lisbon's walls, and already Sa Carneiro's face is covered by that of his candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, Soares Carneiro, a man who denies having a dark past but who, upon opening his mouth to explain his own program, makes one's flesh creep: 25 April? A date to be forgotten. Prior to 25 April? An age-old and enlightening history. The presidential elections in December? An opportunity to restore order in the country, to purge the constitution "of its Marxist aspects," give back what was stolen, put Portugal on the Atlantic timetable and stop encouraging contacts with the East and Third World.

If he were not supported by a powerful rightist coalition determined to put him in the presidency of the republic in order to have in him the faithful executor of a vast plan of restoration and revenge, and if it were not known that his name is linked with Spinola's coup d'etat attempt and was more than once brought up in connection with a paramilitary organization, "the association of commandos," where neo-Fascists are in the front rank, Soares Carneiro might pass for the inoffensive caricature of a neo-Fascist.

But with these forces which are pushing him toward Belém, the palace of the presidency of the republic, and on the wave of the tumultuous victory chalked up by those forces on 5 October, this general, 52 years of age, has no intentions of joking. For him, 5 October has just been the preamble to the final victory of 7 December; at that time, Portugal would supposedly turn the page and the "Marxist constitution" would finally be burned in a "restorative" bonfire.

Threatening Speeches

All this is threateningly presented in the speeches of the leaders of the winning coalition, in their press releases, and in information given out by a radio and television station confiscated and monopolized by them. But it is not and cannot already be an irreversible process, even though, simultaneously with 5 October, a serious and worrisome mortgage was placed on the absolute power of the right in Portugal.

In this regard, we have had a frank conversation with Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the Portuguese Communist Party.

He has no illusions about the gravity of the situation, the instability of the regime which emerged with the revolution and for 4 years has been subjected to incessant attacks by the right in search of revenge, and the uncertainty created by the 5 October elections relative to the future of institutions and organizational changes. Indeed, the situation is serious but not as serious as depicted by those who consider the battle for the presidential spot already lost.

Meanwhile, although it is true that in 10 months of power Sa Carneiro has succeeded in biting off large chunks of agrarian reform in Alentejo, he did not succeed in getting a single one of his unconstitutional projects passed, to return a single nationalized firm to the private sector or to demolish a single one of the pillars which guarantee the structures of the democratic regime.

Secondly, according to an initial analysis made by the PCP of the 5 October vote, the Democratic Alliance won over thousands of voters through conjunctural measures but did not win them over "politically," so that it is possible to foresee a return to the opposition candidate in the presidential elections. It is in December that the final match for power will be played and it is in December that all the leftist forces will have to band together "to beat the candidate of the right."

At his request, we had presented three questions to Cunhal beforehand. At the end of the conversation, of a much vaster and more general nature, as has been said, and one which touched on all social, political, economic and military aspects of the Portuguese situation, Cunhal gave us the text of his answers which we are publishing below.

[Question] What is PCP's opinion about the electoral results of 5 October?

[Answer] The results of the elections are the expression of serious infractions of the democratic nature of every electoral process. The PCP had requested Sa Carneiro's resignation from the government before the elections for three fundamental reasons: his violent and illegal offensive aimed at destroying the democratic changes implemented after the revolution (workers' rights, nationalization and agrarian reform); his plan for the unconstitutional revision of the constitution and the liquidation of the democratic regime; and his specific action to prevent the true expression of the political choice of the Portuguese people. The facts have confirmed our concerns. The government has hamstrung the various forms of the news media (television, radio and newspapers) and has made them instruments for poisoning public opinion; it has developed a campaign of brutal violence based on threats, aggression and intimidation; it has used the state apparatus and funds extensively; a few days before the election it announced a large number of demagogic measures which naturally dealt with real and urgent problems, the legitimate aspirations of broad strata of the population (increase in the minimum wage and pensions, "land distribution," assistance in the purchase of land, family allotments, reduction in the price of fuels, assistance in the purchase of automobiles, subsidies for the regional press, and the like): these measures, although not intended for implementation or "reabsorption" over the short term, have deceived hundreds of thousands of Portuguese.

Monopolizing the news media, using methods of repression and intimidation and demagogic are therefore the factors which led to an increase in the number of votes by the reactionary coalition but not the expression of the free political will of the Portuguese people. In turn, the FRS (Socialist Republican Front) presented itself at the elections with the assertion that, by itself, it could obtain a majority of votes and therefore be the only alternative. Considering that the PS [Socialist Party] had obtained 27 percent of the votes in the last elections, these assertions were absurd and no one was able to believe in them. Declaring itself to be an alternative but at the same time insisting on refusing any accord with the PCP and APU (United People Alliance), the PS has made a democratic alternative impossible. And, in fact, it remained with 27 percent of the vote.

The PCP has insisted on the need to unite all democratic forces and, in particular, the PS and PCP. Refusing any form of union, the PS has made a democratic alternative unbelievable and has facilitated the electoral success of the government parties. The APU's votes decreased from 1,121,374 (19 percent) to 1,000,967 (17 percent) and its deputies from 47 to 41. Considering the conditions under which the elections were carried out, this decline, although significant, is not a cause for alarm. In 1976, the PCP had obtained 785,394 votes. Therefore, it is retaining most of the voters gained between 1976 and 1979. In the near future our Central Committee will make a thorough study of the results of the elections and the political situation derived from that event. But the electoral campaign has shown the PCP's extraordinary organization, its degree of militancy and its capability of mobilizing the people. Important factors for the defense of democracy are at stake. Lastly, it should be added that the anti-Fascist parties as a whole have more votes than the reactionary coalition, which should urge them to unite and constitute a strong enough force to change the situation.

[Question] How and with what forces do you contemplate facing up to the new threats bearing down on democracy?

[Answer] It is true that, since the elections, new and more serious threats have been hanging over the revolutionary conquests and the Portuguese democratic regime. But it must be remembered that the political and social base of the reactionary parties is more limited by their conjunctural electoral support. It seems clear to us that some of them, those who voted for the Democratic Alliance, did not make a grassroots political choice, while the left's ability to mobilize the people continues to be greater.

Over the short term, the demagogic and electoral promises and concessions made by the government in the interest of large capital and large landed property would appear to be a colossal mistake. Those who have been deceived by demagogic will become aware of that mistake and will remember our warning.

The labor, people's and democratic movement is still broad and powerful. The Portuguese people do not want to return to the fascist past. The democratic institutions which the government wants to eliminate are functioning. It is therefore foreseeable that the social and political struggles will become worse. The PCP, and with it the labor and people's movement, will continue to carry on its own activity with strict respect for the constitution and democratic legality within the framework of the institutions created by the April Revolution.

[Question] In view of this new situation, how important are the next presidential elections?

[Answer] The presidential elections may eventually "correct" the results of the legislative elections. The reactionary parties have obtained a majority of deputies in the legislative elections, but their candidate to the Presidency of the Republic, Gen Soares Carneiro, might be defeated. The fate of the April Portugal is not yet definitely decided. The democratic forces have lost an electoral battle. We are continuing to believe in the possibility of blocking the reactionary forces, again taking up the offensive, recovering lost ground, and carrying forward a regime of freedom and social progress consecrated by the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic.

8568
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COMMUNIST PARTY REACTION TO POLISH LABOR VICTORIES

PCE Executive Committee Statement

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 12-18 Sep 80 p 21

(Text) Recent developments in Poland, which have been followed with rapt attention throughout the world, are extraordinarily important for the labor movement and especially for Communists.

The PCE (Spanish Communist Party) hails the struggle of the Polish workers and applauds the agreements signed by the government and the strikers, agreements that are critical of the performance of party and union leaders and that accept the basic grievances of the workers.

There is a recognition that the performance of the unions "has not satisfied the hopes and ambitions of the workers," and authorization has been granted for the creation of new, self-run unions whose independence the government promises to respect. These unions will have a real chance to take part in economic and social decisionmaking and will have their own press organs.

The right to strike has been established. The mass media will serve to "express diverse thinking, viewpoints and opinions."

A series of economic demands have been met: pay during strike days, price controls, wage and pension boosts, reducing the retirement age, etc.

The Central Committee of the PZPR [United Polish Workers Party] has acknowledged the mistakes made in connection with socioeconomic problems, the bureaucratic shortcomings, the insufficient contact with the workers and the people, and the need to develop self-management, not only in enterprises but in municipal and civic life as well. With this approach it has succeeded in dealing with the situation along political and negotiating lines.

One of the most significant features of the developments in Poland has been the involvement of great masses of workers, who have demonstrated a high degree of responsibility by voicing their social and democratic grievances without questioning socialism or Poland's international alliances. Moreover, the Catholic Church has taken a moderate attitude that has helped to resolve the conflicts.

A new stage has obviously begun in Poland's history, although there are still many question marks. Even though what happened there has its intrinsic political, economic and social causes, the scope of developments goes far beyond the country's borders and poses serious theoretical and political problems.

We are not unaware of the enormous anticommunist speculation by reactionary, pro-imperialist forces surrounding the developments in Poland, in a bid to weaken the positions of Communist parties throughout the world and portray as negative everything that has been accomplished in the countries that have done away with capitalist ownership.

We resolutely confront those campaigns and defend all of these socialist gains.

At the same time, we must underscore that what happened in Poland reaffirms Eurocommunism's basic option in the sense that freedom, democracy and the participation of the masses are inherent to socialism. It has confirmed the correctness of our Eurocommunist criticisms of the negative developments under so-called "real socialism."

The abolition of capitalist ownership and the accomplishments in the fields of culture, health care and others unquestionably represent major historic progress. But we cannot close our eyes to facts: the political system, not just in Poland but in other Eastern European countries as well, does not permit true participation by the workers, the grass roots, the citizens in running the country.

Overcoming Dogmatism

The socialist revolution, which began 63 years ago, has known, along with victories, setbacks, mistakes and degenerative phenomena that are typical of major historical changes.

This means that we Communists must exert creative, thoughtful efforts to overcome dogmatic views and negative phenomena and to go on the offensive in developing our theory.

The Polish experience no doubt contains lessons of great value for other countries in which similar contradictions exist, albeit under different circumstances. Bearing these lessons in mind will spur progressive developments and enhance the ability of Communist parties to take the initiative and to thus make democracy and a broader involvement of the masses a reality.

The forms of socialist democracy must obviously be commensurate with the individual characteristics of the development of the revolution in each country. But the essential thing in all instances is to assure the participation of the workers and the people in running the country, as well as respect for criticism and a plurality of views and real political, union and cultural freedoms.

At the same time, the developments in Poland highlight the need at this juncture in history to surmount the division of Europe into military blocs. This would also lead to the development and enrichment of democracy in Western European countries and would facilitate abolition of the bans on Communist Party involvement in the governments of those countries. Such a change on the international level would be a decisive factor in enabling each country to enjoy full independence.

We Spanish Communists are following with the utmost interest the developments in Poland, because we are convinced that democratization in Eastern European countries and democratic socialist gains in Western European countries are reciprocally influential processes. It is our desire that the agreements reached in Poland be respected. We want to see democratization consolidated, so that it can strengthen socialism and Communist parties, thus helping to surmount the split in the labor movement and to spur the trend towards detente and peace.

Executive Committee of the PCE
Madrid, 9 September 1980

Carrillo Executive Committee Address

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 19-25 Sep 80 pp 21-24

[Text of address by PCE Secretary General Santiago Carrillo to PCE Executive Committee during 8-9 September meeting in Madrid]

[Text] Much of the PCE Executive Committee meeting in Madrid on 8 and 9 September was taken up with a discussion of the recent developments in Poland.

The meeting's final resolution was published in our last issue, in addition to the first part of the protocol signed by the workers and the Polish Government. In this issue we include the report of the PCE secretary general that opened the discussion.

I think that you are all familiar with the text of the agreements between the Government of Poland and the Strike Committee, which satisfy the grievances of the Polish strikers.

The essential elements of these agreements are contained in a 20-point protocol that I think MUNDO OBRERO ought to publish in its entirety.

The main issues dealt with in these agreements are, first: since union activities (they say) "have not satisfied the hopes and ambitions of the workers," the creation of new, self-managed unions is authorized, which does not rule out the possibility of cooperation between them and existing unions. Also, a new law will be drawn up, the draft of which will be submitted for discussion among workers before being sent to Parliament, with the new unions to take part in this discussion. The government promises to fully respect the independence of these new unions and to give them a real chance to participate in economic and social decisionmaking and to have their own press organs.

Secondly, the right to strike has been established. I think that this is the second socialist country to establish the right to strike, Yugoslavia being the first.

Thirdly, they provide for the drafting of a bill to limit censorship to the protection of state secrets, the protection of religious convictions and the convictions of nonbelievers and to publications that "attack good customs," the text reads.

In this regard, decisions have been made to televise Sunday Mass (the Poles are going to have the same opportunities as we Spaniards) and to allow religious organizations to use the mass media.

The radio and television stations, printed media and publishing houses subjected to social control must serve, according to the agreements, to express diverse thinking, views and opinions.

They also assert the need for accurate news regarding administrative activities and the government's economic programs.

The agreements include other grievances in connection with pay for strike days, prices, wages, pensions, retirement age, etc.

Our comrades in the Polish United Workers Party have reported to us on these developments and have a positive opinion of the agreements, which have already been approved by the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party. During this and the Fourth Plenum, our comrades tell us, they held a self-critical discussion, acknowledging the mistakes of what they describe as a policy not consistent with economic and social problems. They also acknowledged the mistakes of bureaucratic rule, of failure to come in contact with the workers and the people, and the patent inadequacies of government unions. They have asserted their determination to develop self-management, not only in enterprises but also in municipal and civic life, and they reassert their determination to move towards a real reduction in censorship.

The comrades in the PZPR have a high regard for the workers' peaceful attitude and their protection of the means of production, in other words, the protection of socialist property, during the days of the strike.

At both meetings the Central Committee stressed the need to deal with this kind of conflict along political and negotiating channels.

Our comrades in the PZPR appreciate the Church's moderate, constructive role, with a sense of responsibility in keeping with Poland's national interests. These are their own words.

Comrades who had previously been dismissed from leadership positions for criticizing economic policy (criticisms that the facts have borne out) have now been reinstated.

At no time in the negotiations with the strikers, they tell us, was there any questioning of the party's leadership role in the state, or of Poland's socialist social system and international alliances. The protocol clearly spelled out the positions regarding all of these issues.

Parallel to this, the PZPR has told us about another agreement, which is "to undertake an ideological and political offensive against antisocial elements." In any case, they tell us, the results that they have achieved are the fruit of initial analyses, and they are preparing the Sixth Central Committee Plenum to conduct a more in-depth examination of the causes of this situation.

Lastly, they stress their desire that the Polish people be able to resolve their problems without outside interference. In this regard, they point to Father Wałęsa's appearance with Reagan during the U.S. election campaign as a negative development.

I think that we ought to respect this desire as much as possible. I say as much as possible because even though specifically Polish factors are at play (nationalism, patriotism, the enormous influence of the Church, enhanced by Wojtyla's election as pope, prior conflicts that are at the root of this one), the recent developments in Poland carry implications that go beyond the country's borders and pose serious problems in the theoretical and political fields. Among them we must not underestimate the enormous anticommunist speculation by reactionary and proimperialist forces, which are taking advantage of these developments to try and weaken the positions of Communist parties throughout the world and denounce everything that has been accomplished in the countries that have abolished capitalist ownership. We must obviously confront these endeavors and defend all of the social gains in these countries.

There have even been attempts by Socialist and Social Democrat parties. A number of PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] leaders have not been able to resist the temptation to take advantage of the developments in Poland to say that we Communists do not have answers for workers' problems.

In any case and in spite of these speculations, I would emphasize that the capitalist governments as such have maintained a rather discreet attitude and have even offered the Polish Government loans to cope with its economic difficulties.

This policy might, of course, be an attempt to exert greater influence in Poland through economic aid, but the essential thing is that this stand by the capitalist governments shows that they are truly concerned about maintaining the world balance of power and that they are clearly afraid that any destabilizing development could trigger a worldwide conflict, a danger that public opinion in general is not always aware of and that even we Communists are not always aware of.

I must say, however, that Eurocommunist criticisms of the experiences of so-called "real socialism" gain validity in connection with the Polish experience. Isn't it significant that under a system in which major capitalist holdings have disappeared, the working class is utilizing tactics and posing

grievances as we have done here through the Workers Commissions under the past regime? This should be cause for reflection for the entire party, for all of its members and especially those who try to lump together our criticisms with those of the bourgeoisie and Social Democracy, which ought to be denounced all together.

Far be it from me, however, to draw a comparison between the Franco era and the system of "real socialism" on any ground. But the fact is that not only in Poland but in other countries having "real socialism" as well, the current political system (Togliatti spoke about this issue after the 20th Congress of the CPSU) does not permit true participation by the workers and masses in running the country.

We have always found fault with the pro forma aspects of bourgeois democracy, but we cannot close our eyes to this fact. Socialist democracy is basically a pro forma democracy, a textbook democracy that does not really exist. A layer of bureaucrats runs the show, making decisions on behalf of the working class but without its backing. We cannot say that the working class as such is in power just because the people in government are members of the Communist Party.

Unions have in practice become a cog in the state machine, and I think that the same thing is happening to the party itself. Power ceases to be an instrument of the party, of the unions, of the class and of the people to carry out a revolution. A state technocracy and bureaucracy arise and make the party and the unions cogs in the state machine to control the class and the people.

The abolition of capitalist ownership and the social, cultural and health care reforms that these systems have accomplished unquestionably represent major historic progress towards socialism, but this is still not full-fledged socialism, much less the beginning of communism.

The truth is that in these countries the workers do not feel like the real owners of the means of production. The means of production belong to the state, and the workers still do not consider the state their own. Engels said that there are times when the state becomes independent of society and places itself above it. This rarely happens in capitalist society, only in times of serious crisis. Under so-called "real socialism" the phenomenon seems to be becoming permanent, and thus conflicts such as the one in Poland highlight this dislocation of state and society.

In the final accounting, here as well is the reason why conflicts and even wars break out between states that call themselves socialist, even though these wars are not in keeping with the interests of the masses or the principles of true socialism.

We have to acknowledge that pointing out these facts causes many of our comrades to feel somewhat like orphans, in the sense that if today we cannot fully identify with the course of revolutions that have been at the root of our emergence, it is as if we had lost a father, figuratively speaking.

We have to overcome this demoralizing feeling. The socialist revolution began 63 years ago, but it was not a single act that automatically took care of everything else. It was a starting point that has been followed by, in addition to victories, setbacks, mistakes and degenerative process that tend to come about in connection with all major historical changes. Our loyalty to our origin, our paternity I would say, continuing the simile, lies precisely in the creativity and thinking that we must exercise to surmount the negative aspects of these processes. If we Communists do not make such an effort, by turning to the theories of scientific socialism, applying and developing them, which befits any real science, the peoples in these countries, faced with contradictions, injustices and the absence of real freedom and democracy, could erroneously conclude that the socialist alternative has failed and that a return to capitalism is the last resort.

That is why we must consider that the Polish party has taken a constructive approach by negotiating and seeking new and original avenues, instead of repressing. Other Communist parties in power must now learn from the Polish experience and before the contradictions give way to serious conflicts, take the initiative and promote broad, new channels so that socialist democracy can cease to be pro forma. This would bolster and further the cause of socialism and communism.

We cannot deny that the influence of the enemy might at times be present amid the developments in Poland, as well as those that might occur and have occurred in other socialist countries. We cannot deny that. But it would be a tremendous blunder (it would be making the same mistake as Franco propaganda when it talked about "agents of Moscow," "leaders and members of the Workers Commissions with salaries of 100,000 pesetas coming from overseas to 'agitate' the workers") to think that a groundswell as strong as the one we are seeing in Poland now and have seen in the past, could basically be the result of enemy activities. They are essentially the outcome of real contradictions, of the real and deep-seated discontent among workers.

We cannot claim that the forms of socialist democracy in other countries are exactly the same ones that Eurocommunism advocates in developed countries. The revolutionary process has developed along other paths in the countries of Eastern Europe and they must come up with their own forms of democracy and pluralism. The decisive element is the democratic approach to criticism, to a plurality of views and to the real participation of the various grass roots strata of society, primarily the working class itself.

I think that the acceptance of a second union independent of the party and state, of the right to strike, of self-management and of broader freedom of expression (that is, if the agreements are upheld and respected, as they ought to be) already represents a modification of the political system (not the social system) that offers a problematic opportunity for democratic give-and-take but that could also make Communists more responsive and faster to act and help them to overcome their routine bureaucratic attitudes. Therefore, this is an enriching and constructive trend.

If there is one thing that we have to regret in connection with the Polish experience, it is that developments were not prompted on the initiative of the party itself, as happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Everyone is anxiously following the developments in Poland. The most reactionary imperialists want the bid to fail and even want to see a military intervention in Poland like the one in Czechoslovakia. Those who feel and grasp the need to keep peace, even though they are ideological adversaries of communism and socialism, are cautious and concerned. And we want the trend towards democratization to solidify, to pave the way for further progress by socialism and Communist parties and, in general, to help overcome the split in the international labor movement and consolidate the trends of peace and cooperation in the world.

I think that we should keep a close eye on what happens. There could still be further important developments in Poland.

I want to stress that our criticism of the experiences in the struggle for socialism is part of an overall effort to further the cause of communism, anti-imperialism and peace; it is in no way designed to blend our voice with that of the adversaries of socialism.

From a theoretical standpoint, we do not doubt the superiority of socialism, but that superiority has not yet been attained, and it must be attained in political and social practice.

Santiago Carrillo Statements

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 5-11 Sep 80 p 11

[Statements by Santiago Carrillo after returning from discussions with Yugoslav, Romanian and Italian Communist leaders; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] The PCE secretary general, Santiago Carrillo, has just returned from Madrid after a period of rest during which he had political contacts with high-level Yugoslav, Romanian and Italian Communist leaders. In resuming his normal activities, he made a number of exclusive statements to MUNDO OBRERO SEMANAL, discussing national and international political issues, stressing the importance of home rule questions and unemployment in our country and relating the Eurocommunist path towards socialism with the recent labor conflict in Poland.

Developments in Poland Support Eurocommunist Stand

The immediacy and importance of the politico-labor conflicts in Poland called for a statement in this regard by the PCE secretary general, who offered the following initial commentary on the issue:

"I think that the events in Poland have supported the Eurocommunist stand that socialism must, in effect, expand, not restrict democracy.

"There is a surprising similarity," Carrillo says, "between the union tactics developed by the Gdansk workers and those of Workers Commissions during the previous period, the difference being that Spanish workers were up against a system of private capitalist ownership, whereas the Polish workers are not trying to attack the socialist groundwork of the regime in their country, but are, rather, simply trying to secure democratic reforms that in my judgment are indispensable.

"It seems that state and PZPR leaders have done a good thing by negotiating. I think that this is the way to go and that exclusively the Poles themselves ought to come up with solutions for the problems of socialism in Poland, without any sort of interference.

"One of the things that developments in Poland have taught us is that the advancement of socialism and, later, of communism demands reforms in the political system to consolidate and expand the socialist system.

"Of course I do not think that the patterns that we Eurocommunists anticipate for the transition to socialism and its development in our countries can be applied to the countries that have already abolished private capitalist property, but in any case the Eurocommunist concept of socialism within democracy is also valid for the countries that have already abolished the system of capitalist property."

Joint Spanish-Italian Communique

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 29 Aug-4 Sep 80 p 17

[Text of joint communique by Spanish Workers Commissions (CCOO) Labor Federation and Italian United Federation (CGIL-CISL-UIL)]

[Text] The worker and peasant struggles in Poland are motivated firstly by the workers' determination to achieve better living and working conditions, along with wideranging union and political freedoms. In this regard, there is a great significance to the demands for participation and union autonomy put forth by the Strike Committee that emerged as the democratic and direct voice of the workers during these developments and that is now negotiating these demands with the Polish Government.

The great strike by the Polish workers has had precedents, but those energetic struggles, from the events in Poznan in 1956 to the great worker campaign in 1970, were violently cracked down on. Once again the union struggle is manifesting itself with great strength and a great sense of responsibility.

The objectives of this struggle must receive an answer and therefore demand a just solution free from any sort of repression, much less "outside interference," which would carry extremely grave consequences, and not just for Poland. Hence, gains by the workers and the independence of the country are inseparable objectives in Poland and wherever else such values are recognized.

The West and, in particular, the EEC must raise as much money as possible to prevent the fall of Poland's economy and institutions, thus helping to implement the reforms proposed by the Polish workers in their brave struggle.

On behalf of Italian workers, the Italian United Federation expresses its most deep-seated solidarity with the Polish workers and its hopes that their struggle concludes in complete success. The United Federation pledges, furthermore, to immediately begin calling on the European Trade Union Confederation to further all initiatives that could effectively contribute to a successful conclusion of the Polish workers' struggle.

The Labor Federation of the CCOO supports the positions expressed in the above communique from the Italian United Federation.

CCOO Official Statement

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 5-11 Sep 80 p 18

[Text of 1 September 1980 CCOO statement]

[Text] The recognition of the right to strike and to form unions and of the participation of Polish workers in the country's economic planning constitutes a success for the workers, as well as a victory for the policy of discussion and dialog pursued by the two sides.

The agreed upon solution, which satisfies the workers' economic and social demands, has obvious political overtones that in essence represent the deepening and development of democracy. This is a major step forward the repercussions of which will unquestionably be very constructive.

From the outset the CCOO closely followed developments and expressed its solidarity with the strikers' demands, personally voicing to Polish unions its support of these demands during the visit by a CCOO delegation made up of Marcelino Camacho, secretary general, and Serafin Aliaga, the head of international relations. It now hails the results that have been achieved and the commitments that have been made, among which it underscores, in addition to the recognition of union freedom (including the formation of an autonomous union), the announcement of a union reform by the government that ought to make possible profound changes in the Polish union picture.

The CCOO feels that union pluralism or unity with autonomy and independence vis-a-vis the government or the workers party is the exclusive bailiwick of the workers of Poland. In any case, as far as the CCOO is concerned, one of the outcomes of the developments in Poland is the increase in union power.

Lastly, the CCOO thinks highly of the sense of responsibility, realism and serenity evinced during the conflict and the negotiations by the striking workers, the bodies created by them, the unions that represented the workers' grievances and the Polish Government and authorities. All of them made possible, within the framework of socialist Poland, the resolution of the existing economic and social contradictions, thus opening up new prospects for the development of socialism.

Madrid, 1 September 1980

Camacho, Aliaga Assess Victories

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 29 Aug-4 Sep 80 pp 16-17

[Statements by CCOO Secretary General Marcelino Camacho and International Relations Secretary Serafin Aliaga upon returning from Bulgaria and Poland]

[Text] "Holding union elections throughout the country, wideranging union autonomy and the legalization of the right to strike are the three basic goals of the attempt at an overhaul by Polish union leaders in the search for a new model for union organization, we were told during our visit to Poland," Marcelino Camacho and Serafin Aliaga told MUNDO OBRERO upon returning to Madrid from a trip to Bulgaria and Poland that had been planned prior to the outset of the conflict that Poland is now in. "In the first place, we want to make public our complete solidarity with the Polish workers," they said right after arriving at Barajas.

The trip to Bulgaria and Poland by CCOO Secretary General Marcelino Camacho and International Relations Secretary Serafin Aliaga had been planned beforehand. They will be visiting China in early September.

"It was in Bulgaria, where we of course had very interesting contacts with union leaders of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and CIOLS, that we heard news of the developments in Poland," Marcelino Camacho told us.

Meeting With Pawlak and Sydlak

In Poland, the Spanish union leaders met, as scheduled, with Polish union representatives, among them the secretary and head of international relations, Pawlak, and the president, Jan Sydlak, who was later removed.

"First of all, we of course asked them for information on what was happening so that we could have criteria for judgment," Camacho told us. "They explained that the causes of the current conflict were to be found, on the one hand, in the general economic crisis that is affecting all countries, including socialist countries, and on the other, the mistakes made in economic planning. This highlighted the lack of union channels for input with all of their specific weight in the decisions affecting the national economy and, therefore, the workers. They conceded that in the past the unions had made mistakes by carrying bureaucracy too far and drifting too far from the worker rank-and-file. They also mentioned the existence of antisocialist elements that were trying to influence the strike movement for their own destabilizing interests. They felt at all times that a solution must be based on dialog and compromise, in short, no repression. They thought highly of the moderating role being played by the Polish Church, which they regarded as a logical development because there has always been common ground in Poland among Socialists, Communists and Christians. And they pointed to the following steps to be taken: the call for union elections throughout the country, developing a framework of autonomy for the unions vis-a-vis the state and the PZPR, and the enactment of a right to strike law."

Three Key Questions

After this explanation, Camacho and Serafin Aliaga posed three questions to their Polish counterparts: first, what was the makeup of the strike committees that had been formed in the enterprises that had decided to halt work in support of the list of grievances of the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee; second, were arrests being made, and last, would there be fully autonomous relations in the future among the unions, the state and the PZPR.

Strike Committees

"With respect to the first question, their answer was that the strike committees had been elected directly by the workers and they were made up of PZPR and union members and other workers," Marcelino Camacho said. "The important thing about what they said in this regard is that they feel that the strike movement can be fully incorporated into the structure of the unions, naturally by introducing reforms in them, such as union elections from top to bottom, the recognition of the right to strike and union autonomy."

No Workers Arrested

As to whether arrests were being made, the Polish union leaders stressed the path of dialog to resolve problems. "No one has been arrested," was their assertion. "There have been arrests within the dissident movement, which centers around the KOR [Social Self-Defense Committee] and other groups that are trying to portray themselves as the political voice of the strike movement," Camacho said. The dissident movement is trying to introduce grievances connected with union and political pluralism, as well as full freedom of expression.

Union Autonomy

With regard to the third question posed by Camacho and Serafin Aliaga, the Polish union leaders voiced their conviction that wideranging union autonomy had to be developed. "They have reached the conclusion," Camacho told us, "that the issue is to defend not just socialism but the workers within socialism as well and that both elements have to be coordinated, which calls for strong, autonomous unions that enjoy credibility and can deal with the state and the PZPR as equals."

CCOO Position

"The CCOO has a clear-cut position in this regard," Marcelino Camacho and Serafin Aliaga told us, "although as usual it has been manipulated. First, we told our Polish comrades that we were in agreement with the steps they were proposing, in other words, union elections throughout the country, from which would emerge worker representatives from top to bottom, thus doing away with bureaucratic elections from above, and that we supported full union autonomy vis-a-vis the state and political parties. In addition to all this, the CCOO endorses the communique released by the Italian United Federation" (reproduced above).

"Furthermore," Camacho told us, "when they asked us in private talks who ought to cover the economic costs of the strikes, we told them that in the West strikes were paid for by the losers, some times the employers and other times the workers, but that in the case of Poland we felt that the state should pay, on account of the specific characteristics of the conflict."

Polish unions will hold their congress in November, as it had been previously scheduled. A new model for union organization in Poland could emerge from it, the thinking goes.

Recognition of Strikers' Rights

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 29 Aug-4 Sep 80 p 16

[Text] Changes in the Polish Government, the announcement of union elections and the start of negotiations between worker representatives and members of the government (including the new prime minister) have marked one of the most action-packed weeks in Poland during the current crisis.

At a meeting of the Central Committee of the PZPR at which, according to Secretary General Edward Gierek, there was no lack of "harsh, painful but fair words and sad truths about our own mistakes, inconsistencies, delays, hesitations and weaknesses," the PZPR made major changes in the makeup of its leadership bodies and proposed to the Diet and Council of State equally major changes in the presidium of the Council of Ministers. Removed were Premier Edward Babiuch, Deputy Chairmen Tadeusz Pyka and Tadeusz Wrzaczsyk and Eugeniusz Grochal, the chairman of the Pricing Committee. There were also changes in the leadership of the propaganda department and the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

In Gierek's words, "these changes above all affect the country's economic leadership, as well as major fields of state and party activities. We have appointed to positions of responsibility those comrades who took note of the irregularities and strived to oppose them but whom we did not listen to in time."

Union activities have been one of the most talked-about issues both in the Polish press and at the various meetings that have been held. Jan Pawlak, the secretary of the Central Council of Unions, acknowledged at the time that the unions themselves are not satisfied with the role that they are playing and that in many cases they have to take a stronger line with the administration by demanding that it deal with the problems that concern it. "There is also the question of the lack of instruments whereby the unions can effectively force the bureaucratized administrations to meet the just demands of the workers."

The holding of union elections with an unlimited number of candidates and secret balloting should enable, Polish leaders said, the spontaneously chosen worker representatives to be confirmed, thus securing "stable and solid" authority.

Their present authority stems from the strikes, which have continued, in particular, at worker establishments along the Baltic coast, and the maturity and responsibility of the workers, who have prevented any breach of the peace or destruction of state assets that belong to all.

It is this authority, that of the striking workers, that the government did not recognize in beginning the negotiations with the interenterprise committee, as it even promised to televise the first 20 minutes of each negotiating session. One of the preconditions set forth by the workers, the restoration of telephone communication in Gdansk, was met just before the start of these bargaining sessions.

Inevitable Economic Adjustments

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 29 Aug-4 Sep 80 p 7

[Editorial: "The Polish Crisis"]

[Text] The strikes by Polish workers clearly represent the most serious warning about the need to tailor Poland's economic and political structures to its existing social conditions. In a nation in which capitalist groups and large multinationals with decisive influence on government do not exist, the workers and grass roots cannot feel distant from the centers of power. Even though in times of crisis the question of trust comes to the fore, it cannot be reduced to a question of feelings, to trusting or not trusting one team or another.

Factors with conservative interests, such as the Polish Church, or the inevitable action of outside elements always cross paths, in the forefront in this case. The "scrupulous" silence that the U.S. State Department is trying to keep should not prompt illusions regarding its "neutrality."

Polish workers have already given their administration serious warnings in recent years. There have been three major strike movements in the last 10 years, and they cannot be attributed exclusively to the activities of agitators or outside influences, and Polish leaders have not done so. The defects were real, and at the recent session of the Central Committee of the PZPR, Edward Gierek acknowledged the need to make in-depth changes in unions, "whose supreme function must always be the genuine defense of workers' interests." Gierek also conceded that the economic program put forth by the government had not received social support.

The improved economic performance to which the Polish administration has committed itself is, as the leaders themselves have pointed out, not something that can be secured immediately and without shortcomings, however. Experiences in all economies show that plans can be carried out only to a degree, that not everything can be anticipated and that certain breakdowns are always inevitable. Therefore, social support is indispensable, and it can come only if the workers have played a real role from the outset in determining the objectives that are to be pursued at all levels. It is essential that the state provide the political, union and social avenues for grass roots involvement.

This entails energetic, streamlined democratic mechanisms on the economic, union and political levels. Since in the West and in Spain we have sound evidence that political freedoms (achieved after long and arduous sacrifices by grass roots segments of society) are curtailed by capitalist circles through absolute economic control, political freedoms must be guaranteed and furthered in the nations in which this capitalism no longer exists.

The failure to grasp this, ignoring warning after warning or devising mere compromise settlements when in-depth transformations are needed, entail the risk that the traditional, conservative segments or even the outside elements at work in the Polish crisis might take on an increasingly important role. There is also the risk that the next warning will not be characterized by the calmness and responsibility that the workers have this time and so far demonstrated.

Harsh Lesson for State

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 5-11 Sep 80 p 16

[Article by Federico Melchor: "The Polish Lesson"]

[Text] The lesson has been a harsh one. Let me say that clearly and at the outset. I am talking about the lesson given by the Polish workers to the state, the PZPR and the union organization, a lesson consisting of 3 weeks of strikes begun, sustained and directed by the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee (MKS) against the government's economic and wage policy, against union and political structures in which they are not represented and for democratic freedoms that they are demanding for themselves and for society as a whole.

I would also like to mention from the outset that top-level PZPR leaders, especially Comrade Gierek, have handled the crisis calmly and realistically, which is even more praiseworthy when we bear in mind the external factors weighing on them. Such factors can never be underestimated when viewing the situation in Eastern European countries.

The comment has and will continue to be made that the events in Poland indicate the "failure of the communist model." Such an assertion clearly stems from either reactionary intentions or facile partisan politics, never from Marxist thought. What has failed in Poland and other Eastern European countries is the model of a bureaucratic, authoritarian state, which has come into contradiction (for many years now) with the democratic, liberating, self-management and representative needs of societies in which private capitalist ownership has disappeared without being gradually replaced by a system under which, as Marx and Engels anticipated, the working class, by freeing itself, would free all of society. Such a failure does not, however, lend luster to the Social Democrat experience, whose numerous governments over the last 75 years have not introduced a single basic social change and have brought about not a few defeats and catastrophes for the working class.

Will those who could not see clearly under previous circumstances be able to do so now? I am not talking about the ossified bureaucratic strata but about

those who ever since the truncated Prague Spring of 1968 have listened with irritation to our criticisms of the bureaucratic, authoritarian state.

The facts are there to see, the same facts that Lenin pointed to as political evidence. In one way or another the conflicts have shattered appearances, and what used to look superficially stable has crumbled, because the development of the productive forces and the need for social, political, cultural and state changes also function in the countries in which private capitalist ownership does not exist like "the old mole" that Marx spoke of.

It was useless to try and limit the Polish strikes to their catalyst, economic grievances. An economic plan immediately made its appearance, dictated from above and without any real decisionmaking input by the workers. A Gdansk Communist leader made the following comments: "Current social tensions are largely due to the progressive centralization of decision-making power, to mounting bureaucracy, to growing declines in living standards over the last few years and to difficult working conditions," adding later: "and to the poor functioning of socialist democracy, especially in the labor movement."

The political and social issue was decisive. I have spoken of the bureaucratic state. What I mean by this is a state in which even though private capitalist ownership has disappeared, the major means of production are not socially administered; in which the workers participate solely as producers, not as collective owners; in which coercive methods still exist and are even bolstered by the lack of institutional checks and balances; in which differences take shape in the role that each segment of society plays in the administration and organization of the state and in work relations, while new contradictions are created in the distribution of social products (the Marxist slogan of "to each according to his work" is all too often replaced by "to each according to the position that he occupies on the state scale"). Thus, the bureaucracy, which the state cannot abolish with one stroke of the pen, grows stronger, to the point of omnipotence, instead of weakening and dying out, instead of having its functions taken over by social involvement, although in the long run its great influence will enter a crisis because of the "old mole" that gradually erodes its base.

Over the last 3 weeks the government and the Strike Committees have entered into conflict, negotiated and, finally, reached agreement. The lesson has been a harsh one. The union organization has been overridden, put out of action. The head of government, ministers and union leaders have been bounced. I am not unaware of the existence of "fishermen in troubled waters," nor of the international implications of the Polish issue, nor of the existence of blocs. But I trust those workers, who as in the town of Bytom declared upon joining the strike in a show of solidarity with their comrades in Gdansk: "We don't want to have anything to do with antisocialist elements." I cannot imagine Baltic shipyards workers asking the United States to send them capitalists to run their enterprises and thus exploit them."

Fortunately, the "outside intervention" that would have been triggered by a great national uprising for Polish independence has not come about. So far, the leaders of the PZPR and the state have handled the crisis with political

methods and dialog, with realism and calmness. Self-criticism has begun. The agreement signed by the two sides points to corrective steps that ought to be continued, so that the workers and Polish society can become involved in making decisions about handling their country's affairs and in the construction of socialism under freedom.

Polish Media Control Criticized

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 5-11 Sep 80 p 18

[Text] Two types of journalism have been practiced with regard to the strikes in Poland, and neither contributes to true freedom of expression. One of them, corrected in part during the course of events, was the official stand of the Polish media, which did not report what was really happening in connection with the conflict, inasmuch as they were determined to delete any critical view of the problem and attribute all of the ills to infiltrators who are quite a bit more imaginary than real. The other type has been practiced by those who claim that the doc'workers strike in northern Poland was proof that socialism has been a historic failure. These gentlement have never suggested that the many strikes (and the harsh way that they are repressed) that are staged in all Western countries (in fact in Belgium the strikers took two government ministers hostage during the developments in Poland) are a demonstration that capitalism no longer works as a system.

Strike Information Acquisition Problems

Madrid MUNDO OPRERO in Spanish 5-11 Sep 80 p 17

[Excerpt] MUNDO OBRERO tried to send its editor-in-chief to Warsaw to provide on-the-spot reports for our readers. So far, the Polish Embassy in Madrid has not granted his entry visa, and therefore our information is based solely on international agencies and the services of the Polish agency INTERPRESS.

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CSO: 3110

STATUS OF MUNICIPAL-LEVEL COMMUNIST POWER, GOVERNMENT

Madrid NUESTRA BANDERA in Spanish Sep 80 pp 45-62

[Article by Manuel Castells and Carlos A. Zaldivar: "The Left Marks 1 Year"; maps included are best reproductions available]

[Excerpts] Manuel Castells is a man with extensive background in the urban struggles in our country. Carlos Alonzo Zaldivar is the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) official in charge of municipal and citizens' policy. Both were among the communist negotiators of the municipal PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]-PCE agreements. Last year Manuel Castells was absent, teaching at the university of Berkeley as a professor of urban sociology. NUESTRA BANDERA deemed it of interest today to bring these two individuals together to discuss the development of municipal policy in these first 15 months.

1980 Budgets

Leftist opposition	16 provincial capitals with UCD [Democratic Center Union] mayors	Without budgets for 1980: 6 capitals. The increase in comparison to 1979 in the 1980 budgets approved is less than 50 percent. No major changes in extraordinary budgets. The increase in investments is about 50 percent.
Leftist majority	19 provincial capitals with PSOE mayors	Increase of more than 50 percent in the 1980 budgets, in comparison to 1979. New extraordinary and urban development budgets drafted. Increase of about 100 percent in total investments in comparison to 1979.
Leftist majority	50 towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants with PCE mayors	Increase of between 50 and 100 percent in 1980 budgets in comparison to 1979. New extraordinary and urban development budgets drafted. Increase of more than 100 percent in total investments in comparison to 1979.

Participation


Leftist opposition	16 provincial capitals with UCD mayors	No steps taken in this direction and the motions made by the PCE were rejected in all localities. Negative relations with the Citizens' Movement. Toledo is an exception to the above rule.
Leftist majority	19 provincial capitals with PSOE mayors	Participation regulations approved in 10 percent of the localities. Participation regulations under discussion with the Citizens' Movement in 50 percent of the localities. Motions and partial practices in 40 percent of the localities. Relations with the Citizens' Movement positive but tense.
Leftist majority	50 towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants with PCE mayors	Participation regulations or generalized practices in almost all localities. Free access for residents to the municipal council at all times. Positive but still partial and irregular experience. Generally positive relations with the Citizens Movement.

Plans for Municipal Action

Leftist opposition	16 provincial capitals with UCD mayors	None drafted, except in Avila and Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Leftist motions to this effect rejected. Government on a day-to-day basis without public commitment.
Leftist majority	19 provincial capitals with PSOE mayors	Municipal action plans for 4 years in 25 percent of the localities. Municipal action plans for 1980 related to the budget in 50 percent of the localities. There are no plans in 50 percent of the localities.
Leftist majority	50 towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants with PCE mayors	Municipal action plans for 4 years drafted in almost all localities on the general outline level. Municipal action plans for 1980 adapted to the budget in the majority of the localities.

Information

Leftist opposition	16 provincial capitals with UCD mayors	No steps to inform the population taken in 50 percent of the localities. Information bulletins in 20 percent. Radio programs in 12 percent. There is an information office in one locality. Information policy: none.
Leftist majority	19 provincial capitals with PSOE mayors	Municipal bulletins in 70 percent of the localities. Regular radio programs in 25 percent of the localities. Regular neighborhood meetings in 20 percent of the localities. Information policy: limited and inadequate.
Leftist majority	50 towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants with PCE mayors	Municipal bulletins in 90 percent of the localities. Regular radio programs in 5 percent of the localities. Public bulletin boards in 50 percent of the localities. Organized information campaigns: two or three per locality. Information policy: inadequate, although higher than other levels.



Province of Cordoba

Key:

- 1. PCE mayor
- 2. PCE in the majority
- 3. PCE in the opposition
- 4. Electoral groups supported by the PCE are included

Grado, Asturias, 12,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

All of the streets have been organized with the cooperation of the neighborhood residents. There are ordinances calling for participation in community projects. Whenever this kind of work has been demanded of the residents, the response has been positive.

San Fernando de Henares, Madrid, 12,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Buses have been arranged to take neighborhood residents to the social security clinic.

Sports schools are provided for children and adults (800 enrolled).

The municipal council finances 75 percent of the fees for 200 children at a farm school.

Coslada, Madrid, 34,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A special ticket for pensioners has been established, costing 5 pesetas instead of 25 for the trip to Madrid and return. A health control campaign was carried out in the secondary schools and vaccinations were administered with the participation of the AAVV.

Villablino, Leon, 14,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Public lighting has been provided to those neighborhoods which did not have it.

An access road from Ponferrada to Villablino has been built.

Montijo, Badajoz, 12,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor


A center for pensioners has been built where there was none before and the municipal band has been reorganized.

Fortuna, Murcia, 7,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Telephones are being installed in the districts.

Val d'Uxo, Castellon, 25,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A stove has been installed in each classroom of all the school centers which had no heat.



Province of Malaga

Key:

1. PCE mayor	3. PCE in the opposition
2. PCE in the majority	4. Electoral groups supported by the PCE are included

Santa Cruz de la Palma, Canary Islands, 15,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Five hundred housing units are being built.

Liria, Valencia, 12,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A local history is being published.

Camas, Seville, 24,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Eight preschool units have been built.

A vocational training center is under construction.

There is a middle-level educational institute for 900 students.

The MEC has been granted land for 320 EGB places and 3 special education units.

A "Women's Liberation Week" has been ordered.

Lora del Rio, Seville, 16,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

In winter water was only available 2 hours per day. The problem has been solved and now there is no water shortage.

Puerto de Santa Maria, Cadiz, 47,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

The Alberti museum has been established.

The centennial anniversary of the bull ring is being celebrated.

For the first time, the large warehouses are paying the establishment tax.

Macarena, Granada, 10,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

In April 1979, 60 percent of the streets were unpaved. In a year 75 percent have been asphalted.

Electric energy network: In April of 1979, only 55 percent of the town had electricity. This year the other 45 percent has been electrified.

Three special educational units for 60 children have been established. (Joint work has been done with the APAS and a psychologist.) After a mobilization campaign, participation by all the people was achieved.

The water network was expanded such as to prevent problems for the next 25 years.

Huelma, Jaen, 7,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A total of 4.6 million pesetas has been invested in irrigation, administered with the IRYDA.

The town was paved, in cooperation with the committee and the neighborhood residents, who provided the materials and directed the work. The municipal government provided the manpower.



Province of Alicante

Key:

1. PCE mayor	3. PCE in the opposition
2. PCE in the majority	4. Electoral groups supported by the PCE are included

Algeciras, Cadiz, 37,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Investments in the repair of municipal housing total 100 million.

Pensioners and retirees with income below the minimum wage were given a 50 percent reduction on transportation, water and garbage services.


Five thousand new EGB places were provided.

Two hundred new preschool places were provided.

A technical engineering school and a vocational training center have been built.

Los Palacios, Seville, 22,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

The water supply met only 25 percent of the need. In the first month of the administration a new well was dug, as was later another. Currently the supply is equal to 100 percent of the need for 100 years.



Province of Madrid

Key:

1. PCE mayor	3. PCE in the opposition
2. PCE in the majority	4. Electoral groups supported by the PCE are included

There were no urban transportation facilities. A line with two buses has been put into operation.


An ambulance has been purchased (no such service existed).

Negotiations have been completed for the building of 200 housing units, with construction beginning now.

Dos Hermanas, Seville, 46,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A fire department, which had been lacking, was established.

Four new schools were opened and double shift eliminated.



Key:

1. PCE mayor	3. PCE in the opposition
2. PCE in the majority	4. Electoral groups supported by the PCE are included

Bollullo del Condado, Huelva, 11,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Eight hundred new EGB places were created.

A pensioners' home was opened.


Construction was begun on 50 housing units.

Torredonjimeno, Jaen, 13,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A record library was established. (Two million pesetas were negotiated with the MEC.)

Castro del Rio, Cordoba, 10,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A park was developed, in which a theater for cultural performances was built.



Province of Oviedo

Key:

1. PCE mayor	3. PCE in the opposition
2. PCE in the majority	4. Electoral groups supported by the PCE are included

Montilla, Cordoba, 22,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A new market, for which regulations were drafted, was put into operation.

Following the appointment of an allocation commission, with the trade unions, neighborhood associations, etc, participating, 200 housing units were assigned.

Nerja, Malaga, 10,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A municipal art gallery was inaugurated.

New premises were provided for children's art.

La Algaba, Seville, 11,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A sewer located 200 meters from the town was eliminated.

La Rinconada, Seville, 16,000 Inhabitants, and Coria del Rio, PCE Mayor

These towns had chronic problems with flooding in some neighborhoods, which was eliminated with the completion of suitable canal projects.

Aguilar, Cordoba, 14,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A secondary school which can accommodate 1,200 students was opened, thus resolving the problem of inadequate enrollment capacity.

Corio del Rio, Seville, 21,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

The communal land was put to use. In 6 months, a profit of more than 1 million pesetas was obtained.

Alburquerque, Badajoz, 8,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Utilization of common land to provide work for the unemployed: clearing and improvement of the evergreen oak forest for the production of charcoal (100,000 arrobas, 8.8 million pesetas). Work provided for 200 of the unemployed in shifts of 20.

The municipal council provided 15 scholarships for the vocational training school.

Pinos Puente, Granada, 12,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

The building of 75 housing units was negotiated.

Cabezas de San Juan, Seville, 11,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

A youth house was put into operation.

Viso del Alcor, Seville, 12,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Fifty percent of the town, where there was no lighting, was electrified.

San Lucar de Barrameda, Cadiz, 44,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

Two secondary schools were put into operation to cover the enrollment demands. The municipal nursery was replanted. Plants were given as gifts to all residents with a small garden in front of their houses. Gardens were cared for and trees pruned.

Mairena del Alcor, Seville, 11,000 Inhabitants, PCE Mayor

The old public market was torn down and a new one built.

5157
CSO: 3110

'CUMHURIYET' LOOKS AT GOVERNMENT'S IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Sep 80 p 5

[Article by Mehmet Kemal]

[Text] The nation's fate is in the hands of the National Security Council. No one can deny this reality, because the 12 September operation itself is a reality. This being the case, we shall write within this reality. If we want to continue our writing, this is the indisputable fact.

Before anything else, we must wait and see what the 12 September regime itself intends to do. Even though General Evren explained in simple terms during his radio and television address and at his press conference what things were going to be done, we still must wait for them to be implemented.

First and foremost let us state that the people are thankful that public order has been restored. So long as public order is maintained and the people are safe from fear, this part of the success is great. But after this, will there be a settling of accounts with the wrongdoers of the old regime? We do not know. Since General Evren does not long for political responsibility and intends to wage a struggle against corruption, it will certainly come. The dossiers, with their accumulation of years of dust, will have to be brought down from the shelves. Those who practiced wrongdoing, corruption, influence peddling, and used politics for their own personal profit must be brought to account, because there is nothing about the 12 September regime that suggests the chicanery of democratic double-dealing. Whatever harm this nation has suffered has come about through the chicanery of democratic double-dealing.

The 12 September regime is Ataturkist.

Certain aspirations which Ataturk longed for, but was unable to find the time to achieve during his lifetime, must be made way for immediately. Chief among these is a land reorganization. This land reorganization must be given a legal form, whether it be land reform, agricultural reform, or state farms (Ataturk founded the Agricultural Combines), because this regime does not have to contend with the erstwhile landowning Emin Sazaks, and the Cavit Orals, who seek to block every land reform measure in the National Assembly, or with the large landowners' flunkey deputies who work to bury the measure in the committees. This reorganization will give great encouragement to the good peasants of the country, to the enlightened circles who campaign for the aspiration of land reorganization, and to the people.

This attitude will show that a regime is on the side of the great majority of the peasants, because this aspiration has been nurtured for many long years, and more.

Then, there is the matter of taxation.

Now is the time to close the door once and for all on the practice of taxing only the wage earners, the salaried workers, and the laborers. Everyone knows that in this country there is a class of people who obtain large profits and pay no taxes. If such a class does not exist, then where did so many wealthy people spring from in the past 30 to 40 years? Let us continue to deduct taxes from the paychecks of the wage earners, the salaried workers, and the laborers, but let us also not forget to deduct taxes a year later from the phony invoices and ledgers of this big wealthy class. Ataturk was in favor of a tax reorganization.

There is also the education problem.

Education has degenerated to the point where those who have money and can do the work are allowed to study; those who do not are flooding the streets. Equality of opportunity must be provided in education. In this way the pessimism of the younger generation will be eliminated; their hopes will shine, and young people will be saved from the streets.

I have more things to enumerate, but they are not as urgent as those I have already spoken of.

There is a danger awaiting the new regime. The bootlickers of former times are encircling it. This gang of bootlickers undermines every new regime that comes in with good intentions. Before you realize it, all of these well-intentioned undertakings, instead of growing tall like a noble tree, have turned into a scrawny seedling. Are not the troublemakers of yesterday going to be the troublemakers of today? This gang that says to every regime, 'Praise God that you have come', is now respectfully lining up in front of this regime as well. And so? Well, it will be a shame if it turns out to be the same old story!

The new regime is up to its neck in work. No one has the right to create difficulties for the regime. Besides, those who would like to create difficulties will not be able to do so, anyway. The thing is that everyone wants to interpret and shape the new regime to his own end. The fact is that the new regime has begun its work. It must not become the regime of this person, or that person, but must remain its own regime and make no concessions to anyone on this.

A friend of mine put it this way: "The greatest benefit of this regime is that it has prevented the 450 people in the National Assembly and the almost 200 people in the Senate, all of them do-nothings, from receiving their salaries. It has stanchled this flow of money from the national pocketbook. Even if this regime does nothing else, this much should suffice."

It will require someone versed in the art of computation to calculate how much the dissolved parliament cost this nation. With each member receiving 60,000 Turkish Liras per month,...

The new regime must continue on its present course, providing the proof that it is on the side of the majority and that a small, moneyed minority is exploiting

this country. If the interests of a small minority again win out, and the misery of the majority is not assuaged, then this opportunity will have been for naught.

Both the National Assembly and the government are in the hands of the National Security Council. If this power continues to move in the direction of the interests of the great majority of the people, unimpeded, (because there is no obstacle facing it), then the gates will open to the aspiration of becoming a modern society. Ataturk's aspiration was for us to become a modern society, but the interests of the vote-seeking politicians conflicted with this. Since the National Security Council is not concerned about votes, it will be easy for it to elicit the approval and love of the great majority.

It would be a mistake to liken the new regime to anything in our past experience. At this period of history, at a time when our country is in this crisis, the new regime has emerged. It must apply its own rules.

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CSO: 4907

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OPENED ON FORMER DEPUTIES

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 20 Sep 80 pp 1, 11

[Text] ANKARA, (HURRIYET)--An investigation has been started concerning former deputies who, as observed by State President, General Staff Chief, and National Security Council Chairman Kenan Evren in his press conference, "could not be tried for any crimes they committed owing to the fact that they were continually reelected." Since the 134 deputies who could not be investigated or tried for any crime they committed owing to an unbroken succession of electoral victories can no longer have the privilege of political immunity, it is now possible for them to be tried. In the coming days the former deputies, whose old dossiers are being handled by various prosecutors, will be arraigned before a judge.

It is now known that "former crimes" are the reason for the detention of some of the deputies. Since the political immunity has now been lifted for deputies who had previously committed various crimes but were not prosecuted for them because of their political immunity, these deputies are being detained for prosecution of their former crimes.

According to available figures, the dossiers of 134 deputies had formerly been forwarded to judicial authorities with the intention of eventual prosecution, but owing to political immunity, the dossiers were subsequently set aside to be taken up at the end of the term. Some of the 223 criminal dossiers of the 134 deputies concern election or traffic offenses which entail fines or light penalties. Sources say that deputies who committed these kinds of crimes may be released after their initial interrogation, but that deputies who committed a crime carrying a heavy penalty and consequently requiring imprisonment may be placed under arrest.

It is reported that the criminal dossiers will be taken up very soon, and that a court, competent to examine each particular offense, will render a decision as to whether the deputies will be released or not.

The criminal accusations contained in the dossiers "requesting the lifting of the existing political immunity" of the former deputies are quite varied. In general, among these accusations, the majority of which have to do with election offenses, one finds incitement to separatism, crime against the constitution, smuggling, traffic offenses, and assault and battery.

The names of the former deputies, and the numbers of criminal dossiers outstanding for each of them, which have been included within the 22 dossiers concerned with the lifting of political immunity are as follows:

Necmettin Erbakan	NSP	12
Bulent Ecevit	RPP	8
Alparslan Turkes	NAP	8
Suleyman Demirel	JP	3
Cemalettin Inkaya	JP	2
Nevzat Kosoglu	NAP	2
Gungor Hun	JP	2
Nurettin Yilmaz	Independent	5
Turan Kocal	NAP	5
Mehmet Irmak	NAP	5
Ahmet Turk	RPP	5
Gunduz Onat	RPP	4
Sadi Somuncuoglu	NAP	4
Adem Ali Sarioglu	JP	4
Suleyman Genc	RPP	3
Ahmet Buldanli	JP	3
Oguz Sogutlu	RPP	3
Ertugrul Yolsal	RPP	3
Temel Ates	RPP	3
Halil Akgun	JP	3
Yuksel Cakmur	RPP	3
Muhyettin Mutlu	NSP	2
Ahmet Cakmak	JP	2
Yilmaz Alparslan	RPP	2
Nazim Bas	JP	2
Omer Barutcu	JP	2
Sadullah Usumi	RPP	2
Ihsan Ataov	JP	2
Y. Cemal Bor	RPP	2
Galip Cetin	RPP	2
Celal Dogan	RPP	2
Yusuf Ozbas	NAP	2
Mehmet Dogan	JP	2
Nizamettin Coban	RPP	2
Omer Ihsan Pakoz	RPP	2
M. Tahir Sasmaz	NAP	2
Abdulkadir Kaya	JP	2
Hasan Korkut	RPP	2
Azimet Koyluoglu	RPP	2
Yasar Gocmen	NSP	2

Following are the names and parties of the former deputies concerning whom there is only one dossier:

RPP: Deniz Baykal, Ali Kurt, Metin Tuzun, Teoman Koprululer, Akin Simav, Nurettin Narsu, Semih Eryildiz, Nuri Bozyel, Kemal Tabak, Muammer Aksoy, Etem Eken, Muslihittin Yilmaz Mete, Adnan Keskin, M. Kazim Ozeke, Erkin Topkaya, Rahmi Kumas, Mustafa Senturk, M. Kemal Cilesiz, Celal Paydas, M. Gungor Erdinc, Burhan Ecemis, Veli Zeren, Erol Saracoglu, Ferhat Arslantas, Mehmet Yuceler, Gani Asik, Zeki Eroglu, Selahattin Ocal, Ismail Ozen, Kenan Akman, Lutfu Dogan, H. Namik Tekin, M. Iskan Azizoglu.

JP: I. Hakkı Yıldırım, Esat Kiratlioglu, Ali Yilmaz, H. Ali Dagli, Hugnu Yilmaz, Hamdi Magden, Hasan Ekinci, Koksal Toptan, Oguz Aygun, Huseyin Ozalp, I. Ethem Boz,

Nihan Ilgun, A. Nihat Karol, Kemal Dogan, Ali Ak, Zeki Celiker, Muhammed Kelleci, Tevfik Koraltan, Fikri Pehlivanli, Hidayet Celebi, Ahmet Cimbek, Avni Kavurmaci, Mehmet Catalbas, M. Atilla Ocak, M. Kemal Aykurt, Kemal Sensoy, M. Sait Resa, E. Naci Altunay, Erol Yesilpinar, Ibrahim Topuz, Orhan Eren, Mustafa Basoglu, Kemal Cevher, Kasim Onadim, Mustafa Yilankiran, Halil Karaatli, Mehmet Aksoy, Avni Gursoy, Mufit Bayraktar, Ali Naili Erdem, Rasim Kucukel, Hasan Gursoy, M. Kemal Erkovan, Sinasi Osma, Selahattin Acar, Bekir Adibelli.

NSP: Tahir Buyukkorukcu, Abdullah Tomba, Sener Battal, Abdulkadir Timuragaoglu, Temel Karamullaoglu, Huseyin Erdal.

NAP: Cengiz Gokcek, Ali Gurbuz.

RPP: Turhan Feyzioglu.

UP: Ali Haydar Veziroglu.

NP: Abdulkerim Dogru.

NAP Member Surmen Taken into Custody on Cyprus

In connection with taking the necessary measures to prevent the escape to Cyprus of rightist and leftist terrorists involved in anarchist activities in Turkey, Suleyman Surmen, a member of the NAP's High Disciplinary Council, was apprehended and placed under guard.

No official announcement was made concerning Suleyman Surmen, who was taken from the Anadol Hotel in Kyrenia by security teams acting on a tip.

Wives and Children Visit Former Deputies

On the other hand, the wives and children of the detained former deputies were permitted to visit them yesterday at the Ankara Military Command Headquarters.

The visitation period of the former deputies, who are being detained at the "Army Language and Intelligence School," located in the Ankara Military Command Headquarters garrison, began in the morning and continued into the evening, with groups of visitors being admitted. The visitors came to the office of the commandant of the guard of the Ankara Military Command Headquarters, located at the Bahcelievler terminus, and, after handing over their identity cards received admittance cards. The former deputies were only permitted to visit with their wives, children, mothers, and fathers.

After boarding buses at the main gate, the visitors were taken within the garrison to the Army language and Intelligence School. The visits took place in the meeting room under the school. In a conversation we had with the wife of the detained former RPP deputy for Ankara, Teoman Koprululer, following her visit with him, she said, "They are comfortable. They are permitted whatever they want, with the exception of cameras and drugs. Teoman looked well to me. They say that next week the visit will be much easier."

Ankara Martial Law Command officials said that the visits to the former deputies were carried out in a haphazard manner this week. "After next week it will be possible to have orderly visits, and the number of visits will be increased," they said.

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TERRORIST CONDEMNED TO DEATH IN ADANA

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 20 Sep 80 p 7

[Text] ADANA, Special--The case which arose last Sunday in Adana, and which concerns the killing of armored forces Senior Captain A. Bulent Angin and the murder of State Monopoly worker Erdogan Polat, was tried before the Martial Law First Military Court under the "witnessed crime" provisions. One of the defendants, Serdar Soyergin, was sentenced to death as well as to 10 years imprisonment with hard labor, while another defendant, Ayhan Cansun, was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment with hard labor.

Because it was determined that armored forces Senior Captain A. Bulent Angin was killed by the defendant identified as Suleyman Aydemir, who remains at large, the dossier concerned with this incident was "separated" from the case.

Present on the Martial Law First Court Council during the trial which began yesterday at 0900 hours in hearing room number 3 at army corps headquarters were court-martial presiding judge Lieutenant Colonel Metin Karabay, together with artillery Major Yilmaz Kanmaz and court-martial judge Captain Metin Sever as members, and court-martial judge Captain Muzmer Yuce as judge advocate, of the Court Council.

Following Judge Advocate Muzmer Yuce's reading of the formal charge, the defendants gave their testimony.

Defendant Serdar Soyergin, on trial for the murder of State Monopoly worker Erdogan Polat and the attempted murder of a policeman on duty, gave the following testimony in his defense. He stated that he himself "was connected with the organization known as the Turkish Peoples Liberation Party-Front (TPLP-F), the Swift Ones, whereas the murdered Erdogan Polat was a member of the outlawed organization known as the Progressive Youth Association (PYA), and that for a year there was hostility between them and he was beaten up twice." He said that he had previously worked at Cukobirlik where "Erdogan Polat's friends conspired to force them not to pay his wages, and that on the day of the incident Polat and 4 of his friends chased after him, and only by running was he able to save his life." Later that day he returned with his two friends identified as Ayhan Cansun and Suleyman Aydemir.

Defendant Serdar Soyergin, in summary, said the following:

"The murdered Erdogan Polat and his friends chased after me. If I had not killed them, they would have killed me. We still had that hostility between us. If not today, then they were going to kill me tomorrow. That is why I killed them. I had

a falling-out with the murdered Erdogan Polat over a splinter group clash. As I stated at my interrogation, he beat me up twice. That is why I killed Erdogan that day. I do not bear a grudge. For a year I have been in sympathy with the Swift Ones organization. The bases of my philosophy is what I read in some books about imperialism. Our organization does not possess outlawed books. I could not get paid at the factory. I could not get my severance pay. However, the PYA members there were receiving their payments. Simply because I was a Swift One they were not paying me. That is why I became angry at the PYA members. Erdogan, whom I killed, was also a PYA member."

Defendant Ayhan Cansun, on trial for the crime of being an accessory to the planning and execution of a homicide, gave the following testimony in his defense. He said that he is "sympathetic to the left and that he borrowed money at certain intervals from defendant Serdar Soyergin, but that he had no connection with the Swift Ones. He added that he was a close friend of Erdogan Polat, and that if he had known that Polat was going to be murdered, he would not have gone." In summary he said, "I did not murder Erdogan and I did not draw a weapon on any of the officials. If I had known that such a thing would happen, I would not have gone. I know Serdar as a leftist. I have no idea about what ideology he has adopted. I am innocent."

The Judge Advocate, in his statement of the particulars of the case, which was read later during the trial, asked that defendant Serdar Soyergin be sentenced to death under article 450/4 of the Turkish Penal Code, and to life imprisonment with hard labor under article 449/2, "for the murder of State Monopoly worker Erdogan Polat and the attempted murder of security guard Ismet Kara." As for defendant Ayhan Cansun, the Judge Advocate asked that "he be sentenced to death under article 450/4 of the Turkish Penal Code for the crime of being an accessory to the planning and execution of a homicide."

In the court's decision, which was read later by the Court Council after a brief recess, defendant Serdar Soyergin was sentenced to death under article 450/4 of the Turkish Penal Code for the murder of State Monopoly worker Erdogan Polat, and to life imprisonment with hard labor under article 449/2 for the attempted murder of the guard on duty. Since the second offense was in the nature of an "incomplete" crime, the sentence was changed to 10 years imprisonment with hard labor.

Defendant Ayhan Cansun was first sentenced to death under article 450/4 of the Turkish Penal Code, and then his sentence was changed to 10 years imprisonment with hard labor under article 65/3 of the Turkish Penal Code.

The Court Council also sentenced each defendant to an additional 1 year in prison and a 3,000 Lira fine for violation of law number 6136, and to legal restriction and lifetime prohibition from public services for the duration of the sentences.

During the trial, testimony was heard from 3 guards, an assistant police superintendent, a taxi driver, and a cafe owner, all of whom apprehended the defendants at the scene of the crime, as well as from the widow of murdered worker Erdogan Polat.

Erdogan Polat's widow, Naciye Polat, whose testimony was heard in accordance with a provisional decision rendered by the Court during the trial, said, "Defendant Ayhan Cansun lived in our neighborhood and I knew him. My husband worked at the

State Monopoly cigarette factory. He was a worker and a union member. He used to say that he was afraid. He had a premonition that he would be murdered, but he never told me by whom he would be murdered. Anyhow, Ayhan Cansun used to pass by in front of our house. It was said that he had an affair with a neighborhood girl. My husband committed no crime. He was merely inclined toward the left."

In Istanbul

The Istanbul Martial Law Military Court yesterday, 21 January [sic] 1980, sentenced Turgay Nazari to 16 years and 8 months imprisonment for the armed robbery of 14,000 Liras from grocer Mustafa Sahin, in Sehremini. The Court also sentenced the defendant to 1 year and 8 months imprisonment for possession of a counterfeit identity card and for carrying a weapon.

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